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Beware of saying … that sometimes different cities follow one another on the same 
site and under the same name, born and dying without knowing one another, without 
communication amongst themselves. At times even the names of the inhabitants 
remain the same, and their voices’ accents and also the features of their faces; but the 
gods who live beneath names and above places have gone off without a word and 
outsiders have settled in their place.  
 






This thesis offers a detailed examination of the ideas of the city and of citizenship in the 
writings of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Augustine in their historical contexts. Aristotle is 
considered as a critic of Plato and Augustine of Cicero, with Cicero considered as poised 
between Plato and the Stoic legacy. The aim of this examination is to test certain still 
dominant assumptions about ancient citizenship, defined as active participation in 
government. These assumptions are that ancient citizenship was primarily political, secular, 
adult and male; that it is best articulated by Aristotle; that it is compromised by Rome in 
practice and by Cicero in theory and finally abandoned by Augustine through a Christian 
denigration of the importance of political life in time. Cicero and Augustine are rather 
thought to inaugurate an alternative modern idea of citizenship as the non-participatory 
receiving of rights and protection from the sovereign state. I conclude instead that ancient 
citizenship was primarily by birth, was first to do with religious rather than political 
participation and included women and children. Aristotle’s purely political picture of civic 
origins and of citizenship is therefore misleading. Moreover, Aristotle’s views on citizenship 
turn out to be contradictory and incoherent, just because he has lost the primary religious 
referent. Individual virtue oriented ultimately towards the eternal therefore comes into 
conflict with collective justice. By contrast, Plato’s theory of metaphysical participation is 
exactly suited to conceiving political participation and retaining a continuum of citizenship 
across the human ages and classes. Cicero is caught between this Platonic vision and a Stoic, 
proto-liberal one, and the same goes for Rome itself. Its aspects of empire and monarchy can 
be seen as according with Platonic mixed constitution and universalising ambition. 
Augustine, by virtue of his Christian outlook, perfects a Platonic version of Rome, just as his 
Trinitarian grounding of participation, including political participation, perfects the Platonic 
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Introduction: The City and Citizenship in Question  
 
We can identify a ‘citizenship of the ancients’ and a ‘citizenship of the ‘moderns’. The 
former was defined in terms of the right to hold public office in the city and to participate in 
its decision-making. The latter was defined in terms of legally guaranteed private rights and 
benefits conferred by ‘the state’, sometimes combined with a minimal right of political 
participation, which is the right to vote.1 The former typically involved an active, ancient, 
‘positive’ liberty, both of the city and the citizen, the latter a modern, passive, ‘negative’ 
liberty of free choice in private life, underwritten by a state indifferent as to the content of 
these choices.2  
In addition, it was assumed in the ancient city that governing involved a continuous education 
of its citizens into virtuous flourishing (however defined): ‘Government is the nurture of 
man’, as Socrates was reported as saying (Menexenus 238c). By contrast, the modern state 
only educates its citizens in their youth as a preparation for ‘real’ life and for their own 
individual benefit, or the pragmatic well-being of the state as a whole.3  
In between the ancient city and the modern state in the Western world lay the era of the 
Roman Empire and then of the ‘Middle Ages’. What happened to citizenship during those 
two periods remains contested. But it can certainly be said that the modern notions of both 
the central sovereign state and of passive citizenship were formulated in considerable part by 
thinkers like Jean Bodin and Hugo Grotius, who thought they were recovering the 
assumptions of ancient Roman law.4  
There remains to this day a reasonable scholarly consensus as to the uniqueness of the ancient 
Mediterranean city state. Max Weber argued that, while ‘Asiatic’ cities displayed in varying 
degrees the same characteristic attributes of fortification, a market centre, an independent 
court, political association and at least partial autonomy as found in the West, they lacked the 
crucial linkage of the freedom of the city with the freedom of its citizen inhabitants, who 
enjoyed both private liberty and the collective free power to shape their own political destiny. 
 
1 Michael Walzer, ‘Citizenship’, in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, ed. Terence Ball et al 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 211-19.  
2 Benjamin Constant, ‘The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns’, in Political Writings, 
trans. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 309-28.  
3 Susan D. Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 41-6.  




Citizenship for free men was assured at once by a slave economy and by the prevention of 
debt-accumulation that would have resulted in dispossession and the emergence of a 
proletariat. The latter was much enabled by continuous military aggression and the 
distribution of conquered lands and other spoils of war. In consequence, the band of citizens 
was essentially a ‘military guild’, little concerned with economic trade, and the basis of 
democratisation was martial in character.5   
Weber also argued that the break with kinship ties was stronger in the West than in the East: 
following Fustel de Coulanges, he considered that the Mediterranean city began when a civic 
ritual meal displaced a familial one. 
This can suggest the question, however imponderable, of which came first, the city or the 
citizen. Emile Benveniste noted that, etymologically, polites derives from polis, whereas 
civitas derives from cives.6 This contrast could be seen as concurring with the already present 
relatively strong Roman stress on citizenship as a legal status providing certain private rights 
and privileges, more than as a political status marking an active involvement in government, 
as evidenced by the concern of Roman law, classically expressed by the jurist Gaius, with 
‘things’, alongside the other two primary categories of ‘persons’ and ‘actions’. Or it could 
equally indicate that for the Romans there was no city without a collectively agreed sharing 
between individuals, families and tribes, such that the strong concern with things can be 
alternatively read, not as necessarily pointing towards ‘possessive individualism’ (as J.G.A. 
Pocock suggests), but as the inclusion of a wider material, economic and even cosmic scope 
within the scope of citizen-relations and citizen mediation.7  
In the case of Greece, the evidence would seem to suggest that the city preceded citizenship, 
with the first words for ‘citizens’ prior to the later usage of politai, implying both that 
citizenship was first defined by birth (ethnika) and that it was something held collectively 
(astoi).8 This priority of the city over its citizens could equally give rise to a democratic sense 
of shared government and to an autocratic sense of the priority of the city over any 
individual.  
 
5 Max Weber, The City, trans. Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 54-5, 
91-7; ‘Citizenship in Ancient and Medieval Cities’ in The Citizenship Debates: A Reader, ed. Gershon Shafer 
(Minneapolis MS Minnesota UP, 1998), 43-9. 
6 See Alain Duplouy, ‘Pathways to Archaic Citizenship’ in Defining Citizenship in Ancient Greece, eds. Alan 
Duplouy and Roger Brock (Cambridge: CUP, 2018), 2. 
7 J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times’, in Shafer (ed.), The Citizenship Debates, 31-
41.  




With regard both to the city and to citizenship, we can identify a series of twelve further 
commonly held opinions that may, nonetheless, be more subject to debate: 
 
1. That citizenship was primarily a political matter of reciprocal office-sharing, as 
defined by Aristotle. 
2. That the polis and government by citizen-participation was only fully possible in the 
peculiar ancient Mediterranean circumstances of geographically separated small 
communities, dependent upon a slave economy. 
3. That such a mode of government was primarily democratic, albeit amongst a free 
elite.  
4. That this same self-government by citizens was essentially an immanent and secular 
affair, for which religion was incidental. 
5. That since the crucial mark of the city was held to be citizen participation, the latter 
did not always denote any shared ethical values. Republican politics was not 
necessarily a politics of virtue.   
6. That the Roman empire involved a considerable abandonment of the ancient civic 
ideal, both because of its scale and its weaker commitment to democracy. 
7. That in the medieval era, both Byzantine and Latin, dominated by religion, republican 
citizenship lapsed, apart from a few independent cities, mainly situated in Italy.  
8. That Christianity inherently favours the political ‘subject’ over the participating 
‘citizen’, since it no longer views political life in this world as being of ultimate value. 
9. That, against all the foregoing background, Aristotle’s views are regarded as 
normative. He is seen as an advocate of qualified democracy and even sometimes as a 
liberal.9 
10. That conversely, Plato is not seen as an advocate of citizen self-rule, but of autocracy. 
He is also thought to have inherited Socrates’ supposed rejection of politics in favour 
of philosophy.  
11. That Cicero, articulating a Roman perspective, is to be regarded as in many ways a 
proto-liberal, pointing towards the ‘citizenship of the moderns’.  
12. That this is to be regarded as still truer of Augustine, who already, despite the later 
medieval developments, anticipated a modern realism and liberalism. He did so both 
 
9 See, for example, Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 




by augmenting the Platonic priority of the other-worldly, and by removing all pagan 
trappings from politics. They now became a residual, secular affair, devoted to 
pragmatic compromise, preventing the worst evils and guaranteeing negative liberties.  
 
The aim of the following thesis is to try to test the truth of these twelve assumptions. It will 
conclude that they should in some cases be rejected, and in others considerably modified.  
There are various general reasons for undertaking this re-consideration. They can be listed as: 
 
(a) A suspicion that our entire picture of ancient politics is still shaped by a projection 
backwards of early modern perspectives and exigencies. Above all, in the wake of the 
wars of religion, the ancient world was seen as a repository of secular values, with its 
pervasively pagan religiosity ignored. 
(b) Similarly, and already with Machiavelli, early modernity was attracted by a value-
neutral politics. Again, this may have been to ignore a stronger link of virtue to 
citizenship in antiquity - although most of the earlier Renaissance Humanists, before 
the sixteenth century, in fact did not ignore this and took the opposite tack to that of 
Machiavelli.10 
(c) Reversing these trends, scholarship today tends to show that both Rome and Greece 
were suffused with religion and that, for example, divination played as much part as 
deliberation in the making of political decisions. Similarly, common citizenship was 
marked by certain shared artistic styles and customs.11 Even democracy was born 
under religious auspices when ‘the god himself took the place of the king’.12 
(d) The same scholarship tends to show that the small and intimate character of ancient 
cities has been exaggerated: they had considerable hinterlands and colonial offshoots, 
and yet, as in the case of Rome herself, strong elements of republican self-government 
were still maintained.13  
 
10 James Hankins, Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 
2019). 
11 Duplouy, ‘Pathways’, 36-47.  
12 The remark is by Victor Ehrenberg, cited in François de Polignac, Cults, Territory and the Origins of the 
Greek City-State, trans. Janet Lloyd (Chicago IL: Chicago UP, 1995), 2.n.2. 




(e) Much emerging evidence suggests that Aristotle’s account of citizenship was atypical 
and that political citizenship was secondary to citizenship by birth and to ritual and 
religious participation, that included women as well as men.  
(f) The ‘proto-modern’ understanding of the Roman imperium often does not fit with 
what we now know about its rather more archaic and more religious character 
compared with Greece. 
(g) Since the Middle Ages did not divide familial, social and economic relationships from 
political ones, we cannot so readily assume that ‘feudal’ reciprocity did not involve 
some equivalent to exercises of citizenship. Moreover, the freedom offered to serfs in 
medieval cities and the absence of slaves, extended the priority of freedom and so the 
remit of citizenship.14 
(h) Despite crucial recent qualifications, the ancient city was relatively more a ‘consumer 
city’ than was the medieval town, which involved more systematic artisanry and 
trade. Insofar as politics was a restricted ‘spectacle’, large areas of the economy and 
the administration, dependent upon slave labour,  did not involve so much citizen 
participation. Conversely, the greater ‘corporate’ structure of Rome and then still 
more of medieval Christendom, with its greater fluidity between the familial, craft, 
trading, religious and political aspects of life, could actually be seen as having 
extended ‘citizen’ active involvement. 
(i) The philosophical distance of Aristotle from Plato has been exaggerated. Aristotle 
also favoured an aristocratic reform of Athenian democracy. Meanwhile, the whole of 
Plato’s corpus, as regards his political theory, has been insufficiently explored. It is 
still too easily assumed that the Republic is normative.  
(j) The complexity of Roman authors, especially of Cicero, has been overlooked: their 
problematic relationship to Greece, the tension between Stoicism and Platonism, and 
the degree of their preparedness to criticise the Roman legacy itself.  
(k) Augustine has usually been read in terms of later Christian history and from a 
Christian theological viewpoint. He has been too little read as a still Roman thinker, 
sustaining, if also drastically modifying, specifically Roman perspectives.  
 
 
14 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge MS: 




All these numbered and lettered points concern various qualifications of anachronistic 
perspectives on the ancient city and ancient citizenship. At the same time, it would be equally 
false to impose ideological uniformity on Greece and Rome, and there remain ways in which 
they embodied tensions which do to some degree foreshadow political tensions of our own 
day. The human political predicament is at once temporally specific and yet perennial.  
Thus, there were indeed identifiably ‘proto-liberal’ aspects to Rome and to Cicero. Equally, 
ancient Athens witnessed a perpetual argument as to the nature of the city and of citizenship. 
In the case of both cities (though more particularly Rome), democracy could tend to drift in a 
‘populist’ direction of mass rule, or the tyranny of a majority. But in fact, in the case of 
Athens, even Solon, who admitted all citizens to the governing body or ecclesia, and 
restricted the tyranny of debt, assumed an aristocratic dominance of the political process.15 
Moreover, measures were taken to ensure that democracy did not override inherited laws, nor 
the security of private property, combined with a reciprocal guarantee of public payment for 
political service by poorer citizens.16 And even if the city, via its slave economy and military 
raids, was mostly self-sufficient and non-exporting, many artisans and merchants sought  to 
extend an ‘aristocratic’ and citizen participation also in the productive and trading aspects of 
civic life, besides their political pertinence and involvement - such that Xenophon, in his later 
works, more unambiguously included artisans as citizens than did Aristotle17 Yet these were 
only pressures exerted within a city normatively defined by a certain degree of detached show 
and performance: by  competition (agon), display (epideixis), posture (schema) and 
spectating (theoria).18  
Above all, both democracy and virtue remained in contestation within antiquity. To a degree, 
everyone accepted a degree of mixed constitution, or the blending of the rule of the one, the 
few and the many. But the emphasis could drastically differ. Democracy was more promoted 
by Pericles and his ally, the sophist Protagoras. In the former’s Funeral Ode, it is said that the 
democratic voice of the many prevails and yet that Athens is ready to recognise the talents of 
 
15 Vincent Farenga, Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 262-345, 541; Pauline Ismard, 
‘Citizenship in Athens from Solon to Cleisthenes’, in Duplouy and Brock, Defining Citizenship, 145-59.  
16 Ober, Demopolis, 14-17, 21, 30-1. 
17 Saber Mansouri, La démocratie athénniene, une affaire d’oisifs? Travail et participation politique au IVe 
siècle avant J-C (Brussels: André Versailles, 2010), 225-31; Duplouy, 3, 17-32; Alain Bresson, The Making of 
the Ancient Greek Economy (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 2016); Carmine Ampolo, ‘Il sistemo della “polis”: 
Elemenit constitutive e origine della città greca’, in I Greci. Stoira, arte, cultura, II. Una storia Greca I. 
Formazione, ed. Salvatore Settis (Turin: Einaudi,1996), 297-342.  
18 Farenga, Citizenship and Self, 5; Simon Goldhill and Robin Osborne (eds), Performance Culture and 




the few.19 Additionally, it is stressed that public life is more sacred for the Athenians, but that 
they are to an extent left free to live their private lives as they will. A certain foreshadowing 
of later early modern republicanism (as with James Harrington) is after all evident here. For 
Pericles comes across as ‘communitarian’ as regards public life, but ‘liberal’ as regards 
private.20  
However, Socrates, in the dialogue Menexenus, which may or may not be by Plato, 
mischievously claims that he provides here, in a rival funeral speech, the real views of 
Aspasia, Pericles’ rhetorician mistress, whom he also claims really wrote Pericles’ speech. 
And Socrates (or the real Aspasia) reverses Pericles’ emphasis:  Athens is primarily an 
aristocracy and yet the few best rule with the complete consent of the many, while citizens 
are all free and equal (Menexenus 238c-e). The key to this reversal is the greater insistence 
upon government by the virtuous, and as Socrates’ Apology and the Platonic dialogue Crito 
make clear, virtue for Socrates now means a more absolute, divinely given and oracular sense 
of the good and of justice (Apology, 31b-32e, 37e-38a; Crito, 48b, 49d). Socrates has refused 
to participate in the political process, not because he now pits philosophy against citizenship 
(as Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss thought),21 but because he has re-invented a different 
kind of philosophic citizenship based upon the ‘examined’ life (Apology, 38a). Since 
democracy, by contrast, renders political activism an absolute, it set up a schizophrenic divide 
between public involvement and personal integrity. Socrates is suggesting that this divide 
need not exist, precisely if the city is pursuing justice. Our political sharing depends upon our 
sharing in the divine, else the former will collapse into domination and sophistic 
manipulation - as Plato will argue in detail. By the same token, our private behaviour cannot 
be so much a matter of indifference to the city as Pericles seemed to suppose. And while 
Socrates emphasises more strongly the vertical links of the city, he also more strongly 
stresses its horizontal origins in time and our shared birth from the city who is our more 
primary parent (Menexenus 237d-238b; Crito, 51a-c). 
Socrates, in effect, proposed a new way to harmonise individual character and public role, to 
bring together given physis with conventional nomos. Other thinkers, however, like Antiphon 
and Alcibiades, insisted upon the incompatibility of the former with the latter.22 Beyond the 
 
19 Pericles, ‘Funeral Oration’, trans. Susan Collins and Denis Stauffer in Empire and the Ends of Politics: 
Plato’s Menexenus and Pericles’ Funeral Oration (New York: Focus, 1999). 
20 Farenga, Citizenship and Self, 429-38, 475-6, 536-48.  
21 See Dana Villa, Socratic Citizenship (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 2001), 246-309.  




Periclean compromise they can be perceived as pushing in directions that were either 
libertarian or cynically ‘realist’.  
Given these more perennial tensions, my thesis has a normative as well as historical aspect: I 
am asking whether it is true that religion and virtue are either irrelevant to citizenship or tend 
to contaminate it, or rather the reverse; whether, in fact, there can be no true political 
participation without a metaphysical participation in the transcendent Good.  
In order to conduct this double inquiry, historical and normative, I shall mainly focus upon 
ancient texts of political theory but will try to read them in their historical contexts, both with 
respect to social structures and to historical events.  
The rationale behind my choice of texts lies in the subsequent reading of earlier canonical 
authors by later ones. More specifically, I begin with Plato’s Republic and Laws, and then 
read Aristotle’s Politics as an intended critique of both of them. Then I turn to Cicero’s 
deliberate Roman imitations of these texts under the same titles, before concluding with 
Augustine’s Civitas Dei which is to some degree, in turn, a critique of Cicero. However, in 
the case of Rome I supplement this with some consideration of other relevant Roman authors: 
specifically, Polybius, Virgil and Livy. The former casts important light upon Cicero and the 
latter two upon Augustine.  
Literary reviews would be too complex to isolate and are mostly embedded within the texts. 
But in the case of Greek citizenship in general there is a review of the literature at the 
beginning of Chapter One, and in the case of Roman citizenship in general, a review of the 
literature at the beginning of Chapter Four.  
Chapter One, opening Part One of the dissertation on Athens, reconsiders Plato’s Republic 
and suggests the Kallipolis is at once an ideal ‘city of the One’, and yet too sheerly 
mathematical, in a Pythagorean sense. It is neither intended to be practicable, nor even 
unambiguously utopian. 
Chapter Two argues that the city of Magnesia in Plato’s Laws is the ‘City of the Dyad’ that 
can be related to Plato’s later philosophy of the super-Forms of the One, the Dyad and their 
intermixture. It is both more realistic and paradoxically more ideal than the purely 
philosophical city of Kallipolis. Equivalently, participation in the Forms is now more widely 
dispersed and participation in the city has become more possible for all ages and both 




Chapter Three, while stressing several continuities of Aristotle with Plato, also seeks to show 
that he is a less satisfactory theorist of citizenship than the Plato of the Laws. This is because 
he suppresses the religious dimension of citizenship and by de-emphasising vertical 
participation in the divine, in favour of a rather more formal legal regulation, threatens also to 
weaken horizontal participation amongst citizens. This is seen in the way in which 
contemplation of the divine now tends to remove one from politics, while noble virtue and 
democracy become somewhat incompatible with each other, since the more ritual, erotic and 
corporeal modes of participation in the Good have been weakened. This sets up a tension 
between the highest virtue as such and the virtue of distributive justice, such that citizenship 
is potentially decoupled from virtue and for that reason threatened even as citizenship - since 
Aristotle continues, like Plato to think that the very possibility of self-rule in soul or city 
depends upon being rationally virtuous.  
Chapter Four, opening Part Two on Rome concerns Cicero understood against the 
background of the considerable contrasts between Rome and Greece.  Rome was, from the 
outset, an alliance of different ethnic groups under a shared cultus. This set up a complex 
three-way tension between a greater priority, compared with Greece, of semi-tribal origins, 
an appeal to something numinous as binding different familial groups together and a resort to 
the merely contractual between competing families and individuals.  
At the same time, the much greater mixture of family and political, private and public life in 
Rome, changed the meaning of citizenship in ways that could, on the one hand, tend to the 
more private, but could also, on the other, involve a more variegated sense of the public and 
the political.  
Cicero is marked first of all, the three-way Roman tension. The historical and ancestral stress 
could translate into a Stoic cosmic, immanence, the sense of a numinous vinculum into one of 
participation in Platonic transcendence, and the emerging contractualism into a proto-
liberalism and individualism, often blended with the Stoic affirmation of a vague ethical 
cosmopolis and of natural law over against the self-sufficient individual.  
But instead of reading Cicero as diluting Aristotle’s civic communitarianism, I see him rather 
as oscillating between extremes:  between a greater communitarianism of a Platonic kind 
(given my diagnosis of a semi-Stoic split between public praxis and private theoria already in 




Cicero, along with Polybius also theoretically manifests the second two-way Roman tension 
between citizenship as more apolitically private and citizenship as more diversely exercised 
at several different levels and in several different spheres: familial, economic, ritual, legal and 
confraternal, besides political in the Greek sense. I show how this corporatist possibility 
draws on an alternative set of Stoic possibilities, besides upon Platonism, anticipating 
medieval developments.  
The final two chapters on Augustine seek to show first, how he inherits and consummates 
Roman self-critique and second how he consummates a Platonic vision of civic participation 
as also metaphysical participation.  
Chapter Five demonstrates how he improves upon Livy and Virgil’s critique of Roman 
origins in terms of their sacralisation of mimetic rivalry and scapegoating. The Roman 
preference for legend over myth is shown to reveal at once a ‘Platonic’ embarrassment about 
the violence of mythical stories and yet a greater concealment of real, historical, founding 
violence. Against this, Augustine pits the true eternal angelic city of peace and musical 
harmony, in which it is possible for the earthly city to participate. The notion that Augustine 
moves away from the ancient city and citizenship is implausible in the first place to the 
degree that he now renders the realm of the Platonic intelligences itself fully a city. 
In the final Chapter Six I show that it is implausible also, in the second place, insofar as 
Augustine’s main apologetic argument is that Christians make better citizens also of the 
earthly city and that Christianity is more likely to produce a strong Roman empire. This 
remains the case, even if for Augustine the Roman Empire is not a final good and may not 
providentially endure, and even if he wishes to curb imperial aggression and combine 
imperial generosity with both republican involvement and a more federating subsidiarity. For 
it is clear that Augustine continued to celebrate the universality of Roman citizenship, even if 
he wished to transfigure it.  
I also demonstrate that, just as Augustine completes the Platonic critique of myth with a 
critique of legend, so he completes the Platonic critique of religion by arguing that one must 
not just redefine the pagan gods, but reject their worship, insofar as they are really demons 
whose warped mediation denies the direct and unmediated omnipotent governance of the one 
true Triune God.  
But once more this is to promote and increase citizenship, both earthly and heavenly, and not 




of justice and the mediation of divine mercy and care to everyone. The new stress upon 
forbearance and forgiveness puts a new and much higher premium upon the attempted 
inclusion of all people within the civic realm. Similarly, by denying an inevitable resistance 
of the passions to virtue, Augustine extends the Platonic sense of the mediation of civic virtue 
by eros, or by true desire. The briefly but clearly intimated Christological and Trinitarian 
framing of politics in the Civitas Dei shows that, in effect, Augustine now elevates the Dyad 
and its mediation with the One to total equality with the One. This permits the idea that the 
City which participates in the Trinity can be eternal, and that all our earthly social activities 
can be redeemed through the Incarnation. The affirmation of Creation ex nihilo which these 
doctrines assume demands that, just as nothing is potentially excluded from the divine love, 
so nothing is potentially excluded from a civic community based upon a now more perfected 
and unlimited virtue.   
I conclude the chapter by suggesting that this concurs with the more corporatist medieval 
understanding of citizenship already invoked and whose emergence Augustine’s thought 















Chapter One: Plato’s Kallipolis: Imperfect Perfection 
 
1. What was the City? Who was a Citizen? 
Historians and social theorists agree that the Greek polis involved the irruption of something 
wholly new into human history: the emergence of small, self-governed city-states, 
characterised by the joint participation in, or sharing of rule by a segment of its inhabitants 
who were deemed ‘citizens’.23 This practical participation (metechein) also came to involve a 
continuous debate concerning the best mode of ruling and the nature, both real and ideal, of 
the civic constitution. 
It is not easy to understand how and why this phenomenon emerged. It did so after the so-
called ‘Greek dark ages’ and the transitional ‘geometric’ epoch (900-700 BC). The earliest 
phase of Greek civilisation, the Mycenean, had been characterised by kingship. With the 
collapse of this civilisation, a period of tribal dispersal ensued. Gradually, however, urban 
settlements were re-established by roving war-bands, such that, from the outset, the Greek 
city-states had something of the character of armed camps and also of colonial encampments, 
which rendered the later establishment of specific colonies a natural development.24  
Until modern times, scholars mostly accepted the accounts given of the origins of the polis by 
ancient Greek historians and philosophers of the high Classical epoch.25 These tended, most 
notably in the case of Aristotle, to describe a natural evolution from family to tribal to inter-
tribal groupings, implying the gradual weakening of blood-links and strengthening of 
political ties. Aristotle correspondingly defined full citizenship as an active sharing in judicial 
and political office (krisis and arche) (Politics, 1275a15-17).26  
This picture was first significantly challenged by Fustel de Coulanges in the nineteenth 
century, when he demonstrated how the ancient city assumed, sustained and extended a 
tripartite bond between the family, property and religion.27 More recent evidence confirms 
that various family linkages of genos, phratry and tribe were preserved and even re-invented 
 
23 See, for example, Carlos Castoriadis, Ce qui fait la Grèce, Vol I: D’Homère à Heraclite (Paris: Seuil, 2004).  
24 François de Polignac, Cults, Territory and the Origins of the Greek City-State, trans. Janet Lloyd (Chicago: 
Chicago UP, 1995), 150-4. 
25 See Vincent Azoulay, ‘Rethinking the Political in Ancient Greece’, trans. Angela Krieger, Annales. Histoire, 
Sciences Sociales 69, 3 (2014): 605-26.  
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after the advent of the city.28 If the participating citizens of the polis were primarily 
‘aristocrats’, then that was because they were originally a set of closely associated kinship 
groups.  
At the same time, scholars writing ultimately in the tradition of Fustel, particularly François 
de Polignac, have emphasised how the aristocratic origin of the city as an exercise of military 
power alone is not a sufficient explanation for its emergence.29 The identity of the family was 
linked to the sacral guardianship of property, but the sense of a unified identity of a city 
required a wider extension of ritual cultus to which a greater number of people might adhere. 
Archaeological evidence has shown that, typically, such cults were cults of heroes, and that 
they were often situated, not at the centre, but in the rural peripheries. In most Greek cities, 
therefore, this gave rise to a tension between a centre or meson of aristocratic force, and a 
more dispersed democracy, intimately linked with religion, even if there were many 
intermediate degrees of connection. One peculiarity of Athens, perhaps explaining why 
democracy eventually erupted at its very core, was the relatively great concentration of cultus 
in the centre of the city. In any case, the implication of this scholarly perspective is that 
citizenship (politeuma) was most fundamentally a matter of religious participation, closely 
linked both to family and to terrain. 
This emphasis was initially characteristic of the French structuralist ‘Paris school’ of 
classicists, to which Polignac adhered. Yet even this school did not consistently veer away 
from Aristotle’s definition of citizenship in terms of political participation and membership of 
the governing politeia, which seems to conflict with his declaration that citizenship is by 
birth. What is more, the members of this school did not fully follow through on the gender 
aspects of this tension: if citizenship is by birth, then women are fully citizens; if it is a matter 
of political participation, then their citizenship appears problematic. They tended to conclude 
that women were not really citizens at all and to play down the extent of their religious 
participation, for example in animal sacrifice.30  
It is, instead, the Dutch scholar Josine Blok who has carried through a more adequate 
revision, showing that the evidence of Demosthenes, addressing the case of an appellant for 
citizenship, Euxitheos, conflicts with the historical and constitutional picture given by 
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Aristotle’s Politics, and the Constitution of Athens, a text from his school that was once 
attributed to him.31 Demosthenes’ evidence suggests both that citizenship was primarily by 
birth, and fully included women, and that it was primarily a matter of religious, not of 
political participation, even if the latter was highly prestigious and citizen self-government 
was, indeed, the identifying mark of the Greek polis.32  
Modern archaeological research and use of comparative ethnography has, therefore, 
somewhat disturbed the more purely political and legal account of civic origins provided by 
Aristotle and his school, which gave a picture of widening human cooperation in response to 
pragmatic needs, both economic and military.33 It has eventually, with the work of Blok, 
prompted historians to pay more attention to the non-philosophical literary evidence on 
citizenship.  
We can, however, note that Plato, from whom Aristotle in part derived this view, nonetheless 
also scorned the city envisaged only in terms of needs as the ‘city of sows’ and insisted that 
the religious and ritual laws of the city are its most crucial aspect, ‘the greatest, fairest and 
first of the laws which are given’, requiring oracular and not just human authority for their 
establishment (Republic, 369a-372d).34These include prescriptions for ‘the founding of 
temples, sacrifices and whatever belongs to the care of gods, demons and heroes, and further, 
burial of the dead and all the services needed to keep those in that other place gracious’ 
(427b-c). Equivalently, in both the Republic and the Laws, though in different ways, Plato 
allowed much more civic participation to women than did Aristotle. It can then plausibly be 
argued that it is Plato whose views of civic formation and governance, especially in The 
Laws, more conform to a more recent scholarly awareness of later continuity with the archaic 
period.  
Scholars continue, nevertheless, to debate the relative importance of the factors of ritual, 
force, ownership, conflict, law and constitution in defining the ancient Greek city.35 On the 
whole, though, they tend to agree that these categories cannot, in this context, be regarded as 
entirely separate in the way that we moderns would tend to imagine, nor that formalisation 
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and institutionalisation (though they undoubtedly increased over time) simply displaced the 
familial, ritual and habitual. In any case, the notion of ‘ritual’ as a separate and often 
presumed ‘ideological’ sphere, rather than something all pervasive and fundamental, is 
probably something we project back on all pre-modern times, as Philippe Buc has 
demonstrated.36 The Greek word for law, nomos, seems etymologically to have implied 
‘distribution’, as illustrated in the Minos, a dialogue once attributed to Plato (and probably 
from his school) and therefore it may not be so easy to separate legal rights from more 
informal and prior property ownership, or from rights to ritual involvement in processions, 
festivals, sacrifices, banquets, choruses, hunts and dramas.37  
That which was considered koinon or in common, binding the city together, was in turn 
divided between such ‘participatory’ division on the one hand and things that were entirely 
collective on the other: the res nullius.38 To begin with, there were likely no such 
‘anonymous’ and unclaimed things at all, but the very need to adjudicate disputes concerning 
the not-yet owned encouraged the rise of the sense of an independent authority, the arche, 
that could be variously construed as monarchic, oligarchic or democratic.39 Yet once more it 
was not clear that the constitution of the city, the politeia, could be understood solely in terms 
of arche and the exercise of sovereign authority. It was by some, such as the Pseudo-
Xenophon, but not by others, who took the Spartan view that the politeia was enshrined in 
unalterable nomoi, as with Xenophon himself.40 And then again, ‘laws’ encompassed both 
formal entitlement and more informal, though sometimes required and enforced habits and 
customs, including those within the religious sphere.  
What was the purpose of the city understood to be? Prior to Socrates, always its own strength, 
success (eupragia) and survival. But the greatest key to this strength was understood to be the 
virtue (arete) of its individual citizens: with ‘virtue’ itself consequently understood in a 
somewhat instrumental fashion. Already, as later with Machiavelli, the freedom and self-
control of the individual was seen as naturally aligning with that of the collective body.  
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Only with Plato is there a decisive shift, which affects almost all subsequent political 
discussions: the purpose of the city is now, over and above its own strength and liberty, the 
education of its citizens in virtue, and this virtue, along with the well-being of the city as a 
whole, is understood to be a novel mode of participation in the eternally good.41 Now, beyond 
the Greek ‘tragic’ sense, it is declared that some good cities have been defeated and some bad 
ones have triumphed (Laws, 638a-b). Just because of this novelty, Plato’s archaism in the 
Laws, where he seems in a ‘Spartan’ fashion to insist that the strength of the city consists in 
adherence to unalterable laws, takes on a rather different colouring, because the archaism no 
longer so much aligns to ultimately military strength as to that that more dispersed ‘religious-
democratic’ factor already mentioned. In this context, it may be no accident that Socrates 
goes outside the city (even from the more centralised Athens) to encounter the divine in the 
Phaedrus, and that in the Laws he is very concerned with the civic peripheries and with inter-
civic spaces.42  
If, however, all citizens ought by definition to pursue virtue, of whatever kind, who, exactly 
were the citizens? This issue has been much controverted. Modern research has put a new 
stress on the fluidity of this category: citizenship involved a bundle of different rights, 
entitlements and involvements: economic, religious and political.43 To some degree it lay 
upon a spectrum, because foreign residents (metics) could be admitted to certain roles and 
allowances, while citizenship could be partially or temporarily lost as a punishment.44 Nor 
were the aristocratic ‘property classes’ such a coherent and bounded whole as was once 
imagined.45 Yet for all that, there is today a general agreement that, after all, the bounds 
between citizens, slaves and metics were really quite tight and absolute. Solon’s Athenian 
reforms (594 BC), which abolished slavery based upon debt (such that a free man could 
potentially sink into slavery) tended to tighten those bonds, as was also achieved by Pericles’ 
requirement (451 BC) that in Athens a citizen have two citizen parents.46 Cleisthenes’ 
reforms (508 BC) had conversely ensured that some rural inhabitants of the demes were 
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securely included within citizenship.47 In every Greek city there tended to be periodic 
purgings of perceived foreign usurpers.48 
Yet these divisions were not quite what we might be instinctively inclined to imagine. Metics 
could sometimes be far richer than citizens: if the political isonomia or equality of the latter 
was linked to an economic equality or isomoira, what mattered here was just the honour of 
equality rather than the amount that was owed.49 It was specifically political participation and 
equality that was prestigious, so that even the relatively impoverished plebian classes were 
often competing more for political dignity than for economic status.50 And the fact that 
Athenian citizens received public pay (misthos) for public service as jurors, magistrates and 
councillors, and later (after the early-fourth century BC)  for the political service of 
participating in the assembly, suggests that it was not assumed that all citizens were 
‘gentlemen’ of private means.51 As to slaves, they might live very comfortable lives and 
exercise artisanal, learned and medical skills. Furthermore, the public slaves (demosioi), part 
of the collective res nullius possessed by the city, who have come much more to light within 
recent research, might at times exercise a bureaucratic power, albeit under command, 
effectively in excess of the citizens’ political power.52  
However, the issue of public slavery raises the most controversial question about ancient 
Greek citizen-rule. To what degree was it an ideological sham? Was there a half-unconscious 
suppression of the reality of an already present ‘state’ in something remotely approaching the 
modern sense? Is it possible that the Greeks invented a genuine notion and to a degree 
practice of citizenship rule, but that this was inhibited by other aspects of their own practice: 
inhibitions a later Christian era could to a certain extent release? This view goes clean against 
a still prevailing one that only the unique conditions of the Greek city-state permitted the 
exercise of genuine participatory democracy. 
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The point at issue is not the usual one that participation was only for the privileged few. It is 
rather that the realities of slavery and xenophobia might have rendered the very exercise of 
participation, even amongst a few, to a degree illusory. The reality of public slavery invites 
the suspicion that the ‘leisured’ politics of debate was only possible because the ‘organisation 
side’ of politics (though notably not military activity) had been alienated to an elsewhere, 
where it was always linked to the primary power of the arche and so had an oligarchic bias 
overriding dispersed personal involvement. In an equivalent way, the productive side of the 
economy was considerably alienated through slave-worked landholdings, imperial conquest 
and the exaction of tribute from colonies. Despite significant qualifications, one can still 
understand all Greek cities, following Werner Sombart, Max Weber and Moses Finley 
(including non-self-ruling ‘towns’, besides city states) as having been, at least relatively 
speaking, ‘consumer cities’, lacking the more extensive production and guildhalls of 
medieval towns that allowed them to have a fully reciprocal trade with the countryside.53  
A double question then arises. If the public slavery of the proto-state is removed, does that 
reveal participation to have been an illusion, or does it render it now more genuinely possible, 
as arguably it later became in Byzantium and the medieval Latin cities, kingships and 
empires? Equally, if private slavery is gradually removed, along with the radical sense of 
foreign people worshipping their own gods (abolished within Christendom), does that then 
remove the consumerist leisure requisite to citizenship, or does it rather permit participatory 
self-government also to enter the social and economic realms and to have done with (as in the 
case of  non-cenobitic monasticism, or the working-worshipping life of the medieval guilds) 
the dichotomising of the active and contemplative lives so typical of antiquity? For a life of 
consumptive leisure not only encourages such a dichotomy, it also, at the limit, tends to imply 
that the most ideal leisured or aristocratic existence exits the political and participatory 
altogether. By contrast, if production and consumption are held in an oscillating balance, then 
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so too can be theory and practice, with less danger that the practical and associative may be 
ultimately subordinated to the private and self-sufficient.  
Similarly, given such an oscillation, political considerations of justice can invade the social 
sphere also, whereas classical antiquity tended to be publicly indifferent to questions of 
poverty and social suffering.54 Not only may we detect there, as with Augustine, a failure to 
exercise care and mercy, but also an inherent limitation of the realm in which considerations 
of justice and of participatory involvement are considered relevant. By constricting the 
political in order, apparently, to render it possible, the Greeks may rather have fated it to 
ever-increased confinement and eventual diminishment.  
Eventually, in Chapter Three, we will see that this helps to explain why Aristotle has 
problems about fully reconciling political justice with private virtue, and tends to see virtue, 
both as magnanimity and as intellectual contemplation (theoria), as leaving the scope of the 
practical and political altogether. With the Stoics, as we shall see in Part Two, these 
tendencies will become still more exacerbated. So, it may be not, after all, that the Greeks 
rendered participatory politics possible through a tight set of restrictions and exclusions -
citizen over against slave and foreigner, friend over against foe, the political over-against the 
social and the economic - but that, through the same gestures, they too much restricted it and 
even rendered it finally impossible. The ultimate claim of this thesis is that Christianity 
actually released these inhibitions. 
In this and the following chapter, I shall show the limited degree to which Plato anticipated 
this release and extension though a stronger insistence, compared with both those who came 
before him and Aristotle after him, that participation at the centre is also somewhat 
organisational, that the household-economic and so the productive and artisanal is merged 
with the civic, that all life-stages, both sexes and all occupations of free people are involved 
in citizenship, and that the theoretical and practical-poetic cannot be divided. 
 
2. Introduction to Plato 
In the rest of this chapter and in Chapter Two, I will seek to discover the exact nature of the 
City and the citizen in Plato’s Republic, Statesman and Laws and other relevant dialogues. 
 




The concept of citizenship will be seen to lie at the heart of Plato’s conception of soul and 
city, and city and kosmos, as being in a state of harmony. 
My argument in this chapter will fall into three sections. In part 3 of the chapter, I will define 
the project and nature of the Republic, arguing for a ‘canonistic’ reading of Plato’s dialogues 
as a coherent but dynamic unity, and suggest that the subject of this dialogue, Justice 
(dikaiosynē), is inherent to conceiving of citizenship. I will proceed in part 4 to explore 
citizenship as located in the cosmic order of justice, involving the soul’s ‘motion’ through 
noesis in a vertical ascent to the idea of the Good, and how this ascent to sophia (wisdom) 
informs the central matter of the practically engaged philosophic life: phronesis. Part 5 will 
read the city of the Republic as challenged by ‘three waves’, which problematize and finally 
topple the ‘first best constitution’ of the Republic by exposing it to a special and temporal 
paradox.  I will eventually argue in the following chapter that the challenge of the ‘third 
wave’ is only fully resolved in the city of Magnesia: the city of the Laws. Part 5 will build up 
to this exploration of Magnesia’s ‘second best constitution’ (Laws, 739a-e) as the proper 
space for the mediate art of citizenship. This unique ‘diagnostic’ art will be defined next 
chapter in with reference to the Statesman and the Sophist, as the crucial practice of 
combining the One with the Dyad, or of unity with difference: a participatory practice at once 
metaphysical and practical.  
 
3. Canon and Continuity  
An interpretative controversy that bears decisively upon our argument is the matter of Plato’s 
‘development’; that is to say, whether he ‘changed his mind’ in a lesser or greater fashion 
about a number of issues. The tentative dating of Plato’s works as belonging to an early, mid 
and late period (with the Republic belonging to the middle, the Laws to the late), has had 
mapped onto it a great variety of theories about apparent changes in Plato’s thinking.55  
Two closely linked apparent ‘changes’ in practice and theory are central to my concern: first, 
an apparent retreat from the theory of the Forms; and secondly, an apparent abandonment of 
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the city of the Republic. These are taken by a once popular reading of Plato as illustrating his 
retreat from a linked utopianism and idealism. The disappearance of Socrates from the later 
dialogues is taken as further evidence of such a shift.56 But I follow Leo Strauss in arguing, 
on the contrary, for a ‘canonical’ reading of Plato, and an interpretation of his dialogues not 
as lonely enigmas, but rather as also ‘talking’ with each other, often by way of the tangle of 
connections and allusions made by Plato to literature, philosophy, myth and history.57 
 
Second Best?  
The question of canon and continuity affects the crucial issue of how we are to assess the 
relationship of the City of the Republic, Kallipolis, to that of the Laws, Magnesia.  
In Plato’s Laws he speaks, in the mouth of the Athenian Stranger, of the ‘first best city’ as 
being defined by common ownership in terms which clearly seem to recall Kallipolis. He 
contrasts this with the city he is now about to describe and discuss, which characterises as 
‘the only one which takes the second place’ (Laws: 739c-e).  
Scholars have sometimes tried to apply an evolutionary interpretation of this contrast, 
whereby the proposals of the Laws are understood as Plato surrendering to pragmatism and 
abandoning the regime he proposes in the Republic.58 The other prevailing view is that 
Kallipolis was never envisaged as a functional city and was always suggestive of the city 
found in the Laws. However, both views tend towards seeing the Magnesia of the Laws as a 
compromise, at most: as the best possible city, rather than the absolutely best.  
The second view is by far the more plausible and can be linked to what Hans Joachim 
Krämer calls the ‘indirect’ model for reading Plato, that emerged in modern scholarship with 
the Tübingen school.59 This model attends to the esoteric doctrine that the Platonic dialogues 
frequently imply and argues for the historical reality of an unwritten series of teachings, 
especially in his Seventh Letter.60 From the many strikingly consistent reports of later ancient 
authors, beginning with Aristotle (including several later attested passages in Aristotle’s own 
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lost writings), it can be concluded that these teachings revolved around the ‘super-Forms’ of 
the One (or The Good) and the ‘indeterminate Dyad’, in which all of the lesser eternal Forms 
participated.61 The Dyad is spoken of in terms which show that it was clearly akin to the 
super-Form of ‘difference’ (thateron) in Plato’s Sophist, contrasted with the super-Form of 
the One as being equivalent to plurality in general, which is what the ‘secondness’ of the 
Dyad both commences and enfolds. Even though ‘difference’ or the Dyad remains inferior to 
the One, it is also co-eternal and co-elevated with it, in a way that deliberately refuses 
Parmenidean monism.  
Despite the consistent witness of these later writings, again beginning with Aristotle, to the 
close proximity of Plato to the Pythagorean tradition, it is also clear that the philosophy of the 
One and the Dyad is specifically Platonic rather than Pythagorean - even if later neo-
Pythagoreans like Iamblichus made use of it.62 
 Zdravko Planinc explores this case more than other commentators who support an ‘esoteric’ 
reading of the Republic, which regards its apparently hyperbolic praise of the One/Good as 
not entirely sincere. Just as the Athenian Stranger in the Laws offers his imagined founder 
three potential constitutions but discusses only the second - ‘This plan let us now adopt: let us 
state the polities which rank first, second, and third in excellence; and the choice let us hand 
over to Clinias’ (Laws 739b 1-10) – so Planinc shows that the Republic discusses only the 
first constitution but gestures towards others.63 
Drawing on the work of both Planinc and of the Tübingen School, I shall go further and argue 
for a third position in regard to the relationship between the cities of the Republic and the 
Laws. Not only are the two dialogues fully consonant with one another, but the ‘second best’ 
city is not in any way a compromise project. It is not only the best possible city, but 
paradoxically the absolutely best city, if we are not to refuse the relative truth of temporal 
cosmic realities alongside the absolute truths of the Forms. 
Key to this new reading of the Laws is a fresh account of the role of the One and the Dyad in 
Plato’s political theorising. Although these concepts are well understood in relation to his 
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theory of the Forms, they have been underapplied to his political thought. On my argument it 
turns out that the ‘second-best’ city is rather the city of secondness, of the Dyad and 
difference, as well as of unity and identity. 
As Planinc’s argument suggests, Kallipolis in the Republic is not conceivable as a physical 
city at all in the final summary, and it is no coincidence that the dialogue concludes with a 
vision of the cosmos and the reincarnation of the soul. This point is confirmed by the Laws:  
In such a State - be it gods or sons of gods that dwell in it - they dwell pleasantly, 
living such a life as this. Wherefore one should not look elsewhere for a model 
constitution, but hold fast to this one, and with all one's power seek the constitution 
that is as like to it as possible. That constitution which we are now engaged upon, if it 
came into being, would be very near to immortality, and would come second in point 
of merit. The third we shall investigate hereafter, if God so will; for the present, 
however, what is this second-best polity, and how would it come to be of such a 
character? (739c-e)  
The constitution presented in the Republic is therefore that of the One. The principle of unity, 
which is almost identical with the principle of goodness, is sovereign and supreme in Plato’s 
philosophy. But the world of actual being outside the One involves differences that are in 
tension with unity: to ‘exist’ at all in Plato, is precisely (as we see in the Parmenides) to be a 
union of contraries, and so the ideal constitution, for a truly existing finite polity, seeks to 
unify contrary elements.64  
Plato’s philosophy is not just concerned with metaphysics, but also pedagogy. And this dual 
focus is, once again, one can argue, linked to the combination of the One and the Dyad.  He 
describes two modes of thought, contemplation and ‘practical reason’, which are analogous to 
the two primary modes of the two constitutions. The constitution of the Republic is the 
constitution not really of the city, but of the soul, and so belongs to the Academy and to pure 
philosophy rather than to the polis. It is an invisible order that removes us to the transcendent 
world of the Gods, away from mortal bodies. But in seeking to impose a false unity upon an 
inherently dyadic political world, the philosopher actually risks becoming a sophist and a 
tyrant who imposes unity by force, rather than seeking to distil a paradoxical unity from the 
interplay of complex differences and variations. 
 





4. The City of the Republic 
The subject of the Republic seems obvious: the search for justice. But a number of scholars 
question whether it is so obvious after all. This dissent goes back to ancient Neoplatonic 
receptions of this text. The main alternative is that justice is simply an excuse or occasion to 
develop a political project, with justice (as much about the order of the soul as the order of 
the city) falling into the background early on.65 Proclus, however, argued that the question of 
the city is the same as the question of justice: there can be no apolitical consideration of 
psychic matters.66 And indeed, Socrates tells us that rule is at once psychic and political and 
involves the doing of justice in either case (345d-e) .  
One original title of the ‘Republic’, according to Diogenes Laertius, was the Politeia, 
meaning regime or constitution, closely related to the term for any law-governed formation - 
polis, and to citizen - polites. The other ancient Greek title was Peri Dikaiou, On the Just 
Person.67 The concept of justice as giving to each what is due is properly applied in the 
dialogue to the soul of the individual as well to as the wider society.  
The apparent lack of priority here, one way or another, fits with the fact that, for Plato, as for 
the ancient Athenians is general, there was no ‘power’ in our sense, but rather differently 
arrayed orders whose ‘strength’ is their stability, and who constitute as self-ruling citizens at 
once their selves and their interactions as the city. There was neither a ‘power’ of the State 
over and above this reciprocal relationality, nor an original and anarchic power of isolated 
individuals who then form a polity through contract.  For Plato, instead, the only ‘foundation’ 
is eternal, although it is but problematically mediated. The measure of both soul and city, in 
conjunction, is the Good and our participation in it, in which, precisely, for Plato, 
‘citizenship’ consists. Political things are established, and established as relatively perfect, 
insofar as they are more like the unchanging Good and the Forms of truth which the Good 
illumines. They are therefore constituted in citizenship which concerns at once and 
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66 Proclus, The Theology of Plato [1816], trans. Thomas Taylor (London: Prometheus Trust, 2017). 





indissociably the interior life of the soul and the exterior life of the polis. Since the Republic 
is at once about the soul and the city it is mainly about citizenship.    
The project of the Republic is, in consequence, not reducible, in the manner of modern 
political science, either to an ahistorical quest for secure abstract foundations, presuming the 
priority of the individual, or to an empirical research into the exercise of power as the given, 
external and extrinsic imposition of a political force from which the individual is inherently 
alienated.  Rather, it is a morally and spiritually charged quest for the truth of a human life 
understood as intrinsically civic: an anthropological inquiry that is also about the citizen as 
already understood by Greek culture and tradition.  
 
Soul, City and Transcendence 
Greek cities had at their core nomos or law which was understood as having its ultimate 
source in divine law which might be carried down by tradition, be revealed in prophecy, or 
observed in divine signs occurring in the natural world or the heavenly sphere.68 The Greeks 
understood nomos as reflecting a cosmic order or kosmos that was only later more strictly 
delineated from civil order, expressed by civil law.69 This account was sustained by 
philosophers like Heraclitus who conceived of a changeless perfection which was imaged in 
our changing world via a kind of divine order which he called the logos or word/speech.70  
Socrates alludes to this when he largely sets aside customary law, saying that the city they are 
creating will not require anything but the consultation of Apollo’s oracle at Delphi ‘at the 
navel of the world’(427b-c), and Plato gives his own account of this echoing of the 
unchanging logos in his famous allegory of the cave (514a-520a). According to this allegory, 
having seen the true reality of the Sun of the Good in all its splendour, we would want to 
return to our friends and release them too from our common bondage. But upon returning, we 
would find that our eyes, newly accustomed to the true light, were now blinded, and when we 
tried to tell our friends the truth they would laugh. We would be unable to discourse so well 
on the terrestrial appearances of things, and would at best be considered stupid, and at worst 
put to death for blasphemy. But as our eyes re-adjusted to pale terrestrial light, we would 
 
68 Christian Meier, The Greek Discovery of the Political (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
173-6; Nancy Evans, Civic Rites. 
69 Meier, Greek Discovery, 174-5. 




discover that we could see ‘ten thousand times better than the men there [in the cave]’ (528a) 
and the philosopher who returned - if he could be heeded - would be able to deal with the 
things of this world with greater wisdom than any other kind of man.  
Accordingly, the philosopher should be king because he has perceived the Good: a ‘super-
Form’ which, as the sun is to the earth, is to the realm of the soul the source of all being, even 
though it is beyond being, and beyond all knowledge (509b).  
As we have just seen, the soul does not entirely cease contemplating the Good when it returns 
to the world. When the philosopher ‘turns’ to the world, he is now looking in two directions, 
perceiving our world by the light of the true One (508a-e). The ‘pattern’ of the world is 
discoverable in the higher nomos of the kosmos, and by imitating it, we can both understand 
our own world - created in its image as Plato shows us in the Timaeus - and learn how 
properly to order it.  
Plato locates this bi-focussed vision in the context of his turning of the discussion of justice 
back from the soul towards the city, so that instead of reading ‘little letters from afar’ (those 
of the soul), it would be easier if they were ‘bigger and in a bigger place’(368d). However, 
having described the ideal city as the city of the guardians, by describing their education, 
Plato reverts once more, by a dizzying zigzag, to the question of the right training and 
ordering of the soul. It is in this context of citizenhood, which mediates the psychic with the 
political, that Plato unfolds his central account of the turning towards the Good.   
Both soul and city are assumed by Plato to belong to the natural order, although both can 
become disordered. Therefore, the ordering of the soul is presented as ‘political’, since it is an 
ordering of parts, while equivalently the ordering of the city is regarded as ‘psychic’, since it 
possesses a collective organic unity properly coordinated by a collective nous. For this 
reason, the respective knowledge of the soul and of the city can illuminate each other. But 
part of the tension of the Republic derives from the fact that our knowledge of ourselves, 
though immediately present, is also radically obscure and distanced by virtue of our inability 
to regard ourselves directly, since we are the very power of regard, just as one cannot see 
one’s own eyes, save in a mirror. Therefore, the ‘larger size’ of the letters of the city derives 
from their functioning as a mirror of the soul. Yet that is not necessarily to say that the soul is 
the prime object of interest or prime site of justice. There is rather an equiprimordiality of 




Justice therefore concerns consistently the citizen who is at once psychic and involved in that 
fellowship of souls which, for Plato, as for the Greeks in general, constitutes the city. This 
can be contrasted with the extrinsic control exercised over the subjects of the law by the 
modern state, with the implication that there is for Plato a continuity and inseparability 
between self-government and the shared human government of the city, as there is not for 
liberal modernity. The ordering of the self is possible through the ordering of the community, 
but the latter is mediated to the individual intrinsically, by an act of ethical and cognitive 
appropriation that later in history will be deemed ‘conscience’. 
When the Kallipolis is first broached, the indirect ‘reflective’ knowledge that the citizen gains 
of himself in the city for the moment takes precedence over the more ineffable and non-
reflexive ‘immediacy’ of self-presence. Yet in the midst of the city, by a further disconcerting 
reversal, this psychic immediacy is returned to in the context of education. Even that, 
however, is only obtainable, as the analogy of the cave illustrates, through the different 
mediation of recollection and the regard of the eternal Forms. Our relationship to the eternal 
continues to be characterised by sharing and mediation. Not only, then, does metaphysical 
participation ground political participation for Plato, the metaphysical is itself to a degree 
construed ‘politically’, in so far as it is a matter of methexis. It follows that Plato’s placing of 
theoria at the core of the ideal city is the very opposite of a forsaking of the centrality of 
citizenship, whose essence is participation.  
 
Justice at Issue 
In the Republic, the medium and method by which this vision of the city as justice on a large 
scale are communicated is qualitatively the same as the mode by which the city is imagined 
as living and functioning.  Plato’s ‘Socratic method’, whereby the true nature of ideas is 
revealed by a careful process of question and answer, is also the method by which the city is 
to be ruled.   
The discourse develops out of a question about how wealthy Cephalus uses his inheritance. In 
other words, it is the inheritance of an embodied world that compels us to distribute 
resources. In seeking to distribute resources, we naturally seek a measure which everyone 
calls justice.  It is quickly revealed that most of Socrates’ interlocutors, and notably 
Polemarchus, assume notions of justice informed by their reading of the poets - the 




justice in what we might call almost Nietzschean terms: in which we ‘owe it to friends to do 
some good’, whilst enemies are owed ‘some harm’(332a-b).  
Socrates questions this by asking whether in other arts, such as medicine, the good doctor 
makes his patients healthier or sicker? If a ‘medical’ man exists to increase health, then a just 
man must exist to increase justice (341e-342b). In harming others, we find that we do not 
make them more just, but rather provoke uncontrolled appetites and vices. Similarly, 
Cephalus is being asked to recollect justice. He offers a traditional definition:  Plato is not 
content with this Cephalus’s definition of justice as paying one’s debts and not being 
obligated to another: surely, we would not return a borrowed weapon to a friend if he had 
become mad? Therefore, the question of justice becomes: what do we truly and validly owe 
one another?  Yet the monetary level seems wholly inadequate; there must be some deeper 
level of obligation. But exactly what?  It follows that the soul, caught up in a world that it has 
inherited, rather than fashioned for itself, must nonetheless seek to discern what is real and 
what is not, and in dialectics find a novel way to communicate this in the course of a 
discussion that obscurely casts us adrift between polis and oikos, citizen and foreigner, youth 
and age, coming and going.  
For Plato, there are no beginnings in time: the arche (origin) is not discovered at the opening 
of the dialogue, but in its midst. The problem of the political can never have a clear beginning 
because our reality and our own knowledge already precede our inquiry.  Thus, in looking for 
the soul, we are already caught up in the soul; in searching for the city, we discover it already 
around us. We only embark upon the search for Justice (Dike) in Plato because we already 
obscurely know what it is; the answer necessarily precedes the question (328e). In 
collectively recollecting this answer, we discover it to be that justice involves doing equal 
and appropriate good to all, in terms of trying to render present a transcendent unity and 
harmony (331d-335d). 
However, this vision is violently attacked by Thrasymachus, who significantly rebels against 
the dialogic method as such. He seems to threaten the whole project with disaster, demanding 
that Socrates reveal his wisdom as a speech instead of a dialogue, so that he can lay impious 
hands upon it (Republic 336d), like the young men Plato later describes in the manner of 





How can Socrates now overcome him? In Plato’s dialogues, our modern concept of ‘power’, 
is also absent in the psychological sense of a voluntaristic force subject to an arbitrary will; 
instead, Plato speaks of ‘strength’ or ‘size’ in highly bodily terms: the tall ship’s captain with 
the mutinous crew, or the ‘titans’ mentioned above. They are dangerous, but more with 
respect to their spontaneous wildness, which is really a kind of uncontrolled courage, an 
excess of a virtue than of what we moderns think of as ‘power’.71 Socrates has easily 
mastered the ‘erotic’ Polemarchus, who is childishly willing to be guided and shaped. But 
Thrasymachus, the ‘spirited’ man, described in terms that seem clearly to echo Homer’s 
description of Achilles, is like a rabid wolf, cold yet mad, and determined to end the dialogic 
play.  
Socrates is, however, a master of phronesis and is ruled by nous. Unlike the plasticity of 
epithumia (desire or appetite) or the inflexibility of thumos (force or spiritedness), nous 
(reason) allows Socrates skilfully to shift the music of his speech to match his student/foe.  
He first ‘plays dead,’ at once frustrating Thrasymachus’ desire for conflict, and causing him 
to laugh, like the tragic Achilles undone by a comic Odysseus, (336e-337a) who sought to 
use cunning against Achilles’ force. Whereas Achilles’ companions tried to force piety upon 
him in order to make him return the priest’s daughter whom he had captured, Socrates, whose 
philosophical cunning exceeds that of Odysseus, rather unnervingly hands over ‘the disputed 
prize’ of the Iliad, which is here the argument about justice, in the most overblown manner. 
(Iliad I, 1-30). For he mercilessly flatters, bribes and seduces Thrasymachus, as well as 
applying all his skilful logic, such that the latter, who thinks he has boxed in Socrates, is 
himself left with no other option but to advance down the road Socrates wants and submit to 
questioning (337b-338b).  
Having worked his erotic magic, Socrates now employs reason, drawing out the full brutality 
of Thrasymachus’s warrior ‘Justice’ and revealing it as an almost proto-Machiavellian 
political philosophy, Justice is instead seen to be about the proper relations within the soul, 
whereas doing harm to others whilst apparently doing good to yourself is revealed as really a 
self-mutilation. (354a-c).  
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Having employed both pleasure and pain fully to restrain him, Socrates turns to a wilier 
opponent for the greater bulk of the dialogue. Glaucon is both spirited and erotic and is 
halfway to possessing nous.72 He is impatient to hear the argument to its conclusion, refuses 
to allow any relevant aspect to pass and will quickly notice an aporia. Because Glaucon is 
both (half) wise and sincere, he is the hardest to master, and the one who does most to further 
the search for truth.  
 
The Re-imagining of the City 
Plato distinguished four ‘levels’ of reality in the Republic (511a-e).73 In our world, on one 
side of ‘the divided line’, there are images which are mere shadows or reflections of physical 
beings, and likenesses that are physical beings that reflect higher realities by their shape or 
form. Beyond material things, on the other side of the line, there are ‘objects’ of the mind, 
essentially mathematical realities that the geometers speak of through ‘hypotheses’, and 
finally there are the unchanging perfect Forms, in which lower realities participate. This 
scheme is presented in the Republic not simply as an account of reality, which it is for Plato, 
but as a kind of ‘key’ or ‘legend’ to read the map of the dialogue. 
As the initial discussion of justice illustrates, there is, in this dialogue, a continuous tension 
between the materially and historically given, on the one hand, and the need for ideal, 
mathematical and philosophical revision, on the other. The past is not a fully reliable guide, 
but neither is pure introspection, since the self is both shaped by civic history and obscure to 
itself. It is to resolve this triple tension that Plato had recourse to a re-imagination of the 
already given city, to a new envisaging of justice in bold letters that are at once both real and 
ideal. To reimagine the city is to retrace the origins of any city, and this connects to the 
human need for participatory co-belonging, in fact for citizenship: ‘The origin of the city, 
then, said I, in my opinion, is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our 
own needs, but each of us lacks many things’ (369b); ‘Come then let us create a city from the 
beginning, in our theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our needs’ (369c). 
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This city of speech (Kallipolis), based on the division of labour, takes shape in stages. But is 
this city as sturdy as it appears? In fact, we can argue that it is not. This merely geometrical 
reality proposed by Socrates is like an image of a living creature, but it is not the true city.  
 Its ideally ‘geometric’ relationships, motions and harmonies can be discovered, which 
correspond to the mathematical level of reality: our abstract groping towards a grasp of the 
Forms.  At the same time, they are described in evidently ‘psychic’ terms, since the structure 
of any city involves, for Plato, the disposing of various types of human character. The 
tripartition of the city is strictly isomorphic with the tripartition of the soul, without a priority 
of either, since both reflect the structure of the kosmos.    
In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates described the soul as divided into three parts - reason, force and 
appetite - the ‘two horsemen’ and their ‘charioteer’, for this allegory (Phaedrus 246a–254e). 
By parallel, the one ruler, the few fighters and the many worker-consumers are the parts of 
the city, suggesting that justice, death (whose threat thumos wields and holds at bay) and love 
are the mediating, overarching and existentially and cosmically ‘transcendental’ concepts.74 
The city is founded not directly by justice, but by need and therefore by appetite: ‘the first 
and chief of our needs is the provision of food for existence and life’ (369d-e). Yet we also 
see the other two qualities in operation, though in genetic reverse of ontological priority.  
Appetite comes first, providing the drive that pushes us into relationship with our fellow 
human, the sphere of eros. To enact and continue this association is an act of rationally 
applied force (thumos), sustained by the constant pressure of the threat of thanatos.  
Thereby the ideal ‘psychic city’ is being built up by Plato. First comes the city of eros, or of 
‘pigs’, described in childlike bucolic terms, innocently consuming what it is given, never 
knowing that excess is possible (372a-d).75 But once the city begins to transcend ‘necessity’, 
and develop more complex forms of production, it also develops new appetites and desires 
(472e-d). These desires force the acquisition of further resources, which in turn brings the 
city into conflict with its neighbours (473e). This obligates the development of an armed 
force, capable of waging war (474a-e). But these soldiers, ‘guardians’ as Plato terms them, 
involve a tear in the fabric of the city. They are driven, if they are to be good soldiers, not by 
eros alone, but by a stronger force (thumos), which one might call in a sense the ‘death drive’ 
In describing this nature as ‘spirited’, Plato denotes a kind of disciplined striving and 
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mastery. Thus, the new social class represents also a new psychic aspect of the city, which it 
inevitably turns upon the polity that brought it into being. The class of guardians, standing 
apart from desire, seek to discipline and control it, ordering the desires of the city back to 
moderation. This in turn produces a yet higher form of consciousness: nous or reason, the 
capacity to know things as they are in order to supply a norm of moderation and not just to 
desire or control them through subjugation.  
In the struggle to conceive how to manage these physical spaces, and visible desires, mapped 
on to the geometrical city, Socrates and his companions seek to discern a genuine psychic 
balance. They discover, finally, what seems to be an account of justice: to allow to each 
element of the city, and of the soul, what is proper to it. The resulting harmony is not a 
distribution amongst alienated and atomised parts, as the first theory of justice implied, but 
rather what we might call ‘the common good’. The city must come to see itself as a single 
being, its unity produced by the highest and best parts ruling the lower. To produce this unity, 
the guardians, enshrining the principle of unity, must hold everything - goods, wives and 
children - in common (416e-417b). They serve as ‘auxiliaries’ to reason, mapping the image 
of the Good onto the city, sustaining it in proportion (414b).  
To produce this perfect harmony, a kind of eugenic programme is instituted. By a secret lot, 
the best individuals of the city are encouraged to procreate, and each child regardless of 
background or sex is to be educated and tested like metals in a furnace. Those with the best 
characters are selected to be guardians, and the best amongst the guardians are made rulers.  
Educating these guardians involves a careful, medico-aesthetic application of two practices: 
gymnastics and music (411e-412b). Their bodies and appetites are to be disciplined through 
pleasure and pain to have healthy and moderate desires and to obey psychic injunctions. 
Meanwhile, the savage, ‘spirited’ aspects of the guardians are to be tamed by musical 
instruction, which will train their souls to desire the good and love wisdom. As with the 
doctor prescribing the right medicines, the trainer giving the right foods and exercises, the 
musician playing with rhythm and harmony, justice is about treating each thing as it truly is, 







5. Kallipolis All At Sea 
Yet Kallipolis, for all its apparent perfection, has introduced immense instabilities and 
contradictions. Essentially, it has tried to map an unchanging reality onto physical space, as if 
the latter were static, and it is no coincidence that the city is underwritten by the ‘noble lie’ 
that the guardians are born out of the earth, giving them an arche that repudiates the cycle of 
reproduction (414b-415d).76 The city of the Republic is a dreaming city that has ‘forgotten’ 
its own mortality, living in a mythic space outside time, a realm of perfect and unchanging 
harmony and proportion. If the order of city and soul are strictly analogous, then we can be 
suspicious of this, just because Plato criticises the notion of the soul as a harmony in the 
Phaedo, as being too immanentist and too ignoring of its transcendent home and orientation 
to truth and goodness. Moreover, the theory of the soul is here compared to a sea-going 
vessel, in the same way that the theory of the city is regarded in the Republic.  Simmias there 
seeks ‘the best and most dependable theory’ of the soul, in order to ‘use it as a raft to ride the 
seas of life’. To which he adds: ‘assuming we cannot make our journey with greater 
confidence and security by the surer means of a divine revelation’ (Phaedo 84c-88b, 40-98). 
Therefore, if the merely harmonic and so geometric soul flounders, one can suspect that the 
merely geometric city does also. Is the tripartite city of justice as the division of labour fully 
in keeping with the city that is guided, beyond any immanent divisions by the vision of the 
Good? We will now see why it may not really be so.  
 
As Plato has already made clear, the city that Socrates proposes is intended to institute a kind 
of reformation of culture, specifically poetry (377a-402c). A key part of the musical 
education is exposure to a poetry (and this for the Greek world would mean theology also in 
most respects) that presents gods and children of gods as just and virtuous and unvirtuous 
men as worthy of ridicule. Likewise, the prescribed modes of music would be shaped to these 
ends. Significantly, narrative and imitative poetry (third and first person, roughly speaking) 
are distinguished, and the combination of the two arts is forbidden, with imitative idioms only 
permitted to speeches concerning virtuous men (395a-398c). 
 
Thus, Plato’s ambitions in his dialogue go far further than a merely ‘political’ project in our 
narrowly modern sense of establishing legitimate institutions and institutional procedures. It 
ventures instead a complete reshaping of the human character through a morally driven 
 




remaking of poetry.77 Plato the new Homer sings the praises of Socrates as the philosophic 
hero, and seeks to filter and amend Homer’s mythos: to render it fully transparent to truth, 
removing what he sees as flaws and distortions.78 Some passages of Homer, such as Achilles’ 
‘roaming distraught along the shore of the unharvested sea’, despite their power and beauty, 
are like siren songs: they teach us self-destructive lessons that range from showing a hero 
forgetting or denying the immortality of the soul, to his irrationally and cruelly punishing the 
dead body of his foe (Republic 388a; Iliad, 24: 10-12). But on the other hand, the idea of 
Odysseus who ‘reproached his heart with word [logos]’ shows an image of the properly 
ordered soul and encourages strength in the face of adversity (Republic 390d; Odyssey 20: 
17-18). One can note here the contrast between Achilles’ individualistic threat to the city and 
to military unity, and Odysseus’ longing to flee conflict and return to the (proto-Platonic?) 
unity of kingdom and household.  
The purified ‘sophistry’ of dialectic must both discard and remedy the older, ultimately myth-
based reason.  Thus, Socrates in dialogue with Glaucon, who is eventually over-convinced by 
his vision of the Kallipolis, invokes ‘three waves’ that seriously threaten to tear down his own 
‘city of speech’ that may (it is secretly implied, on Zdravko Planinc’s view) after all remain 
somewhat sophistic. These waves are, respectively: the ‘equality of male and female 
guardians of the kallipolis; the community of women and children in the guardian class; and 
the requirement that philosophers rule, or rulers become philosophers’ (449a-543e).79   
Planinc frames these challenges as being to do with a tension between giving each man his 
due and the unity of the city, i.e., as between ‘justice’ and ‘the good’, which is primarily a 
matter of the common good. The first wave is the division wrought by sex: ‘we are escaping 
one wave in telling about the women’s law’(449a-457b).  The second wave of the sharing of 
women, children and property, looms higher over the ship of state: ‘this one [wave] is far 
bigger than the other’ (457c-461c). For whilst the equality of male and female evoked in the 
first wave was desirable, it was arguably not possible. But in the case of this second wave 
there is a question both as ‘to its possibility and its beneficialness’. The third wave is the 
problem of how the city can come into being at all. This constitutes the ‘biggest and most 
difficult’ wave (471c-473d) and Socrates’ answer to the effect that the philosopher can also 
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be a ruler, and the ruler a philosopher, risks ‘an uproarious wave’ that is ‘going to drown me 
in laughter and ill repute’ (473c-d).  
The three waves are often read as further revealing the nature of Plato’s ideal city, as 
humorous devices to force Socrates to confess to the full radicalism and yet coherence of his 
argument. Planinc dissents, because he adopts a deeper allegorical interpretation of Plato, that 
instead of reading the Republic superficially and in isolation, reads it alongside other Platonic 
dialogues and the epics of Homer.  
He identifies two central points about the three waves by recourse to this method: first, their 
Homeric origin centred around an analogy of Odysseus’ sailing from the island of the 
goddess Calypso, and secondly, an implicit reference to a ‘second sailing’ of Socrates. The 
significance of the Homeric aspect is that by reading Homer’s account of the three waves that 
assault Odysseus, we discover that they  do not just differ in rising scale of intensity, as we 
saw above, but also in quality and effect.80  Planinc argues that we can only make sense of 
this analogy if we recognise that the ‘city in speech’, the Kallipolis, is being implicitly 
identified with the vessel that Calypso has Odysseus construct.81 This raft is, as Planinc 
writes, ‘unusual’ in that it has ‘a deck, a mast, a sail, and a steering oar’.82 The raft, like the 
city of speech, is capable of being controlled and directed, manipulated for the purposes of 
the participants in the dialogue. This manipulation is a kind of sophistry, albeit a productive 
one described in the Sophist as ‘diagnostic’, and as having a kind of preliminary legitimacy 
(265a-d).  
The raft must also, like the ideal city, be constructed, but its deconstruction by the art of 
dialectic is a necessary step to distinguishing the truths that the Kallipolis reveals about what 
is good and desirable, from their improper distribution and capture in a geometric framework 
constructed using the eristic (merely rhetorical) method. The vessel represents a ‘geometric 
city’ in which the ideal city is planted on the infertile ground of spatial extension.  
The ‘second sailing’ that Planinc talks about it is a reference to the Phaedo (99d) in which 
Socrates uses this phrase to describe his reaction to his ‘disappointment’ with the ‘many 
absurdities’ of ‘Anaxagoras’s account of how nous is the cause and order of all things’ (98c). 
Whilst Plato’s attraction to this notion is obvious, he has Socrates object that ‘Anaxagoras 
 
80 Homer, Odyssey, 5, 233-494.  
81 Planinc, Political Philosophy, 269-85. 




gave “no thought to the agathon”’ that embraces and holds all things together’ (Phaedo 99c). 
The phrase second sailing (deuteros plous) is a clear parallel to Odysseus’s departure from 
the island of Calypso: Odysseus had already sailed for home once, and through the wrath of 
Poseidon been trapped with Calypso for seven years, and his release from the island is a 
‘second sailing’.  
That this is the significance of both the reference to the waves in the Republic and the second 
sailing in the Phaedo is made clear by the number and increasing severity of the waves, as 
just mentioned. Following the analogy, we surely discover that the Kallipolis is never 
intended to reach the far shore, and that indeed it belongs to the island of appearances that we 
are seeking to leave. (Odysseus’ vessel of escape is hewn from the timbers of the island, 
unlike the cloak that Odysseus receives from a divine source). And as we shall see presently, 
the Kallipolis is precisely deficient in its inability to marry nous with agathon. 
The first wave, in Planinc’s words, ‘almost destroyed the ship completely’ and ‘it was now 
truly a raft’.83  The equality of men and women is a kind of purification, in which the division 
between male and female is removed, and justice is restored, as the same qualities and 
arrangements of the soul are to be equally valued in women as in men (450c). But this 
process does not leave the city unaltered: the analogy involves an apparent inversion of 
Aristophanes’ comedy The Assemblywomen (Ecclesiazusae) in which the women of Athens 
stage a coup and institute communism.  This was meant as a satire of the Greek polity, with 
women portrayed in order to mock the pretensions of all rulers, for the very reason that 
Aristophanes considers women in this role to be a laughable absurdity. As Allan Bloom 
remarks, Plato is seeking to defy Aristophanes’ parody of Socrates in The Clouds by having 
Socrates not only outdo him as a comic playwright, but make what seems absurd to 
Aristophanes the very essence of justice.84  This city in speech is presenting us with what 
Bloom calls a ‘divine comedy’ in which our perverse concept of the Good city as absurd (the 
ongoing charge of those who call Plato a ‘frustrated idealist’) is challenged by a 
demonstration that it is rather the mortal city as such that is absurd.  We learn to situate 
ourselves in the perfect city and to direct ‘a more divine laughter’ at the city trapped in time 
and convention, failing to contemplate and imitate the unchanging divine idea of the Good.  
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And similarly at the pretensions of mortal lawmakers and customs, who, having flawed and 
false ideas about the gods, corruptly translate divine nomoi into human law.  
But the apparent justice that withstands the onslaught of the first wave, that of the equality of 
men and women, has not removed the deep-rooted injustice inherent in the immanentised 
geometric ‘city of speech’, in the very structure of the vessel. The biological difference of sex 
is not just a matter of a more limited strength on the part of women, but rather inheres in the 
differentiation of sexual/reproductive roles which Socrates absurdly reduces to the idea that 
‘they differ in this alone, that the female bears and the male mounts’ (454e). The premature 
collapse of this Two into the One will be shown to be the antithesis of justice, and to have 
introduced a fatal contradiction into the city. Just as each element of the soul is needed to be 
given its proper role and status, so too is the duopoly of sex.  
A further absurdity later introduced to address the education/protection of children (under the 
protocol of the ‘second wave’), the notion that they would follow their parents into battle to 
observe them, mounted on horseback, to effect an escape in the event of defeat, reveals how 
it is not just male/female differentiation that is becoming strained under the demand of unity, 
but that of youth/age, revealing the extent to which the aspect of time has been left behind 
(466e-467e). In erasing sexual and age difference in the matter of warfare, Socrates has, 
Planinc argues, hitherto placed too much weight on ‘spiritedness’ and has done an injustice to 
the virtues of moderation, justice and prudence.85   
True courage is only possible when thumos is guided by moderation, or sophroysyne, 
whereby the soul has a ‘healthy’ appetite, desiring everything in right proportion. The eros of 
the soul, when in proper balance with the other parts, is not a chaotic desire that must be 
chained by coercion, but in its ideal form always fills the soul with desire to do the right thing 
in the right way. Thus, when fighting fellow Greeks, rage at the enemy who threatens the 
state when engaged in external war must always be tempered with recollection that they are 
ultimately phylos or kinsmen, and that the war is in one sense a stasis or internal war between 
kinsmen who must one day reconcile. Therefore, Plato recommends that irrevocable damage 
to the foe in the conduct of war be avoided when fighting Hellenes (469b-471d).  
The guardian is like a dog, because, as Socrates declared earlier, ‘the disposition of noble 
dogs is to be as gentle as it can be with their familiars ... and the opposite with those they 
 




don’t know’ (375d). But what of the fact that the guardian, having been loosed upon the foe, 
must also regulate the city? And the further complication that the guardian must also treat his 
foe as a future friend, for, as we have seen, even the unjust man must be treated justly, and 
this means not harming him, so only using force to the extent necessary to protect everyone 
from harm and keep him from committing an evil act? 
In this way, time presses up ever more intensely against Plato’s narrative - past and future 
must be somehow interwoven and mediated: the enemy may become a friend, the friend is a 
potential foe.86 Only sophrosyne can diagnose the right application of an almost medicinal 
violence, or more accurately application of courage/spiritedness to avoid injustice. But this 
virtue emerges not from courage, but from an eros that bears the imprint of a cosmic order 
discerned by the nous, and acts both as a kind of intuitive discernment of vice and virtue, and 
a principle of reasoning or distribution. It drives the higher parts of the soul by giving the 
proper weight and balance to the different options before them, allowing them to be rightly 
used.87  
Thus, the only way the rule of the guardians makes sense is if there is a class of guardians 
who do not fight (as opposed to those amongst the fighters who rule), but rather employ 
thumos as a supplement to eros, instead of vice versa. These guardians would look beyond 
the actually timeless and steely grip of courage, and instead towards the cyclical nature of 
life. They would act either to inflame courage, or to cool its ferocity where appropriate. And 
does not this suggest the primarily female character of the supreme guardians? It is women 
who are physically unsuited to melée combat, who are by dint of their fertility perennially 
unavailable for combat and intense exercise. Women are closer to the birth of children, and 
by virtue of their bodies intimately connected and educated in the cyclical nature of reality. 
The courageous are always looking to space: to the competition of cities, the running of the 
race, the tide of battle. That is embodied by Sparta, a city constantly at war with its 
neighbours, without walls or boundaries because it cannot conceive of disaster: it does not 
think of itself as a city in time. But the equalising of the female, one may speculate,  belongs 
to the city not of the One, and of male-female indifference, but already to the City of the 
Dyad, in which sexual difference may be implicitly included, just as the oikos is much more 
integrated into the male public processes of the polis within Kallipolis than for the usual 
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Greek norms.88 Of course, in terms of the sheerly psychic and philosophical city it would 
seem that women are included because of their psychic equality, rendering gender difference 
irrelevant. Yet a tighter consideration suggests that the supreme, non-military guardian is 
paradigmatically female, by virtue of the difference of the female body itself.  
One can therefore conclude that, while the Kallipolis dubiously (it is implied) erases sexual 
difference in its allowance of full gender equality, the challenge of the first wave implicitly 
suggests a revision whereby the possibility of the equality of women in rule, besides a 
genuine notion of this very rule, actually requires the recognition of this difference.  
In terms of this same tension between unity and mixture, ‘the second wave’ challenges the 
notion that not only are men and women to be given the same roles, but women and children 
are to be held in common. To maintain the geometric order, at war with time, a strict 
programme of eugenics must be enforced, and the natural family be wholly dissolved (414c-
415c).  
This imperative, however, runs up against one of the great ambiguities of the Republic, which 
is the extent to which the life of the guardians and other persons living in the city converge in 
a shared citizenship: something we saw in the Introduction to be disputed amongst Greek 
thinkers At many points, it seems clear that the guardians are a distinct class, with the 
disciplines of communism being theirs alone: they are to live apart in barracks and the 
‘children of silver and gold’ are to be selected in the eugenics programme to join the 
guardians (415d-417b). But it is not clear whether the whole city participates in the sharing of 
women or if this applies to the guardians alone. If it is only the guardians, then, since it has 
been made clear that sometimes ‘silver and gold’ will come from ‘bronze’, this entails the 
removal of children from their biological parents, which would seem wholly to undermine the 
universal schema of the city, since the children of the ‘bronze’ parents, will know who their 
biological parents are, whereas the children who are silver and gold, will not, being 
supposedly sprung from the civic womb directly. But if, on the other hand, women and 
children are held fully in common by all, then how are the guardians meant to impose 
discipline? The people of epithumia will see the guardians as brothers and sisters, parents and 
children, and vice versa. How will an elderly citizen of the ‘bronze’ class respect the 
commands of a gold or silver child? How will a guardian - taught above all in piety - chastise 
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an elder of a subordinate class?  Moreover, in their policing duties, will they not be required, 
at least in theory, to detain, lay hands on and even banish or execute their elders, even of the 
guardian or ruler class? It is not envisaged that the guardians, and least of all the rulers, will 
transgress in a manner that requires this treatment, but there seems inherent in the Kallipolis a 
tension between the divine law due the family and the criminal law between citizens, only 
accentuated by the merging of polis with an artificial oikos. The Guardians are meant to act 
as the city’s conscience and policemen, but the very principle of externalisation by which 
they came into being has been collapsed.  
Justice as tripartition may be adequate to space, but it is not adequate to the mingling of 
classes and the intersection of familial and civic hierarchies consequent upon time. If human 
interactions in time are more than a matter of force, then their ordering requires a referral of 
their contingent details to the light of the eternal Good, whose transcendence exceeds the 
immanence of spatially divisible justice and the mere common (spatial) good of the city. In 
this way, already the flow of time, with its engagement with the finite otherness of the Dyad 
is indicated as paradoxically nearer the exaltation of the One/Good than the fixed immanent 
hierarchies of justice and its restriction to the division of labour.89  
Glaucon was initially persuaded by Socrates of the rightness of sharing women and children. 
But besides now doubting its realisability, he has also lost much of his passion for it, since 
increasingly his reason is somewhat repelled by this vision, at once absurd and lovely, of the 
Kallipolis, with its account of swanlike innocence in mating, of a universal family 
constituting a perfect single will. Apparently, Glaucon was originally moved away from 
normal eroticism towards a more austere vision by Socrates. But covertly he had been too 
erotically persuaded of this disciplined orgy.  
If the first wave secretly, against the uneasy surface meaning of the text, dislodged a vestigial 
overrating of violent thumos in the city of speech, and the second dislodged a vestigial 
overrating of sexual epithumia, then Socrates’ third and ‘greatest wave of paradox’, that will 
implicitly cast the boat aside, will be addressed first to the nous (473c-474c). It might seem 
we were here progressing from seeing how a threat of an excessive spiritedness and desire in 
Kallipolis are ultimately restrained by reason, but covertly, as I shall now argue, Plato also 
implies that this ‘perfect’ city is too purely rational.  
 




The city is finally (by implication) deconstructed by the question of how it is to be ruled. This 
third problematic allows Socrates to point Glaucon away from the spatial image of the city to 
the contemplation of a more complete philosophy. He shows Glaucon that, before they can 
address how the philosophers are to come to power, they must address what a good 
philosopher is (473d-474c). Socrates is now able to persuade Glaucon to desert the ‘raft’ and 
employ the ‘cloak’ of the dialectic method, beginning with the question of the relationship of 
‘is’ to ‘is not’ (473b-c), which will be the central premise and issue of the Sophist, the 
dialogue that most of all reveals the dialectic method, and the relationships between the 
Forms. From there, Glaucon is led into the analogy of the cave (514a-520a), diverting from 
the immanent image of the Kallipolis to a purer contemplation of a transcendent image of 
wisdom as the Forms glimpsed in the light of the Good. Having appealed to Glaucon’s nous 
and guiding him to the highest pinnacle with every enticement he can manage, Socrates now 
has to guide him down again. He must secretly (one can argue) unwind the Kallipolis, and as 
in the Sophist, descend by division, going from the One to the Two in order to discover the 
Good, and the One amongst the Many.  
As Socrates promises in the analogy, Glaucon’s eyes have become accustomed to the light of 
the true sun; he has finally come clearly to observe the One/Good, his eyes seeing first the 
forms of ‘phantoms of the human beings and other things, then ‘the things themselves’, next 
‘the light of the stars and the moon’, and finally ‘the sun itself by itself in its own region’ 
(516a-b). But now he must return into the cave - and here he finds himself desperately 
confused and assailed. His vision will, as promised, become ‘ten thousand times better’ than 
his peers, but he will need gradually to recover from the blinding light of the One, so that 
with his dialectic vision - the twin eyes of the Dyad? - he can identify good and bad, ‘is’ and 
‘is not’ amongst the many, and distribute everything in right proportion as suited to its nature: 
the art of the statesman.  
It is true that the solar focus on ‘the One’ in this passage seems to resolve the problematic of 
justice in the first two books. How do we know that the ruler/knower is not simply a higher 
enforcer, if his role is merely to position the other roles of force and desire? Contemplating 
the One/Good gives him after all something specific to do and a guarantee that knowledge is 
no mere sophistic persuasion.90 Yet the problematic remains: how can this role of 
contemplation really be a political role? How is the intellectual ‘forcing of force’ and 
 




counter-desiring of desire any more than arbitrary hierarchy at the human level, both political 
and psychic?  As has already been intimated, it can only be so if there is an erotic echo of the 
Good even at the lower levels. And that implies once more the mingling of levels and classes 
- not promiscuously, as is risked by Kallipolis, but in a genuinely fruitful, because ordered 
way, through the rightly desiring phronetic instances of human events and interactions in 
time. Otherwise, the guardians cannot be seduced away from contemplation in order to rule, 
without inevitably descending into martial and erotic corruption, as Plato now proceeds to 
trace.  
In consequence, the Kallipolis is finally attacked by mapping it not onto the static geometric 
abstractions invoked at the outset, but rather still more emphatically onto the flow of history. 
The raft of the city is ultimately torn apart before Glaucon’s eyes, and he cannot return to it if 
he wished.  As Planinc observes, ‘the eugenic vision fails’, as Socrates argues that ‘your 
rulers, will not, for all their wisdom ascertain by wisdom combined with sensation…the laws 
of prosperous birth or infertility of your race…but they will escape them and there will be a 
time when they will beget children out of season’ (546a-e).91 Socrates calls this ‘high tragic 
talk’; whereas the city outside of space and time was a ‘divine comedy’, the same city 
exposed to the ravages of time is ‘tragic’ from its own standpoint, although absurd from the 
perspective of the philosopher (545d-e).  
This melding of tragedy and absurdity is inherent to Socratic irony, which is a divine or 
daemonic compassion that at once conceals and reveals, while giving each what he is ready to 
accept. In this context, the irony works by the covert triumph of Socrates’ own narrative (and 
mythically shadowed) doubts over his mathematically modelled dialectical surmountings of 
these doubts:  his only apparent withstanding of the waves. The supposed degeneration of the 
city is described as a failure to understand mathematical harmonies, no doubt of a 
Pythagorean kind. Yet one can suspect that the ‘geometric’ account of breeding is as much a 
parody of the attempt to impose a ‘geometric’ schema on biology as it is a serious account; 
the earlier line about ‘not geometrical but erotic necessities’ can be read as implying this 
(485d). Plato’s account of the best medicine as being that which was applied to correct 
healthy bodies, rather than to maintain sick ones, could imply that he does not endorse a 
medically revisionary eugenic programme in the mould of the Kallipolis, when linked to his 
 




view in the Laws that nature itself is imprinted with an order and logos that maintains a 
‘natural’ balance of pleasure and pain.  
In the end, it is surely clear that Plato prefers the erotic over the geometric, since the ultimate 
Forms contain the prototypes also of material things, which the mathematical forms, though 
higher in status, as merely thin and abstract, do not. This mediating role of mathematical 
realities was added by Plato to the pre-Socratic Pythagorean tradition which originally 
understood the identity of things with numbers in a much more direct and ‘materialist’ 
sense.92 
In the course of the cycle of temporal decline, the guardians become corrupted, desiring 
wealth and honour above the good, and giving greater weight to gymnastic education than 
musical (548b-c and 549a-b). They turn into untamed beasts who prey upon those they 
should protect. The ‘aristocracy’, the rule of the wise - literally the rule of wisdom - is 
replaced by ‘timocracy’ in which the desires of the populace are ruled by an elite, through 
excessive force and not persuasion (547c-d). In course of time, the people are impoverished, 
and the regime becomes an ‘oligarchy’, a rule by the few/rich (550c-551a). The city of the 
One turns ineluctably into the city of the dyadic, of differences, in a negative sense: first as a 
mixture of good and bad in timocracy, and now as the two cities of the rich and the poor 
(551d). Eventually, the city rises up and distributes wealth and power throughout society, 
creating a democracy, and it is the many, the desiring part, that rules (557a-558c). But this 
unguided and rudderless multitude ends up becoming ruled by fear of the few, and so 
appoints a ‘tyrant’ who removes all the best citizens - those ‘few’ whose virtue makes them 
capable of ruling - and engages in constant warfare to maintain his position (562a - 569c). In 
Book IX the scale is shrunk to the individual character of the psyche alone, with the 
characters of the different regimes dialectically degenerating into that of the Tyrant, the truly 
unjust man.  
This seemingly inevitable degeneration of the philosophical city may cast into a different 
light the expulsion of the older civic theologian, the poet: is his lyric art not declared ‘more 
beautiful’ than the permitted hymnic? (398a-b) Is this lyricism somewhat more integrated 
with the hymnic as a continuous lyrical life in the city of Magnesia? Inversely, does not 
Plato’s mockery, in the Symposium (189c-193d) after Aristophanes, of a hermaphroditic ideal 
 




as too rivalrous to the divine, suggest some equivalent mockery of his androgynous city of 
Kallipolis?  
So, to summarise: the language of violence and contradiction is first expunged in the 
Republic with the creation of the Kallipolis, but then exposed as still after all lurking by the 
‘three waves’.  This city exits from normal human time at some point after the guardians 
emerge, yet justice is fully revealed in this city precisely by the division of the guardians 
from the others. Until the ‘best’ are selected out as the ‘few’, the ‘best’ cannot rule, as the 
Good is not identifiable, nor the consequent good and just rule of the forceful and desiring 
classes as subordinate. But in conceiving of how the few should live, Socrates imposes upon 
them the impossible triple demands which appear to withstand the three waves, but 
esoterically do not.  
Each challenge is met by an ever more extreme imposition of unity, that results in a yet more 
extreme division, as the dyadic difference starts to reassert itself though the exposure of 
inherent contradictions in the One. First, the male/female binary is abolished. The equality of 
women immediately introduces the problem of how reproduction is to be married to strict 
equality of roles and education. This is answered by the destruction of the old/young and 
oikos/polis boundaries, with the abolition of the family and the presence of the young on the 
battlefield. But this abolition confuses the operation of the civic hierarchy with the familial 
one, rendering justice impossible and the rule of the Good inoperative, as lacking the 
invocation of phronesis. Finally, the boundary between philosopher and statesman must be 
breached and this demands that either a philosopher becomes a king or a king a philosopher. 
Yet given the relatively degenerate character of thumos and epithumia, that must entail the 
corruption of the philosopher who is supposed to be the only uncorrupt ruler.  The historical 
succession of regimes reveals that the philosopher becomes gradually indistinguishable from 
the sophist and will be cast out in a bad division that does not differentiate good from evil, or 
worse, differentiates in the wrong direction. The statesman who must be educated becomes 
the Tyrant and the city of the One, the city of unremitting evil. 
One cannot therefore read this process of decline as simply a betrayal of the ideal city, but 
rather as a decadence that results necessarily from its over-ideality. This is exactly why the 






Chapter Two: Plato’s Magnesia: The Ideality of the Real 
 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter I will eventually compare and contrast the city of the Laws with the city of the 
Republic, arguing that this apparently less ideal and ‘second best’ city is for Plato in fact 
more genuinely ideal as well as realistic. I shall further claim that this view entirely coheres 
with his later understanding of participation and articulation of a metaphysics pivoted on the 
relationship between the One and the Dyad. This later metaphysics, I shall suggest, 
corresponds with the relatively more democratic bent of the Laws, which is thereby shown to 
depend upon and not to be somewhat removed from Plato’s affirmation of our sharing in 
transcendence as the basis of a just civic existence. I will first chart the evolution of his 
metaphysical thinking prior to the Laws and its intimate connection already with 
developments in his political thinking. 
 
2. Transition to The Laws 
The relationship between the Republic and the Laws can be regarded as analogous to the 
relationship between the Sophist and the Statesman: the Sophist performs the ‘good’ sophistry 
of diagnostic questioning by turning the destructive nature of sophistry upon itself, rehearsing 
the reality of the many (the infinite variety and lack of an idea of truth inherent to sophistic 
argument) by opening out to the  variety of things, but then categorising them in kinds 
through the sifting by dyadic difference. The dialogue ultimately reveals the prevaricating 
sophist hidden amongst the many and this ‘bad One’ is put on trial, just as the Republic 
reveals the ‘bad One’ of the tyrant. In the Statesman (Politicus) however, the threads are 
rewoven as we search for the just man, the ‘good One’ of the statesman who appeals to the 
Many only through the mediation of the Dyad and so reconstitutes the Many as the 







The Democratic Plato 
In the Republic, the few are systematically corrupted. They become brutal, acquire excessive 
wealth and power, and finally their own excessive ‘spiritedness’ consumes itself and they 
become too weak to control the many, so that the city becomes divided between wealthy and 
poor, thereby yielding ‘two polities’. The larger city of the poor, angered by their 
mistreatment, eventually overthrows the oligarchs. Socrates describes democracy as ‘very 
fine’ because it allows every man ‘freedom’ and contains ‘all dispositions’. It is a kind of 
laboratory in which every type of character and potential constitution can be discerned and 
debated, including, thinks Plato, the philosophical disposition towards truth (Republic 557b-
561e). 
The city of the many is paradoxically at once divided and united. It has lost the earlier unity 
of the community of ‘is’, of simultaneously shared pleasure and pain, but it has gained a 
community of ‘is not’ or unlike, a community alternatively united in its shared desire for 
freedom and equality (557a-558c). Because the city of the many allows every kind of person, 
and permits them freedom, it is analogous to the city that preceded aristocracy: the ‘natural’ 
polis, or ‘city of utmost necessity’. The desires of that early city began as moderate and good, 
and it is never described as evil or wicked, but on the contrary as admirable. But the city 
must, with the corruption inherent to the passage of time, necessarily give birth to corrupt, 
oligarchic rulers. 
In this passage of Book Eight of the Republic, Plato insinuates a rival chronology to the 
somewhat imaginary one that details the decline of the beautiful city of speech, seen in the 
previous chapter. With the benefit of understanding the Kallipolis as unrealisable in time, we 
see that it is actually timocracy or oligarchy that normally and historically ensues from the 
anagkaios polis or necessary city, and that philosophers cannot readily emerge from these 
more realistic and corrupt guardians at all. Rather it is from democracy, succeeding to 
oligarchy after the rebellion of the excluded poor against the corrupted oligarchs (in alliance 
with their more decadent sons) which contains contending freedoms giving rise to debate. 
Therefore, for Plato, only the breakdown of an inherited customary order and hierarchy 
embodied by the few, can lead to a radical questioning of the true nature of order or reality. 
The sophist, like the aristocratic guardian class in the city of necessity, emerges naturally in 
this setting. Sophistry is developed to fill the newly created needs of the regime to master a 




dangerous nominalism and moral relativism, as embodied in Thrasymachus’ claims that the 
best man is the strongest, wealthiest and most cunning. Because nobody is permitted to rule 
by force under democracy, it is necessary to persuade, and so the sophist takes up one man or 
one faction’s cause; but because he does not seek truth, he sells his words, adopting first one 
position and then its contrary. But ultimately this fosters an incipient anarchy that can only be 
stemmed by tyranny, itself supported by the most successful use of sophistic persuasion.  
It is in reaction to this that the ‘good sophistry’ of philosophy emerges, combating its cunning 
with the ironic cunning that points to an absolute, abiding truth beyond the civic vagaries of 
time and place.  
However, the deployment of sophistry and of counter-sophistry stokes the old fear of 
oligarchy in a new guise: the existence of men, both sophists and philosophers, who are 
capable of persuading others and educating the young, is perceived as an unacceptable 
expansion of power at the expense of the unity of the demos. This is illustrated by the 
playwright Aristophanes, with his eagerness to mock and cut down to the size the leading 
citizens through his comedies, exposing their pretended embrace of democratic sentiment, 
which equal laws would seem to enjoin upon them.93  This is why, Socrates, despite being 
poor and ugly, is singled out for special treatment in The Clouds, as the genuinely detached, 
but here naturalistic sceptic who recognises no other gods but ‘chaos, clouds and the tongue: 
these three alone’.94 By contrast, the reprehensible behaviour of the sophists who sought to 
rule as did the oligarchs of old, for their own sake, gave a bad name to philosophy, and 
unable to distinguish the two, the people tended to turn to the worst of the sophists who is the 
tyrant. The tyrant seduces the city with his speech and persuades them to accept the rule of 
the ‘bad One’, which is to say, the unjust man and so injustice itself.  
 
Politics and Participation 
How can the subversion of democracy by the democratic encouragement of sophistry be 
prevented? How can the people be brought to accept the new aristocracy of the wise, which 
will alone save them from oligarchy and tyranny, and so paradoxically, uphold also the 
democratic element? 
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It is in the later dialogues of the Sophist and the Statesman that we see the dialectical method 
guide us away from the Kallipolis, and towards the true island kingdom envisaged in the 
Cretan discussions of the Laws, to the city on the brink of eternity: as Planinc puts it, ‘the 
perfect image of the movement of nous’. The eikon is also a participation, for Plato ‘freely 
interchanges mimesis and methexis’.95  To ‘perform’ a role is to actively share in its life and 
nature: to enact the script of the civic laws with true erotic devotion and no ironic reserve as 
satirised by Aristophanes.  Yet it now arguably turns out that, in comparison with Magnesia, 
Kallipolis was not by this standard authentic. It was rather at a further mimetic remove from 
truly involved methexis of the Forms themselves (Republic 509c-511d). 
So, the mirror-like, two-dimensional geometric ‘map’ of the Republic is replaced with 
something less like a reflection, or an idealised drawing, and more like a carefully crafted and 
painted statue (Republic 420c-d). The reflection might appear to be superficially closer to the 
original as sheer mimesis, but in fact it is the ‘performative’ statue that is the closer imitation, 
because it is a thicker, more relatively self-standing ‘sharing in’ or participation. The former 
image is more ‘exact’ in relation to the eternal side of the divided line, but Kallipolis is 
mapped only onto the dimension of space.  It is the city more on this side of the divided line, 
conceived in terms of time as well as space, prudence as well as wisdom, that creates the 
more rounded and substantive image that is paradoxically most like the One/Good by virtue 
of a more dispersed, and so democratic, erotic linkage.96  
The nature of this city involves the Dyad equally with the One and their intermingling: a 
constant marrying and interweaving of things together to produce a quotidian and realisable 
harmony. In this city, the inhabitants are caught up in the duopolies of city and soul, male and 
female, city and world-soul and world-soul and kosmos. These progressively ‘larger’ souls 
each possess a character, psychically imprinted by the cosmic order, capable of recollection 
by dint of the soul’s descent from the One into the Many, which can be read as the soul’s 
descent into time.  
In this context, it is no coincidence that the last book of the Republic is an account of the 
soul’s journey through the kosmos, and of particular note is the crossing of Lethe that washes 
away memory (Republic 620d-621b). This parable of the soul’s descent into the changing 
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world is understood by Plato as educational, teleologically oriented towards the 
encouragement of wisdom and the overcoming of forgetfulness.  The entirety of the world of 
‘appearance’ - vivified by the world soul according to the Timaeus - is impressed with the 
virtues revealed in Kallipolis, particularly moderation, whereby the appetite is conditioned to 
desire everything in right measure. On the political level, the most primitive human 
communities that are directly under the rule of necessity, are ‘naturally’ taught to be 
moderate if they are to survive. With the further development of cities, human nature is 
revealed in its full psychic richness, but also its inherent contradictions and instability. The 
city is regarded as the mediate realm, between the animal and the divine, world and 
individual, and between the world of becoming and the world of what is.  Since it is thereby 
identical with a human existence (for the polis is given a rather broader definition by Plato 
than by Aristotle), the human being as such is implicitly identified with citizenship, that has 
for Plato both a temporal and a cosmic import.  Equivalently, the city is, in its essence, that 
institution which, though caught up in time and space, seeks to transcend them, playing above 
all the part of time as a ‘moving image of eternity’ (Timaeus 37d). This mediation is most 
strongly expressed in the concept of methexis or participation.  
Methexis describes the interrelationship of transcendent Forms to the embodied world, 
whereby one thing ‘partakes’ in another, without being that other.  This describes not only the 
relationship between finite things and the Forms, but also between the Forms themselves, 
and, by reflection, between things and things. Plato uses a number of terms for 
‘participation’, such as parousia (presence), symploke (interweaving), koinonia (coupling), 
mimesis (imitation) and mixis (mixture). However, methexis, used ninety-one times in the 
dialogues, is the one most widely applied by scholars, and that which seems to best capture 
the general sense.97 Plato deliberately avoids using terms restrictively, so his dialogues form 
not a sophistic speech to manipulate or ‘fix’ our response, but rather allow us, also, to 
participate in and to perform his works themselves.  
Methexis derives from the Greek theatre, describing a mode of performance in which 
audience interacts with the players, breaking the ‘fourth wall’ that might circumscribe a 
stage. So, in theatrical terms, we can think of the diagrammatic and over-finished Kallipolis 
as too stage-like, too like the written word as presented in the Phaedrus, as not available to 
dialogue, not capable of imitating truth along the axis of time where all are equally actors. 
 
97 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. P. Christopher Smith 




Rather than this geometric mere mimesis, or ‘flatttened’ methexis, a fuller participation 
suggests a dynamic relationship between Forms and things, an involvement in a ‘theo-drama’ 
in which the heavenly action fully circulates amongst ‘the audience’.98  
Some scholars have claimed that participation is less present in the later dialogues, arguing 
that Plato departs from his theory of the Forms, with a consequence of canonical 
discontinuity and assumed ‘change of mind’ in Plato’s own time. This stems from a classic 
misreading of the ‘third man’ argument, which is used not to destroy, but to clarify the 
theory, distinguishing between ‘higher things’ of the same kind as embodied things, from 
transcendent exemplars and causal sources of those things, thereby preventing the ‘third man’ 
regress (Parmenides 132a-b). In fact, the ‘critique’ of the Forms is for Plato an intensification 
of the theory of participation, since it ensures the priority of an ineffable sharing in a 
mysteriously unknown paradigm over any notion of a copying of a ‘visible’ hyper-example 
of a finite entity, just as, one can suggest, the implied critique of Kallipolis is an 
intensification of the need for civic and individually erotic participation in the Good. 
Methexis in Plato is indeed at once a metaphysical and a political concept, as indicated by its 
origins in Greek theatre, which was regarded as ‘performing’ citizenship in an act of pious 
representation of realities involving the divine realm - while we have already seen in that 
citizenship itself was a kind of performance for the Athenians.99 Yet this semantic range is to 
a degree under-addressed by Plato scholarship, concealed by inappropriate divisions between 
a   metaphysical, literary and political Plato, when his philosophy depends upon the 
integration of all three dimensions.100 The Sophist and Statesman have certainly been seen as 
dialogues for which methexis is integral; but the same cannot be said of The Laws.101  
The Sophist arrives at the idea of participation both in and amongst the Forms via a 
discussion of the nature of truth and falsehood, to deal with the apparent paradox of 
describing something as ‘that which has no sort of being’ (237a). This is ensuant upon the 
problematic of the one and the many: the ‘parts’ that compose our existence must be ‘real’; 
yet the ‘whole’ in its fullest sense is without parts: thus, either reality is different than the 
whole, which would give it a reality outside of reality, and render the ‘is not’ problematically 
 
98 As Gadamer argues, methexis suggests ‘real relationships’ in contrast to mere mimesis: see Gadamer, 
Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato (New Haven CT, Yale UP, 1983), 11. 
99 See Prauscello, Performing Citizenship, for the significance of drama to Plato’s conception of citizenship. 
100 Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Sophist (New Haven CT: Yale UP, 1983), 84. 




fully real, or else the apparent reality of a unitary whole with parts that are other to the whole 
is an illusion.  
A similar aporia is exemplified by other distinguished contraries such as motion and rest: 
either motion is not rest and this ‘is not’ is, or else rest and motion collapse into each other. 
Ultimately it is decided that the philosopher must be like ‘a child begging for “both”: he must 
declare that reality or the sum of things is both at once: all that is unchangeable [and fully 
exists] and all that is in change [and in part non-existent]’ (249d). For things to exist they 
must possess both rest and motion. Clearly reality is not exclusively either at rest or in 
motion, and yet reality as a whole, it would seem, cannot be both in motion and at rest 
without being contradictory. The only way out of this difficulty is to consider all things as 
being capable of ‘blending and participation in one another’, just as they all commonly 
‘participate’ in a reality that somehow exceeds the contrast of rest and motion, being and non-
being. The same thing applies in general to the relationship of the same to the different 
(thateron), which is clearly equivalent to that between the One and the Dyad attributed to 
Plato’s oral teaching.  
Embodied reality somehow blends and interweaves elements of both motion and rest, whole 
and parts, unity and diversity, same and different, while the transcendent realm of the Forms 
still more mysteriously fuses the two into one. It is, however, rapidly established that the pair 
of motion and rest is different from the pair of same and different, just as their respective 
terms are different.  Thus, each of these terms must be Forms in themselves.  The eventual 
conclusion is that ‘It must then be possible for ‘that which is not’ to be…the nature of 
difference makes each of the other four Forms - motion, rest, same and difference - different 
from reality or existence, such that their ‘is not’ being, in a sense ‘is’ (Sophist, 255d-e). Each 
new division not only divides but unites, such that the stability of the Forms is guaranteed by 
their mutual participation in one another, a blending that is structured by an interplay of 
compatibility and incompatibility, echoed here below as a musical and grammatical 
interweaving of vowel and consonant, low and high pitch.   
This account of participation however, neither begins nor ends with abstraction. Rather, we 
came to the question of being and non-being due to the hunt for the sophist, a figure that for 
Plato is the antithesis of the philosopher, a person who uses his command of logic and 
rhetoric not to seek for truth, but to pervert and manipulate language for his own ends. In the 




argument, whereby the sophist argues that his truth-denying speech still cannot be considered 
false, as it is impossible for ‘that which is not’ to exist. The search for truth therefore begins 
in The Sophist as a hunt and trial of a criminal; the sophist poisons the well of public 
discourse with falsehoods, corrupting the republic. But the dialogue also commences with a 
deep ambiguity about the identity of accuser and defendant: exactly who is the figure of the 
stranger at the outset? What is his relationship to the invoked Parmenides, known advocate of 
pure identity (Sophist, 217a-d)? We are in a state of moral uncertainty, and only a trial can 
determine guilt and innocence, separating out truth from falsehood.  
 
The Longer Trial of Socrates 
In fact, each one of the dialogues is a kind of juridical process. There is a continuous ‘trial’ of 
Socrates in which Socrates is going to be found innocent and eventually crowned as the 
winner of the race, returning, like Odysseus, to his true oikos in his philosophical triumph 
over death.102 It is precisely the principle of thumos, integrally linked with death, that must be 
overcome in the Republic, as we have seen.  This duel with death is literally played out in the 
Phaedo, Crito and Apology, but is presented allegorically in many other dialogues. 
In the case of the Republic, we begin to see a transformation in Socrates, and also in the 
Laws, if we accept Planinc’s opinion that he is here transformed into the ‘Athenian stranger’: 
alien at once to either sophistry or to Parmenidean monism. This transformation does not 
imply the disappearance of Socrates, but rather the consummation of his philosophical vision: 
for Socrates sought to be a midwife, not a sophistic ‘author’. In finally erasing Socrates’s 
name, Plato is therefore presenting Socrates at his very pinnacle: not as dead but as life 
transfigured:  entirely transparent to truth, bringing readers to the love of wisdom without 
imposing anything upon them.  In the end, therefore, Socrates is found innocent of having 
influenced his followers. It was truth - the Good itself - that did that. 
 
Participation in the Sophist 
This continuous trial ‘process’ is linked to the very notion of participation, as is revealed at 
the end of the discussion on non-being in Sophist: ‘this isolation of everything from 
everything else means a complete abolition of all discourse, for any discourse we can have 
 




owes its existence to the weaving together of Forms’ (260a). This ‘discourse’ is precisely 
philosophy, and by this statement Plato is not only indicating that it relies ontologically upon 
an interweaving of Forms, but also that the method of dialectic is inseparable from such a 
concept of ‘horizontal’ participation. Such a method is employed throughout both the Sophist 
and the Statesman in order to locate the particular ‘types’ of their respective titles.103 This is 
done by a process of continual division of categories, somewhat anticipating Aristotle’s later 
approach to the classification of being and revealing the arguable link between his turn to the 
immanence of Forms and Plato’s later concern with horizontal participation at once within 
the eternal realm and in their finite echo. Thus, we see that participation involves the ordered 
division and connection of reality and that thinking is itself a participation in and echoing of 
this cosmic process.  
The city is included in the process, and within this context the sophist is negatively classified 
as a parody of the philosopher defined as a psychic doctor and civic educator. He is a 
perverse figure in a number of senses: a ‘hunter of tame animals’ who uses persuasive speech 
in secret, for compensation; and most worryingly of all trades and sells virtue. The weaving 
together of Forms, or the art of dialectic, is misused by the sophist to combine that which is 
inconsonant, or to rip up the fabric altogether and teach that reality is not subject to any moral 
law (Sophist, esp. 223a-224d.).  
 
It follows that the sophist makes a mockery of methexis and so also of citizenship which is 
true human sharing. The key way that he perverts participation is in treating it as commercial: 
freely exchangeable, as movable goods which involve no deep connection. It is no 
coincidence that he is a hunter of tame animals either: both the simple rustic city and the city 
of excessive courage exclude the sophist, along with commerce. Only once we reach the 
stages of oligarchy and democracy can these forces finally emerge. If the association of the 
Forms in participation is analogous to the harmonious city-state, then the commercial 
association of ideas in the Sophist is analogous to the treacherous commerce of the oceans. 
So, we can see, positively and negatively, how, in this later dialogue, participation now 
relates more clearly to the horizontal interconnections of the Forms and the political 
interconnections (both hierarchical as with noble and base and equal, as with rest and motion) 
 





of the embodied Forms, besides the vertical participation of embodied beings in the Forms. 
The embodied beings thereby also participate in the eternal horizontal participation amongst 
the Forms themselves to produce the complete political dimension, such that the ineffable 
unity of the five prime Forms, including difference, and despite their mutual difference, is 
finitely reflected in embodied oscillations.  
Participation therefore is both a thought and an affect or power (dynamis): ‘anything has real 
being that is constituted either to affect anything else or to be affected’ (247d-e). 
Paradoxically, while resident in the temporal world we can only bring unity under the Good 
by the act of division. Participation in the Forms that exist in the light of the Good includes 
participation also in the Dyad. 
 
Participation, Myth and Politics in the Statesman 
The linkage of participation with politics is taken further in the Statesman. Theodorus, a 
geometer, makes the mistake of suggesting that Socrates will be ‘three times in my debt’ for 
discovering the ‘statesman’, ‘philosopher’ and ‘sophist’ (Statesman, 257a-b). Socrates swiftly 
mocks him for suggesting that any ‘mathematical expressions of proportion’ could 
encompass the differences between them. For the harmony and relationship between the 
Forms is not one of simple proportion, nor does number stand above the Forms; rather the 
harmony is one of relationship and speech (hence the grammatical analogies of The Sophist).  
At first the Statesman is defined as the herder of men. But the stranger (Socrates?) objects 
that ‘we are claiming he [the statesman] alone is herdsman and shepherd of the human flock, 
but we are merely singling him out as such from a host of competitors’ (268a-c). The true 
shepherd is rather also ‘matchmaker’, ‘midwife’ and provides ‘games and music’. The 
mathematically ‘pure’ concept of each man fulfilling only his profession according to mere 
‘justice’ has been already amended in the Sophist, which thereby advances the Republic’s 
suggestion of the primacy of the Good (and its prudential instantiation in specific temporal 
circumstance) over the Just. Whilst each man must fulfil a singular role in one sense, that 
unity has dramatically shifted from the performance of one task (even if it has individual 
parts/elements) to an understanding of each role or job as involving a multitude of functions 
and roles proper to it. This multitude must be made one by a unifying and individually 
realised telos. Instead of citizenship involving merely the legal prescription of ascribed roles, 




single role, itself echoing the integration of the whole city. This is supremely true of the 
supreme citizen who is the statesman. 
The Stranger proceeds further to elucidate the nature of the statesman by telling a ‘likely 
story’ (275b). Since the truth of political participation is one of social relationship, formed 
since untraceably primordial times, it cannot be readily captured only by logical subdivision, 
or logos, but rather such an account must be informed by mythoi, stories which help shape 
what Plato will refer to in the Laws as ‘right opinion’ or orthos doxa. Such stories, since they 
are not subject to any external measure of truth, and are lost to time, can only be judged by 
the standard of their internal consistency and harmony. Thereby they transcend the mere doxa 
that is common in the world of politics, intrigue and rumour, and instead turn the intellect 
towards both eternal truths and internal harmonies.  
Appropriately, then, the myth that follows is itself a story of the history of soul, the cosmos 
and of recollection itself. It describes the cosmos as a ‘living creature, endowed with reason 
by him who framed it’ and who ‘imparts its rotation to it’ (269c-e). However, ‘there is also an 
era in which he releases his control’. In the first era, the rotation of the cosmos is the reverse 
of today, and everything moves under divine control, time flows backwards, and there is, in 
consequence, no procreation. The world is under the rule of Cronos who rules the world 
directly with the assistance of the daemons. Under their sway, humans are an ‘earth-born 
race’, who like, the guardians according to the ‘noble lie’, are born from the ‘womb of the 
earth’. Therefore, the world of embodied beings was once governed by the same harmonious 
order of participation and blending as exists between the Forms. It was directly ruled by 
beings who contemplated them, and thus imparted and mediated the image of the Forms to 
the embodied world.  
Thereafter, the world is released from divine government and the cosmos proceeds on its 
course of ‘having control and government of itself and all within it and remembering, so far 
as it was able, the instruction it received from God’ (273a-b). The Stranger asks which era 
makes for ‘greater happiness’ and the young Socrates replies ‘No, I cannot decide’ (272a). He 
explains that, if the humans of that time had used their ‘association’ with the animals to ‘learn 
from each several tribe’ their ‘distinctive truth’, then it would have been a ‘thousand-fold 
superior’ to our own, but if not, then it is our own that is superior (272b-d). Although the 




it would seem, it is only the freedom and challenge of our ‘self-moving’ world that permits 
the development of philosophy.  
The significance of participation in this account is pervasive. First, the universe has its 
motion ‘imparted’ to it by God; self-movement is always participating in motion, being and 
intelligence itself. The learning from the animals by intelligent human beings is an image of 
the one and the many and their mixture.  In this way, recollection requires us to associate 
beyond ourselves in order to learn. Likewise, the statesman of our current era, after the retreat 
of the divine governors, participates in divine statesmanship by diagnosing vice and 
ignorance and persuading his patient into virtue.  
The true Platonic nature of city and citizenship has finally begun to take shape: the soul and 
the city alike are mediate entities between the realm of spiritual intelligence and the animal. 
But it is the psychic citizens, who of themselves constitute the city, who participate in the 
Good not just upwards through contemplating sophia, but downwards through their exercise 
of phronesis. Like the demiurge, they stand between the One and the Many, and must 
constantly cast an eye to each. In living in cities and exercising citizenship humans are taking 
on a daemonic role, mediating between the realm of appearance and the Forms.  
The descent or katabasis into the realm of the animal, of the many, is thereby a homeopathic 
purification. As we see in Book X of the Republic, we lose our memories in proportion to our 
‘suffering’- to our knowledge of evil - and those who are most impelled to forget partake 
most fully of animal nature by becoming beasts (620c-d). Yet recollection always potentially 
keeps pace with this descent, for we transcend time not by entering into timeless simulation 
of the eternally real (as in the Kallipolis) but through forging a city defined by the obscure 
invocations of mythos.  
After the mythological approach, the Stranger resumes the dialectical one. 
The statesman is declared to be analogous to the weaver both as philosopher and king 
(Statesman, 277a-279b). He threads together the different classes of society, and through 
their mutual participation they form a whole; the strands remain distinct but are held in place 
by their interlocking relations with many other strands. This forms a ‘weave’ of vertical and 
horizontal threads: the warp and the weft. Likewise, the very form of the dialectic of division 
is itself analogous to this weaving, as all the threads must be distinguished, and yet combined. 
Both arts are essentially the ‘blending of forms’, and the very act of dialectical division is 




participation: where the horizontal threads of the woof cross the vertical threads of the warp, 
horizontal and vertical are blended together.  
Equally, the polis is dialectically divided into its crucial causes and components of ‘noble’ 
and ‘base’, slave and free, public and private. The different classes of people must be woven 
together into ‘service’ itself, which must in turn be blended with production (306a-309b).  
Above all, the horizontal ‘warp’ of ‘desiring’ and pliable characters, surely kindred to the 
‘difference’ and ‘motion’ of the Sophist, must be interwoven with the vertical ‘weft’ of strong 
and inflexible characters (309b). This dialectic is subsequently expanded to embrace the 
different modes of governance which are monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny, all 
typically foregrounding an excessive dominance of the different civic component (301b-d).  
The acts of division in these dialectical operations are governed by two primary rules as set 
out towards the end of the dialogue. The first is: ‘let us divide them according to their natural 
divisions, as we would carve a sacrificial victim. For we must in every case divide into the 
minimum number of divisions that the structure permits’ (288a). This minimum consists in 
the most general categories, beginning with the principle of unity and simplicity emphasised 
in the Sophist. As before, each later categorisation is necessitated by a logical inconstancy or 
lack in the earlier principle.  Closely related to the rule of simplicity is the demand that each 
division must be between two non-arbitrary groups:  both halves, for Plato’s method of first 
‘dividing down the middle’, must rather be united by shared qualities (263b). The analogy of 
the sacrificial victim is not coincidental; the ‘middle’ division of the carcass is between what 
is due the gods and what is for humankind, between what is noble and base; it also establishes 
dialectic as a sacred and civic ritual. 
Thus, if The Sophist establishes a triple link between participation, dialectic and difference 
(the dyadic), the more explicitly political Statesman connects all three in turn to the 
liturgical.104 
 
3. The City of The Laws 
 
104 Cornelius Castoriadis stresses the bizarre musicality of the Statesman and links its ritually participatory 
character with an anticipatory refusal of what Hegel later named ‘alienation: Sur Le Politique de Platon (Paris: 




The ritual character of both psychic reason and civic ruling as a mediation of the high and the 
low, the One and the Dyad is most explicitly and lengthily expounded in the Laws.105 
 
Overcoming Stasis 
We have seen in discussing the Republic that, for Plato, the attempted escape from 
contradiction instead reveals apparently unsolvable aporias. This insight is alternatively but 
complementarily grasped by Giorgio Agamben in his short book Stasis. He argues, following 
Nicole Loraux, that the nature of the ancient city is that of a perpetually suspended civil war - 
stasis in the Greek.106 He plays upon the double image of stability and struggle and takes it to 
be a normative state of pre-modern politics. Drawing particularly on Plato’s Menexenus, 
Agamben argues that Plato is reflecting, in his account of Athens, a mode of civil war that 
was always anticipating reconciliation. The very act of stasis is part of kinship and unity 
itself, as we see with the use of the word symmeignymi, which means at once to fight and to 
mingle.107 We find then a further dark variant of the notion of participation, interweaving and 
mixture. 
Stasis arises from the circumstance that, while the city ends the vengeful feuding of families 
(as at the end of Aeschylus’s Oresteia), the very exclusion of the oikos from the political also 
ensures that civil war rumbles on, surfaces in civic disputes and even helps constitute, 
through the suspended irresolution of this disputes, civic unity. Similarly, conquered peoples 
under the governance of the City can continue to be alien and threatening. But inversely, as 
we see in Plato’s description of warfare in Republic Book V, even the foreigner may still be a 
Hellene, and therefore if disunity invades within, unity also imposes its imperative from 
without.  
It is partially in this context that Plato searches for a more universal definition of justice, 
whereby it is due to everyone, just and unjust, and may never involve a harm, unlike the post-
tragic but actually still tragic and contradictory circumstance of the Greek city where justice 
to the polis still necessarily involves the revenge of one family faction against another, or 
against a stranger who is yet not altogether so. Even in fighting, enslaving or killing an 
 
105 See Evans, Civic Rites and Anderson, Realness of Things Past, 129-148, 242. 
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enemy, we must for Plato be acting in a teleologically educational, just and moral capacity. 
The descent of the soul into time, and the coming of the age of Zeus, subsequent to the era of 
Cronos, as discussed in the Laws, represent the opening up of the possibility of learning, by a 
process of cyclical recollection and forgetting, and a continual interweaving of goods.  The 
Good is realisable for us along the axis of time, so we must always treat an enemy citizen or 
city as a future friend, especially in view of the fact that the Laws is actually concerned with 
an alliance of politeis. Therefore, we should destroy only the worst and justice-refusing part 
of the city and leave intact its capacity to recover.  
We see then a transformed account of the city. Instead of seeking to exclude Difference, or 
the Many, from the One, or the Same, and so the household and locally alien from the civic 
realm (which only leads to their being externalised and recurring), we instead create a unity 
though participation, through the marrying of contraries. This city is none other than 
Magnesia: the city of the Laws.  
 
The Genealogy of Law 
The new city is born out of the question not ‘what is justice?’, but rather ‘what is the origin of 
the laws?’. This seemingly mundane question is actually the more ultimate. The polis (city), 
polites (citizens) and the politea (constitution), for Plato, all pertain to a psychic level of 
being to which the issue of justice is not entirely adequate. Justice concerns the city’s 
equitable arrangement and distribution within a given and established space. But once the 
nature of justice in space and in the geometric abstract had been established, and a variety of 
concerns about the nature and participation of Forms and of the Good had been addressed, the 
way was made clear for a work capable of interweaving the strands of temperament through 
the contingent and changeable course of human history. 
This turns out to be equivalent to the question of law, in the sense of prescribed ritual patterns 
for the conduct of life. And we need to realise here that the nomos refers not merely to 
customary law, but to the nature of the kosmos. So, in seeking the origin of nomos, Plato is 
endeavouring to give a more complete answer to the central question of his philosophy: how 
to live the objectively good life in terms of a universal goodness.108   
 




In Laws 1, each traveller recommends the system of government native to them, and the 
Athenian, the ‘Socrates’ of the dialogue, weaves them into an ideal system, based on the 
merits and limitations of each: ‘a household or family can be said as a whole to be worsted by 
itself when its wicked members triumph, and be its own mistress when they fail’ (627c-d). In 
other words, the city is caught in a perpetual stasis, with the disputations of the ‘laws’ 
forming a battleground in which good can be divided from evil, and evil may triumph over 
good. Good legislation is defined as discerning ‘which of these states [pleasure or pain] is 
better or worse’ in each situation, when this ‘judgement takes the form of a public decision of 
a city’ (644d). Law, then, is a dialectical ordering of participating elements, demonstrating 
participation in action. The true nature of the guardians as those who, like dogs, ‘can 
recognise their master and bark at the stranger’, is revealed in this counter-logic of civil 
conflict.   
Moreover, The Laws describes the nature of participation between embodied beings and 
Forms more clearly than the Sophist and the Statesman: ‘each of us living creatures is a 
puppet made by gods...these interior states (pleasure and pain) are, so to say, cords, or strings 
by which we are worked; they are opposed to one another and pull us with opposite tensions 
in the direction of opposite actions, and therein lies the division of virtue from vice’ (644d-
645c). In other words, the source of the motion of our souls resides in the ‘strings’ of our 
participation in eternal reality. For since the Forms are also intelligences, it is clear that one 
cannot clearly distinguish in Plato ‘gods’ from ‘Forms’.  
Our ability to act lies in our ability ‘to yield to one of these tensions’ of transcendent and 
embodied reality, and the path of the moral life is to ‘always co-operate with the noble 
drawings of law’. The continuing importance of the dramatic imagery inherent to methexis is 
seen here in the idea of humans as players in a puppet show, whereby we become participants 
in the drama of divine law and cosmic order. As ‘spectators’ of the eternal we more 
fundamentally try to ‘act it out’, to the amusement and concern of the gods, who are the more 
final audience and stage-directors of the ‘real tragedy’ of this city, which does not pretend to 
the purification of the tragic and poetic proper to the Kallipolis. 
This training of doxa is one designed especially for children (664a-669b, 788a-824c). It relies 
not on critical thinking, but the correct habitual response to stimuli in different circumstances, 
like learning steps to a dance.  In the Republic, the Guardians are revealed by an effectively 




rather than following the dialectic method, wherein both arguments are ‘mixed’ and the good 
of both is gradually sifted from the bad.109 In the eristic, one seeks only to defeat the other 
argument, which causes the bad parts of your own to be retained. The education suggested by 
the eristic argument is also one-dimensional – courage is learned by witnessing courage, but 
not when it is inappropriate through counter-example. This can issue in the ridiculous, like 
the mounted battalions of children in the Kallipolis. The example of Magnesia suggests to the 
contrary that courage, and the other virtues, are to be taught not by simple imitation alone, 
but by a more complex imaginatively discerning participation.  
To continue and reinforce this training in ‘right opinion’ in the case of older, ruling men, the 
Athenian recommends that we ‘ply our puppet with drink’ and ‘by participating in this 
practice’ older men, who are most fitted by sagacity and experience to rule, are ‘brought back 
to the mental conditions of [their] remote infancy’, which involves a Dionysian confident 
energy otherwise deficient to age in its sober condition (645d-646a). For the older citizens, it 
is not sufficient to apprehend things in abstraction, but rather their souls must be set in 
motion to appreciate difference (again the echoes of the Sophist) by the mingling of pain and 
pleasure, which requires the soul to be pliant and child-like (669b-672c). 
Prauscello has admirably summed up the implications of this for Plato’s conception of 
citizenship: ‘children and elderly people, rather than being “imperfect” citizens or citizens 
with “qualifications” according to the Aristotelian vision, are seen as embodiments of 
different stages of the human existence, all of which are able to contribute to a lifelong 
training in civic excellence’.110 She suggests that this view of ‘citizenship as practice’ was 
‘counter-hegemonic’ in relation to a prevailing view of ‘citizenship as achievement’ which 
regarded it as mainly a legal status not acquired till the age of roughly Thirty-One, and 
attained through a specific cursus of education and (likely beginning towards the end of 
Plato’s life) military service in the ephebia.111 She rightly links this radically new inclusivity 
in the later Plato to the new pre-eminence of time and the new stress upon eros: the crucial 
matter of the right tuning of affectivity in which all share.112  
What one might call this ‘essential use of weakness’ is paralleled at the historical level in 
Laws III and IV (676a-724b). As with the Statesman and the Menexenus, although later cities 
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in Plato’s era corrupt the primitive simplicity of earlier pastoral society, it is only by dwelling 
in the later corrupt city that the soul can be educated not only to master pain and pleasure, but 
more significantly to master virtue and vice. For it is by being exposed to vice that we can we 
learn to become truly virtuous, as opposed to merely innocent because immature (however 
questionable such a thesis would seem to be from a later Christian perspective). Thus, 
wisdom is won in the city-state in the course of civil war, which is the ultimate test and 
school of the soul.  
Looked at this way we might suggest that the era of Cronos corresponds with the Kallipolis 
of the Republic, and the era of Zeus with the lessons of The Laws. Notably, the idea of 
autochthonous people in the earlier dialogue is the ‘likely story’ told to the Guardians in 
order to give them ‘right opinion’ (414b-c). This myth is given at least partial reality by the 
civic control of human breeding. However, the programme of breeding is an attempt 
artificially to lift the city outside of time and it is in the failure of this programme that the city 
of Magnesia comes into its own. 
 
At Last, Magnesia 
The city of Magnesia is very different from Kallipolis, even in its immediate description 
(Laws, 704a-724b, 735a-747e). It is divided into twelve sections, each with a village, 
surrounding a central area of worship, commerce and supreme governance.  
Unlike the city of The Republic, it is composed not of communal barracks, but of a set 
number of free families, governed by heads of households, which both turn cultivate the land 
and participate in the political process.113 Parents are sacred, to be worshipped and served as 
gods, and offences against them by children treated as blasphemy. Magnesia is a general 
school at once of shared practice and of philosophic logos. By contrast, we can call the 
Kallipolis of The Republic the ‘Cronos City’ of a primordial patriarchy, since only the 
Philosopher-Kings are masters of logos, with the rest of the city raised on mythos alone. 
Magnesia, however, is ‘Zeus City’, as it interweaves logos and mythos for all its citizens. The 
governing nomos denotes at once both ‘law’ and ‘music’, with the ruling older generations 
required to participate and be educated continuously also in ritual doxa, to sustain wisdom. 
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Only through ritual can wisdom be fully attained in theory as in practice. Kallipolis is an 
image of the soul, but in Magnesia, the lower and higher aspects of the soul (nous, thumos 
and epithumia) are more harmoniously united.114  
This mixture is reflected in the many unequal but proportionate distributions between classes 
and ages of people in Magnesia (740a, 715a-768e). Consequently, there is here present a 
hierarchy of ever greater refinement as well as a hierarchy of logical derivation, with each 
‘natural’ subdivision a ‘performance’ of the internal harmonies, resonances and hierarchies of 
the Forms. In ordering and distributing goods, the good ruler goes directly beyond right 
opinion to true wisdom, and by these acts reveals and participates in ‘the God’, which we can 
take to be the unity in which all the Forms participate, and in which they are ordered, divided 
and ruled.  
It is in the mythical-logical interweaving of the Laws that we can begin to see what vertical 
participation means in this context. The participations between the Forms, mediated by the 
Form of Difference that at once distinguishes and unites them, as discussed in The Sophist, is 
precisely an image of a supreme weaver and harmoniser. If it is to image vertically this 
interweaving, then our own world requires a kind of horizontal ‘charm’ to weave together the 
apparently contradictory and warring elements, and this process necessitates a weaver, the 
just ruler or ideal ‘statesman’ to enact and perform participation.  
Most decisively, it obliquely suggests that the Forms themselves are politically ordered: they 
require a divine ruler and statesman, a unitary theos to integrate them. A supreme God, 
sometimes invoked by Plato as ‘god’, or ‘the divine’ (to theion), lurks behind the Forms, 
exactly as a ‘second god’, the Demiurge, blends together diverse elements to shape the 
Kosmos as discussed in the Timaeus.  
Just as the era of Kronos is to ‘be infinitely preferred’, unless it should prove that the era of 
Zeus ‘serves to educate the soul’, so Kallipolis is supreme and yet the ‘second best’ city of 
Magnesia claims a paradoxical superiority by the very merit of its apparent imperfection in 
being the city of difference rather than unity, and of the dialectic unity of the Dyad rather 
than the eristic unity of the false ‘One’, which proves eventually to be a tyrannical imposter. 
So, whereas the Kallipolis seeks to refine and purify each element and keep them separate, 
Magnesia mixes together base and precious metals, creating an alloy. And whereas the 
 




elements of Kallipolis were in a secretly unstable Pythagorean harmony, the elements of 
Magnesia are carefully interwoven in such a way that they seem utterly concealed but are 
preserved from impurity by a ritual cycle of refinement through the application of the twin 
laws of eros and thumos (Phaedo, 85e-88b). The forceful element is represented by the new 
Guardians who impose the criminal law, but it is now tempered by an application of eros in 
the form of communal rituals.  
In each application of eros/thumos the other serves as ‘auxiliary’. So, the criminal law dealt 
with in Book IX (853a-852c) stems from the love due to family and fellow citizen, with 
particular emphasis and gradation applied to inter-familial crimes (728b-730b) and crimes 
against neighbours (843a-e), while the purpose of all punishment is curative, directed towards 
social healing, since injustice is taken to be a disease of the soul (728d, 933e). Meanwhile, 
the erotic rituals, ultimately directed towards appropriate marriages (771a-776b), including 
male-female dances in states of moderate undress, are checked and measured by the rule of a 
‘master of the revels’ who channels eros towards virtue and wisdom (722a-d). 
The essence of the role of the godlike human shepherd of Magnesia is summed up in the 
conclusion of the Statesman: it is to make good marriages (310a-311c). Unlike the eugenic 
programme of the Kallipolis, it is not similar natures, but contrary ones that must be joined. It 
is precisely when a class is ‘purified’ that it loses its erotic bond with the other classes, and 
destructive regime change occurs, as the Republic described. But if each class contains an 
element of the other their conflicts will always occur with the anticipation of peace, and 
whilst the other may be distinguished, they may never be radically excluded from the polis. 
This state of adequately pacified stasis inclines not towards perpetual violent conflict, but 
ultimately towards a moderated violence channelled through legal disputation. Opposing 
parties are brought together to determine truth in common. Citizenship becomes 
fundamentally oriented towards a balancing and interweaving of public and private life, of 
oikos and polis, male and female. The household participates in the political and vice versa. 
Rather than merged, they are held in a paradoxical tension, mediated through both the 
literally assumed soul of the city and the interactions of the now properly mingled souls of 
the citizens.115 At the heart of citizenship lies marriage, a unity achieved by the union of 
opposites without the dissolution of either, in which One, Few and Many are latently present. 
 




We have finally washed up upon the shore of Ithaca, and like Odysseus Socrates has donned 
a disguise, that of the Athenian. Like Odysseus also, Socrates begins in a cave (Odyssey 
12.102-105, 345-65). The Laws is a dialogue in which three strangers meet on a pilgrimage to 
a sacred cave, and on the way discuss the origin of the laws (624a-626b). The cave in 
question is the ancient subterranean sanctuary where the Cretan king would commune every 
seven years with Zeus. Socrates, it can be argued, appears amongst the pilgrims not under his 
own name, but under the name of his city, for his soul is the true constitution of Athens and 
he is its Philosopher King. He has always gone cloaked in irony in his earlier dialogues, but 
in effecting a final escape from the secular cave, en route to the sacred one, he becomes, like 
Odysseus in the cave of the Cyclops, who declared, ‘my name is Nemo [no man]’ (Odyssey 
9.366), everyman.  
The true statesman enters under the authority of Zeus into his rightful household, which 
interweaves oikos and polis, just as it fuses cave and heavens by entry into the positive sacred 
darkness. Like Odysseus who is greeted as a beggar, Socrates, the true philosophic king in 
disguise, deploys his cunning (the good ‘sophistry’ of the Sophist and Socratic irony) to trick 
the bad suitors of the city: those who wish to make a bad marriage and usurp what they 
cannot rule. He identifies the loyal servants, whom he makes his auxiliaries in his plans, just 
as the best of the servants, his old nursemaid (and midwife!) recognises Odysseus.  
In this way, the good parts of the city are separated from the bad, by the statesman’s art, 
using firstly eristic as a diagnostic weapon, as in the Republic, to divide the good members of 
the household from the bad. Having made this division, the ‘wicked suitors’, the thug-
guardians are killed, and thereafter the women who prostituted themselves to them - the 
sophists - are executed. Finally, the very image of the contemplative soul of the city -
Penelope, as it were - is reunited in the marriage bed constructed by ‘Odysseus’ (whom we 
can take to be now symbol of the active soul) as the true city of Magnesia. This vessel will 
bear Odysseus/Socrates through the remainder of his days, as it will cradle humanity in time, 
until the soul departs for the true eternal city of which it is the living image (see Republic 
592b).  
 
4. The Missing Third City 
If, as we have thus far argued, the Laws was written in continuity with the Republic, an 




(Kallipolis and Magnesia) referred to amongst those to be chosen by the legislator, but there 
is said to be a ‘third [constitution] we shall investigate hereafter, if God so will’ (739d). We 
might infer that if Plato dedicated two dialogues to the first and second-best regimes 
respectively, and promises to discuss a third, then a third dialogue ought to exist.  
This third best constitution is identified by a number of scholars as democracy, and if the first 
dialogue was a discussion of the republic, the second of the laws, then presumably the third 
would be a discussion of the people, and perhaps it would be entitled Demos. Plato 
presumably never got around to it, or perhaps never really intended to. 
But this is not the only third dialogue that Plato suspiciously failed to write. One of the best-
known examples is the hypothetical dialogue Hermocrates, the third interlocutor in the linked 
dialogues of Timaeus and Critias. Likewise, in the case of the Sophist and the Statesman, a 
third dialogue is promised on the subject of the Philosopher.  Mary Louise Gill accordingly 
argues that Plato never intended to actually write a third dialogue, and that the Sophist and 
Statesman provide the reader with the dialectical ‘tools’ to reconstruct the dialogue for 
themselves.116  
This ‘missing third’ aligns not only with the ‘third regime’ of democracy, and the ‘third’ 
figure of the philosopher, but with other Platonic triads: most significantly, for my purposes, 
with the tripartite soul in the Republic, the god-human-animal structure of the transmigration 
of the soul, and the three classes into which he divides society in the Republic and the Laws.  
The Timaeus/Critias pairing can also be compared with our hypothetical Republic trilogy. If 
we conceive of the uncompleted trilogies as dialectical movements, we start with the ideal 
and the heavenly: the cosmology of the Timaeus and the impossible best regime of the 
Republic; we then proceed by an act of dyadic, eristic division to the second dialogue, which 
occurs within time and history: the temporal city of Magnesia and the mythical civilisation of 
Atlantis, the city consumed by the cycle of history as discussed in the Critias. The first text 
represents the divine (as we see in the Laws), the life of the philosopher, and the rule of a 
perfect monarchy. But this undivided monad is a false ‘one’: we gaze upon it but do not yet 
know it; we must instead come to know the true Unity (in the closest manner possible for us) 
through imperfect participation by an act of division, such as is enacted in the division into 
 




creation by the demiurge in the Timaeus, and by the descent from sophia to phronesis in the 
Republic.  
Nevertheless, the dyadic perspective is in turn not completely adequate: as pure monarchy 
threatens to be tyranny, so also pure aristocracy threatens to be oligarchy. The democratic 
component of mixed government, mixed Kosmos and mixed thought is missing. With 
seeming paradox, this third, popular component is also the esoteric, unwritten oral element: 
the bond of hermeneutic and legal judgement that links unity with difference. The people are 
both weaver and shuttle.  
The third and always unwritten psychic completions of these trilogies would provide, one can 
infer, the cryptographic key, by dealing more with the lower, animal element and also 
reversing the order: here we ascend from sophist and plebeian, to soldier-statesman, to 
philosopher. But the unwritten dialogues are not a call to follow a line of descent past the 
human into an unending animality, but are rather a dialectical call to turn back, retrace our 
steps, and read backwards and side to side - the motion of the weaver, the action of methexis: 
recollection now as a way of life, one might say. This call is made by the higher eros of the 
Symposium, which elevates even the lowest, animal component. One can then suggest that the 
more dispersed and ritual character of the mediation of justice in the Laws unifies the two 
senses of the third as at once the democratic ‘lowest’ and after all the esoteric dialectical 
‘middle’, in a way that can be connected with the uniting role from top to bottom of the 
higher eros.  
Nonetheless, the Dyad can equally and alternatively be regarded as the factor of mediation 
between the One and the hypothetical third. The ‘second dialogue’ of The Laws already 
advocates not the false dyad of timocracy, but the true dyad that unites the Many with the 
One by a measured use of force. Thus, within Magnesia we descend into the oikos, into the 
choirs and feasts, besides infancy and controlled drunkenness, into the primitive city once 
more. We enter into the eros of the soul, animal nature, birth, democracy, mixture, forgetting. 
But we return from this condition through the governing discipline of dyadic thumos to a 
higher uniting eros, a divine animality, recollection.  
In the city of Magnesia, therefore, we can discern an ‘animal’ constitution in the households, 
which allows a mixture of all kinds of character for civic life to draw upon, and also a divine 




ensure that they are in keeping with basic legal principles, to relate them to theology and 
engage in contemplation of the ‘self-moving’ divine realm (894b).  
The analogy here is clear: the philosophers will continue to rule and dwell in the 
philosophical city, but it is a ‘nocturnal’ one, since the allegorical sun is allegorically 
concealed. As dawn breaks, a dyadic interval starts to govern. In one sense this is the 
mediator. But in another, as we have seen, it is the lowest democratic elements that mediate: 
since effective compulsion is more achieved through the ritual patterns, the most vital laws, 
erotically capable of weaving unitary wisdom with compelled division.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The ‘less perfect city’ of Magnesia offers a mixture that conveys stability and escapes from 
the cyclical decline consequent upon Kallipolis’s over-vaunting. Both cities are constituted 
by the reciprocal rule of people over each other, rather than by any extrinsic and modern state 
governing apparatus which bypasses the need for the virtue of the citizen and so for mutual 
citizen self-government.117 The emphasis on law in the Laws is not a switch to a concern with 
a more objective authority over-against the people, since the crucial laws are themselves to 
do with instilling the right ritual patterns of behaviour. As Prauscello suggests, ‘the 
relationship between citizens and the law is like a “scripted process”, since ‘citizenship is a 
script to be enacted’.118 But for justice to be fulfilled, this enactment must be authentic and 
must involve all free people, of all life-stages and vocations. The crafting of the city is not 
just architectonic, on the part of the rulers, but also artisanal, on the part of each citizen. 
As we have seen, in the city of the Republic, it is either the case that the citizenship of all 
means the abolition of the normal oikos in favour of the new artificial and mythical city-
household, or else that the citizenship of the guardians alone requires that the city is also 
constituted by the non-citizenship of the desiring class, who must simply be controlled, such 
that the nature of the polis as defined by citizen self-rule is compromised. But the city of the 
Laws already restores a basic democracy, while also integrating aristocratic and monarchic 
functions. Already it points towards the third, inferred, unwritten democratic city which is to 
be theorised through enactment. All citizens are now fully such, albeit within an inherently 
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hierarchic order, in a city where Spartan pain and Dionysiac pleasure are also allowed their 
paradoxical roles in mediating the Good. In this way, Plato saves the Greek ‘citizen project’ 
of self-government, while sustaining his salves against the degeneration of democracy into 
sophistry and tyranny. Magnesia is not just a more realistic city, as more realistic it is also 
more genuinely ideal. 
Plato never abandoned the theory of the Forms, nor the centrality of participation. However, 
his later (and perhaps always intended) more articulated metaphysics, which balances the 
One with the Dyad and elaborates the horizontal mixture of the Forms amongst themselves, 
both eternally and in the course of time, is matched by his later more democratic articulation 
of citizen self-government. There is no retreat from metaphysics into pragmatism involved 
here: instead, there is a clearer witness (as also with the account of cosmic origins in the 
Timaeus) to the inextricable involvement of metaphysics with the religious and the liturgical. 
The later comparatively greater bend towards the popular, is also a comparatively greater 
bent towards eikos mythos (Timaeus, 29d, 59c, 68d) as the necessary twin of eikos logos.119 
Both lexemes refer to discourses bearing upon true images of the intelligible Forms, as 
opposed to either false reason or false narration. Plato’s later more integrated poetic and 
philosophical account of participation includes also a more integrated account of the life of 
true citizen in the true earthly city.  
Since Greek citizenship concerned a mutual sharing of rule that was typically at once 
hierarchical and egalitarian, insofar as it involved some element of ‘mixed government’, the 
Platonic metaphysics of both vertical and horizontal sharing is arguably the most appropriate 
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It is Aristotle rather than Plato who has been taken as canonical in relation to the topic of 
ancient citizenship, articulated in the course of his critique of Plato’s political thought. Yet I 
have already intimated reasons to doubt this status, and this chapter seeks to consolidate those 
intimations.  
 
Commentators such as Lloyd Gerson have nonetheless argued persuasively for reading Plato 
and Aristotle overall in a unified and complementary fashion (as was already done by the 
Middle and Neoplatonists). Even those like Macintyre who tend to be more critical of Plato, 
have argued for Aristotle as ‘revising’ and ‘completing’ the Platonic project.120 Where he 
appears to dissent from Plato, he is offering a dialectical development, as Macintyre 
contends. However, I will argue against Macintyre that Aristotle sometimes returns, without 
convincing solution, to tensions which Plato has already resolved.  
   
 
2. Aristotle as student and critic of Plato’s politics  
 
Like Plato, Aristotle traced the origins and development of the polis and proposed the 
founding of an ideal colony (1260b, 27-1261a, 8).121 The primary aim of this section will be 
 
120 Lloyd P. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 1-23. See Eduard 
Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (Mineola, NY:  Dover 1980), 166-85 and Erich Frank, ‘The 
Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle’, American Journal of Philology 61 (1940): 34-53 as 
paradigmatic of this ‘anti-harmonist’ reading of Plato and Aristotle. By contrast, Gerson identifies Antiochus of 
Ascalon as a key ‘harmoniser’ of the two philosophers, and Cicero as reflecting this account through Varro.  See 
also Léon Robin, La Théorie Platonicienne Des Idées Et Des Nombres D'aprés Aristote (Paris: Félix Alcan, 
1908) and Harold F. Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1944) and The Riddle of the Early Academy (New York, NY: Russel & Russel, 1945), as 
further examples of a revival of the ‘harmonising’ position. See also Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? (London: Duckworth,1988), 88-102. 
121 Aristotle, Politics, trans H. Rackham (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1998), used for all quotations from the 





to understand how and why this city differs both from that of the Republic and of the Laws, 
cities which Aristotle specifically denounces in the course of his own theoretical elaboration.  
 
We are fortunate to have almost the entirety of his Plato’s corpus, as he wrote it, and his 
dialogues are pedagogic: designed to teach the reader how to be a Platonist. By contrast, we 
only have Aristotle’s work at second hand; the surviving texts are effectively lecture notes 
taken by listeners and we cannot in consequence be fully confident that they record 
Aristotle’s views with complete accuracy. Moreover, they may reflect only the account he 
gives of them in the unique setting of the Academy, in which not every debate or argument 
registers the true beliefs of the debater.  Many of the arguments Aristotle dismantles in his 
works might have been put forward as straw men for the purposes of refutation. It can be too 
easily assumed that some of these arguments, particularly as relating to the doctrine of Forms, 
were intended as authentic representations of Platonic positions, whereas they may have been 
offered as deliberate travesties for purposes of elucidation, or to rebut misunderstandings of 
them.122 Finally, what we know of Aristotle’s lost works suggests that they may have retained 
a more Platonic orientation.123 
 
All of these qualifications noted, there remain substantial conflicts between the two thinkers 
in their approaches to philosophy and politics, and these differences were productive of more 
substantial ones. 
 
It is striking that, on my reading, Plato and Aristotle make very similar critiques of the 
Kallipolis as a city dominated by an overly reductive, and quantitative geometry. Both agree 
that even the wisest philosophers will inevitably make the wrong divisions and decisions (for 
example, in the form of who is to marry whom, and which child is to be assigned to which 
class) and cause a political degeneration which the regularity of the operation of law may 
serve to correct. Where they differ is in their alternatives to this system of polis-making. 
 
As we see at Politics 1265a, Aristotle significantly begins his critique of both the Republic 
and the Laws with the question of number. He suggests that for the 5000 citizens of Magnesia 
(as opposed to more manageable 1000 of Kallipolis) to be kept in ‘idleness, together with 
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their wives, children and attendants’, ‘an area the size of Babylon’ would be required to 
sustain them. Aristotle’s contention is that the quantity that Plato seems to have determined 
as fitting for Magnesia’s warrior class disregarded the geometrical question of ratio as 
between between the khoran and tous anthropous (the country and the population).124 Yet 
highly specific prescriptions were laid down in this respect by Plato, such as the number of 
5,040 men as the (free adult) population of Magnesia and the demand that property be 
continually equalised between these. With respect to immovable property, it is actually Plato 
who more adhered to the democratic principle of isonomia, or legal equality, at least in the 
case of this fictional city.125  
 
Aristotle went on to assert that Plato had neglected the question of constitution, or of ‘regime’ 
in the Laws: ‘there is hardly anything but laws [nomoi]; not much is said about the 
constitution [politeia]’ (1265a). This concerns the notable Greek tension between the koinon 
as arche and as nomos referred to in the opening section of Chapter One. The lack of a 
specified regime in the Laws and the lack of laws in the Republic does indeed tell us 
something: if we read these two dialogues together, Plato was proposing that the ideal 
constitution must stand above the laws, but that we neglect at our peril the mediation of this 
ideality by law, which, indeed, as exemplifying the formally dyadic offers its own mode of 
ideality. For Plato, as for most ancient Greeks, a constitution was precisely determined by 
stipulating who should rule, and the requisite character of those who rule: it was not a matter 
of ‘organisation’ alone.  Aristotle shares this understanding of constitution, and so his 
accusation against Plato would seem to suggest that the latter called into question the very 
basis of a ‘politics of virtue’ in favour of a more impersonal mathesis: but this would be to 
read the ‘laws’ of Magnesia too much as if they were the more formal geometric 
arrangements of Kallipolis. The truth is rather that Plato thought of constitutional character as 
mediating Ideas above numbers with the help of the numerical patterns of liturgy and custom. 
By contrast, Aristotle merges constitution and law, such that in effect his Politics offers ‘The 
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The science of politeiai that Aristotle develops, whereby different regimes are compared, 
divided, and subdivided through the discovery of qualitative distinctions, is not novel. Rather, 
it is the method proposed by Plato in the Statesman, which we called that of eristic 
Difference, of making the right division within multiplicity, a method sustained in the Laws. 
The mystery of why Aristotle nevertheless attacks this dialogue is surely not to be ascribed to 
a failure to be aware of this methodological continuity. Rather, Aristotle has apparently good 
reasons to argue for the extension of Plato’s own self-critique to Magnesia as well as 
Kallipolis.  
 
As we have seen, Plato’s account of the operation of ethico-political phronesis assumes a 
prior ascent to the fully rational level of the soul through the operation of sophia. The ascent 
is complemented by a paradoxical descent which unifies the lower with the higher through 
the act of making ‘marriages’ between goods and making the many one. This reflects Plato’s 
understanding of the soul as a hierarchy formed of nous, thumos, and epithumia as the lowest 
element. But the least principle of desiring becomes, in the mode of the higher desire that is 
eros, especially operative in the Laws, also the supremely mediating and integrating 
daemonic factor between more sensual and more cognitive elements. Aristotle, by contrast, 
saw body and soul as directly and hylomorphically unified.  This given unity is defined by its 
telos, involving a horizontal growth of a thing from its potential to its actuality, which may or 
not be fulfilled, in some contrast to Plato’s notion of a psychic ascent as integral to the soul’s 
nature.  
 
Nevertheless, in these albeit different ways, both Plato and Aristotle wished to emphasise the 
continuity between soul and body, sense and reason. This continuity is naturally linked to 
further continuities between people and land, and between goods and the Good. As we see in 
Book III of the Politics (1287a, 29-33), Aristotle wanted the Good itself (‘God and reason’, 
as he puts it) to rule in the polis, a vision that he clearly shared with his teacher. Where they 
differ most fundamentally is in method. Both were dialecticians, but Plato emphasised the 
interplay of the One with the Dyad, and of rest and motion, in a dynamic hierarchy of ascent 
and descent which applies also to the life of the polis. Aristotle, on the other hand, sought to 
deduce everything step by step from foundational principles, making divisions into integral 
unities with an analytic precision. In this way, an episteme of definite ‘demonstration’ 





In consequence, for Aristotle, each type of thing has a nature and a form of knowledge 
appropriate to this nature. In other words, things are known by themselves: if we look at 
something’s nature, we can immediately discern its telos or purpose.127 Once we know that, 
we can say what ‘the good’ is for it, in its own particular case. The best of all arts of knowing 
is that which pertains to contemplating the best thing, that to which all things are oriented; the 
final cause which is the first mover and his handiwork the cosmos (Nicomachean Ethics, 
1178b8-1179a35).128  
 
In terms of his political understanding, this leads Aristotle to stress that the art of politics 
involves practical wisdom (phronesis), since politics is a practical matter concerned with 
living well in community, which is a matter of justice, or of the proper coordination of human 
lives and properties (1277b-30; NE 1140a24-b30). Though he agrees with Plato that the best 
and highest art is that of sophia, the contemplation of the highest, most unchanging good, he 
much more strictly divides politics from contemplation as a practical rather than theoretical 
matter and equivalently suppresses the primacy of ritual and religious participation as 
defining Greek citizenship.129  In the Nicomachean Ethics (1177a-1179a),  Aristotle 
accordingly describes complete happiness as belonging to contemplation, and delineates a 
hierarchy of happiness in which the Gods are entirely happy and blessed, whilst humans who 
are perforce caught between the active and contemplative life are imperfectly happy, and 
animals who have no part in contemplation cannot be said to happy at all.130 On this scheme 
of ‘division’ the fluidity of Platonic participation is lost, because political and even animal 
life no longer share in contemplation in some remote degree by virtue of their activities. 
Instead, these activities are regarded as inherently estranging. It is true that the education of 
the citizen in virtue for Aristotle implicitly included intellectual virtue, and so, in a sense, the 
entire city is, for him, as for Plato, directed towards theoria.131 Yet the latter is achieved less 
 
127 Aristotle, Physics, 194b23–35. 
128 All references to Aristotle, apart from the Politics, are to The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: OUP, 1994).  
129 This subversive philosophical suppression, with its negative implications for the full citizenship of women, 
has been demonstrated in detail by Blok in her Citizenship in Classical Athens, 13-21. At one point she notes 
Plato’s greater conformity to existing civic reality in the Laws in the appointment of priests and priestesses more 
by divine lot than human vote (236-7; Laws 759c) but she does not extend this argument with respect to Plato, 
as I have tried to do. 
130 The active life seems to be given a higher status in the Eudemian rather than Nicomachean Ethics (Eudemian 
Ethics 1219b). The Nicomachean Ethics is presumed to be later and its elevation of the theoretical can be seen 
as resulting from inherent problematics concerning the relationship of virtue to justice considered in this 
chapter. 




by collective worship (as in Plato), as by individuals who have eventually forsaken the 
practical life of politics.  
 
This weakening of metaphysical participation in Aristotle is reflected in the immanent details 
of his politics whereby, once more, a fixed hierarchical division tends to prevail over a more 
dynamic and in the human case at least (but arguably beyond it, given Plato’s belief in 
metempsychosis) more pedagogic, hierarchical process. In consequence, the household, 
including animals, slaves, women and children, become for Aristotle significantly more 
external to the life of the polis.132 Similarly, less is explicitly said about the vertically kinetic 
process of education as integral to the political.   
 
Aristotle’s great achievement was to discover in things their particular types of integrity, 
shape and purpose. But in the course of this novel project he came, arguably, to 
overemphasise the sheerly given nature of things, making of that essential nature a limiting 
horizon of potential. Plato’s cosmos, by contrast, is one in which more vertical and in 
consequence also more horizontal transformation is possible for all things. 
 
Plato accordingly comes generally closer to speaking of things ‘analogously’- in a loose, 
rather than geometrically proportionate sense - so that whilst he also makes Aristotle-like 
distinctions, he tends to allow, for example, that happiness of some genuine kind is in 
operation even at the level of beasts, because for Plato universal ideas are real of themselves 
and actively involved as generating powers in the shaping of things. They are not simply 
abstractions that are diversely instantiated, realised in various instances. For Aristotle, 
participation tends to be construed in terms of solely the statically mimetic, as opposed to the 
other methetic element of a dynamic ‘sharing in’ or more active ‘partaking’. We are able for 
him to participate in the good to the extent we resemble it. The gods are perfect likenesses of 




132 It is possible that it is Aristotle and not Plato who was further removed from actual Greek practice here, for 
which the oikos was an integral part of the polity and indirectly women did play participatory political roles, 
since the polis was not an exercise of central democratic control of isolated individuals in the modern manner. 




Aristotle was perhaps more conventionally Greek than Plato in his greater hesitation about 
psychic deification, tempered praise of democracy, and his tragic account of life.133 His ‘best 
possible city’ is an account of human existence that ultimately despairs of more than a partial 
realisation of the good, especially at the political level. This is why he regards a quality of 
detached, ironic reserve as a typical aspect of a noble (kalon) character: the aristocratic 
politician may perforce have to punish and rebuke his fellow men, but he does so with a 
certain disdain for the whole process (NE 1128a32, Politics 1332a10-15).134 
 
Equivalently, Aristotle’s redemptive mission was to render joyous this fate by a kind of 
acceptance: each thing is allowed to be entirely itself; each thing contains within itself the 
potential to be itself in an ideal, fully actualised sense within the bounds of its own finite 
existence. Yet this ease with one’s own fate had been already displaced in Plato by a divine 
unease and a daemonic discontent.135 Aristotle, instead, suggested as ultimate principles in 
the last line of the Politics ‘moderation, possibility and suitability’ (1342b,31-3).  
 
In terms of these three principles, we can further comprehend the central points of divergence 
between the two philosophers. Plato accepted moderation in virtue, but also excess in the 
exercise of love, because there cannot be ‘too much’ in relation to the good, whose temporal 
increase should be limitless. Whilst both philosophers note the necessity of engaging in the 
active life (the great return from contemplation in the Republic), Plato claimed that this is an 
act of almost super-abundant love: the philosopher will not wish to return to the world below 
but does so out of love of his fellow citizens. Yet in this ‘descent’ into the active life, the soul 
perfects its wisdom. Aristotle does not quite say that there can be ‘too much of a good thing’ 
in relation to the Good - indeed he addresses this question in the Nicomachean Ethics with 
respect to the fate of the overwhelmingly outstanding citizen - but precisely the concept of 
the ‘becoming’ and the ‘possible’ ends up being the limiting horizon that introduces the 
‘mean’ into the question of our relationship to the Good: we must tend to the needs of the 
body, which extends to negotiating all the matters of the world as regards marriage, money-
making and the waging of war, and this renders a ‘pure’ focus on contemplation immoderate 
in terms of normal civic existence (NE 1095b,1177b).  
 
 
133 Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford, OUP, 2002), 5, 471-73.  
134 See Susan D. Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 154-60.  




Similarly, the life of the body is seen as a check on happiness and the contemplative life by 
both philosophers, but in Plato the realisation that we must participate in the good qua our 
mortal embodiment is the opening to an account of how the very problematic of bodily/active 
life is its own unique channel into the life of the Gods. For Aristotle instead, the need of 
‘moderation’ in order to attend to particular practical goods is regarded as inherently a check 
upon our contemplative participation in the Good, almost as if ‘the Good’ and ‘goods’ were 
in a state of ontic rivalry. 
 
Thus, Aristotle did see the sense in which one cannot have ‘too much’ of the good, or ‘too 
much’ virtue, but this caused for him a kind of excretion of the purely virtuous and the purely 
generous from ordinary ethical and political life. At the sublime edge of practical reality, we 
have the presence of the contemplation of the cosmos and the divine which cannot be 
excessive. But between the regularity of praxis and the theoretical margin lies the 
problematic and yet paradigmatic phenomenon of the magnanimous, entirely noble man, 
whose impulse to virtue is hyperbolic compared with ordinary civic norms and expectations 
and not much given to admiration, since nothing is as great as his own sublimity which 
approximates him to the divine (NE 1125a). In a Nietzschean fashion, Aristotle suggests that 
an aspiration to complete nobility and magnanimity might cause such a man to seek to seize 
as many goods from others as possible, to subject them to his own ‘throw-away’ generosity 
and desire to make glorious public gestures (Politics 1325a). This would seem to be in a 
sense ‘just’ if the measure of justice is the maximum exercise of virtue.  
 
Yet Aristotle does not go along with this counter-intuition that he nonetheless entertains. 
Such a mode of ultimate justice would also destroy the city, for even robbery with exalted 
intent offends our usual standards of what justice entails (1281a). Thus, a tension appears 
between magnanimity and justice, which are both and variously said by Aristotle to be the 
ultimate in virtue. Is the height of virtue the self-sufficient capacity to be discriminately and 
somewhat disdainfully self-giving, or is it the relational regarding of the good of the other as 
well as of oneself (NE 1129b29-33)? As we shall see, this ethical tension is intimately linked 
to a political tension between the rule of the person and the rule of the law, just as the excess 
of the magnanimous man over routine justice is linked to the problematic of the ostracising of 
the overweening individual.136 
 





The three categories of the moderate, the possible and the suitable also lead Aristotle to come 
to startlingly different conclusions on the issues of democracy, citizenship, monarchy and 
empire. If we read the Republic and the Laws together as representing the ascent of the soul 
upwards to the ideal city of the One, then down to the dyadic city of Magnesia, then we can 
observe a similar duality in Aristotle. 
  
He is in fundamental agreement with Plato about the nature of the Good, and the fact that the 
Gods most fully, perfectly and ‘naturally’ share in it. Both philosophers also agree that the 
‘best possible city’ is a blend of the ideal and the practical, the unified and the diverse. But 
for Aristotle the ‘best possible city’ simply is the best city full-stop - precisely, because of its 
instantiation of these three principles. The Kallipolis is not the best city because it is neither 
possible (biologically, economically or psychologically), nor respective of the differences 
involved in human ‘becoming’ (it has women take an equal place with men and receive the 
same education), nor moderate (it excludes various forms of art that promote 
moderation/harmony, and in general takes extreme stances).  
 
Plato’s view, by contrast, if we take into account both cities and their implicit relationship, 
effectively cuts across Aristotle’s question of the possible.  Finite things exist by virtue of 
their fluid participation in the very highest things. This existence is not simply a deficiency, 
but both an imitation of, and a dynamic sharing in the realm of the Forms which includes as a 
super-form, the form of the Dyad or of Difference, which is an exemplary archetype of their 
very divergence from the eternal perfection of Unity.  
 
For this reason, ontological limitation is much more ambivalent for Plato than for Aristotle. 
Less imperfect for him considered simply as the fate of restriction, such that for Aristotle the 
good of say, being a tiger, is in no inherent sense deficient. Tigerhood can be perfect 
tigerhood, just as perfect citizenship is perfect in itself, without refence to other modes of 
being good, including being a good man as such. And yet for Plato limitation is more perfect 
than for Aristotle as being more perfectible outside its own given bounds, especially in the 
case of human beings, including their civic life. All things can rise or fall in the ontological 






of deification. So, in one sense, for Plato, all finite possibility is more restricted; in another 
sense it remains more open, even in its finitude, to transformative improvement.  
 
It then follows that, indeed for Plato the ideal city of the One is impossible for men because 
of their embodiment and their becoming, which certainly requires a ‘mean’ compromise, as 
for Aristotle. Yet at the same time, it is not entirely impossible because of dynamic 
participation. The possible dyadic city can ‘impossibly’ aspire beyond itself and it contains 




3. Democracy and Citizenship 
 
Since Plato and Aristotle nonetheless converge on so much as to the necessary ‘mixture’ of 
the ideal and the real, it seems somewhat baffling that Aristotle should end up recommending 
a form of mixed government that is nonetheless apparently more biased towards the 
democratic (Politics 1332b-1334b). The answer to this conundrum lies in his complex 
account of citizenship. 
 
The paradoxical nature of citizenship in Aristotle can be read through two lenses: the 
supreme ‘rational’ community of the polis, and the cosmic order in which Aristotle locates it.  
If the ‘true’ citizen who is the philosopher is a subterranean figure in Plato, then in Aristotle 
he remains so concealed. The truly free man cannot be a slave (1255a-b), while the truly good 
man must be king (1284b;1287a). Yet between the natural slave and the natural master, lies a 
troubled and ambiguous realm in which Aristotle’s average citizen is located: one who is 
clearly free but not so clearly virtuous. What really sets Aristotle and Plato politically apart is 
that whilst they agree on the nature of the polis, the citizen and this truly ‘human’ realm, 
Aristotle makes the only true imitators of the Good the first mover and partakers in the divine 
life who are the gods and the daemons.  Citizens in general are not participants in the eternal, 
although kings form a partial exception. The citizen is certainly (and by definition) one who 
has a share in this-worldly rule, since he is partly one who rules, partly one who serves. But 
this share in rule does not so clearly give him a share in turn in divinity, nor even, it turns out, 





Aristotle freely admits, following Plato, that ‘the best must rule’, that there must be a rule of 
virtue which is the government of passion by reason through a justified exercise of private 
and collective force or thumos (1279a-b). For him, also, the very purpose of the city and its 
laws is the education of the citizens in virtue.137 But what constitutes the best, or the finite 
good, is where the two subtly diverge. In Book III (1277b-1278c) Aristotle outlines the 
differing forms that citizenship takes in the polis. We might say that Aristotle (somewhat in 
accord with what we now know of Greek citizenship as a spectrum)138 defines four different 
main gradations of citizenship: formal citizenship, as having been born of citizen parents; 
artisans and labourers granted a limited share in government in democratic regimes; the 
ruling elite of an aristocratic regime, and finally the ruler of a monarchy who is its sole true 
citizen. Aristotle’s account of citizenship varies based on the regime: ‘As there are several 
forms of constitution, it follows that there are several kinds of citizen, and especially of the 
citizen in a subject position’ (1278a). But he never finally situates citizenship or narrows it to 
one of the four definitions just given, an ambiguity that reflects wider contradictions in his 
Politics.  
 
It is easy to read Aristotle as passing quickly over the matter of speaking of children and 
women as formal citizens, making way for his substantial argument for the respective merits 
of aristocracy and democracy(1284b). But a different perspective emerges if we focus more 
upon the assumed metaphysical context of Book III. Three strongly interrelated themes 
emerge: the interrelationship of animal, human and divine worlds; the status of friendship and 
the possibility of arriving at the Good in political life.  
 
Aristotle’s most straightforward, clear definition of citizenship - that of ruling and being ruled 
in turn, and in having a share in offices - is what for him defines the very nature of a polis as 
having a genuine and fully human politeia (1277a-b). The city is constituted by citizen-
participation in its governance. And yet this supreme definition of what a citizen is belongs 
only to the third, aristocratic definition of citizenship.  
 
 
137 Collins, Rediscovery of Citizenship, 44. 




The definition becomes more unsettled in relation to the second kind of citizen who may not 
necessarily share in or qualify for office (except in a complete democracy) but nevertheless 
has a role in selecting citizens for office, and in serving in more limited roles like jury 
service. Aristotle openly wonders whether such people are fully citizens: if they are so 
counted, then true virtue is no longer the key mark of citizenship, and yet free people are 
neither metics nor slaves (1277b). Such semi-citizens who do not rule, have no need (or 
perhaps capacity) to exercise the virtue of phronesis, but only of ‘right opinion’ (orthos 
doxa). And notably this is also true of citizens in the phase when they are being ruled and are 
not ruling (in their case the capacity for prudence lies dormant, 1277b). Where the definition 
is left behind altogether is in the cases of women and children, who are clearly said to be 
citizens, but have no share in government whatsoever. Finally, the monarch rules but does not 
share in office: he is not ruled in turn, but only rules. 
 
In relation to this requirement of reciprocity, it is crucial that both citizenship and friendship 
are bound up with questions of equality; only equals can be perfect friends, just as perfect 
reciprocity implies at least some mode of equal distribution (NE 1158b-1159a).  Yet the 
question of the connection of these social relationships to virtue is ambivalent. For the Good 
is either held entire by a godlike magnanimous soul who is fittingly the King (exercising the 
arche) and doled out in portions to the servants of that divine master, or else held in common 
between equal citizens (as the distributed koinon). The most perfect virtue seems after all to 
escape both friendship and citizenship, and so the very nature of the polis, whose character 
threatens thereby to become more one of pragmatic compromise between immanent reason 
and passion, than one of the salvific mediation of transcendent reason, as with Plato.  
 
This is despite the evidence that there is some equivalent of Platonic eros in Aristotle. Just 
because phronesis is for him a specifically intellectual rather than practical virtue (as not so 
specified by Plato), even though it regulates practical reason in order to establish in differing 
situations the appropriate mean, and the best circumstantial way to achieve ends, it is the 
practical virtues themselves which discern both the ends of flourishing and the means to those 
ends, which are the exercise of the virtues themselves. Inversely, since these ends are specific 
‘goods in general’ we can even say these ‘final causes’ are somewhat theoretical, after all a 
little ‘Platonically’ tinged. And yet they are discerned, along with the intrinsic and inherent 
means to those ends, by the virtues themselves which involve a blend of reason and emotion: 




thought’ (orexis dianotike). Thus ‘the origin of action - its efficient, not its final cause - is 
choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end...good action and its 
opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character’ (NE 1139a-b4). All 
that phronesis supplies is the balancing of virtues and a more ‘controlling’ reason with the 
operation of the passions (NE 11444b-1145a).139  
 
Yet just because of the eminence Aristotle gives to intellectual virtue in general, including 
phronesis, which is ultimately ordered to purely theoretical sophia (NE 1145a),140 he has a 
predilection to seek an eventual escape from the emotive (just as the ‘consumer city’ in 
general sought to escape the realm of needs and contingent impulses), which is only 
achievable in the sphere of pure, dispassionate, intellectual contemplation, where the erotic, 
unlike in Plato, has been left behind. It follows that for him ‘longing’ is confined to the 
practical political arena of compromise. Even magnanimity (which starts to exit the political, 
as we have seen) is a calm and self-regarding sway of the widest possible influence, while 
theoria involves an entirely calm and fully satisfied excess that is purely cognitive. 
 
The full implications of this comparative subordination of eros can be seen in Aristotle’s 
complex endorsement of democracy, which he understands in terms seemingly not so 
different from Plato’s description: it makes possible a kind of ‘wisdom of crowds’, because 
every kind of person and quality is present. The most virtuous individual in the city may have 
a greater claim on authority than any other individual, but he possesses a more incomplete 
account of the good than that of the city as a whole. Consequently, when the entirety of the 
polis (its adult male free citizens) is gathered, it speaks with greater authority than any one 
person, and so represents the primary element in Aristotle’s ‘best possible’ regime (1282a). 
These massed citizens can rule over each other simultaneously or else ‘turn by turn’ simply 
through their own virtuous activity and with no modern sense of a ‘separated’ central ‘state’ 
or governmental apparatus (1317a-1318a). 
 
 
139 For this see Nicomachean Ethics VII in general. It is arguable that Macintyre does not fully grasp the leading 
role of the emotions in Aristotle, because of his strong desire to reject modern reductive ‘emotivism’. See 
Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1983), 1-36, 137-53. 
140 Aristotle here suggests that ethical prudence is ordered to wisdom just as political ruling is ultimately 
subordinate to the rule of the gods. The difference from Plato here is then the relative lack of participatory 




But what is for Plato a ‘many coloured garment’ of the assembled citizenry, in which good 
may jostle with bad, is in effect for Aristotle a vision of a single titanic person, statically 
containing base passions (controllable only to a degree) alongside reason and the will: 
 
 Just as the multitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands and many 
senses, so also it becomes one personality as regards the moral and intellectual 
faculties. This is why the general public is a better judge of the works of music and 
those of the poets, because different men can judge a different part of the 
performance, and all of them all of it. (1281b)  
 
For Plato, such a city could not be said to be truly united. It is paradoxically ‘atomised’ in a 
sense, allowing the good to escape oppression by the wicked (for a time), but keeping the 
wicked from being educated or chastised by the good. Fundamentally, as we saw in the last 
chapter, Plato thought, in agreement with Aristotle, that unity can only exist in the city, as in 
the soul, when the higher parts rule the lower, higher goods are valued above lower and 
virtuous men rule those of lesser virtue. But for him this is both a matter of an essential 
restraint rather than mere ‘management’ of the baser by the higher, and also one of 
continuous erotically educative raising of the baser through its prudent arrangement by the 
wise and its orientation beyond itself to wisdom. By contrast, for Aristotle, there is rather less 
fluidity and communication between both the parts of the soul and the classes within the city. 
In consequence, tension arises between virtue and the coercive achievement of unity. 
 
Aristotle is half-prepared to allow that, since virtue should rule in the city, aristocracy or 
monarchy are preferable to democracy. However, the more there is virtue, the less there is 
any widespread citizenship in the full sense (and so the less there is a city) and vice versa. He 
is even ready to allow, in albeit problematic terms, that the person of uncontaminated virtue, 
if such there be, should be the sole ruler, such that pure monarchy involves the monarch 
being the sole citizen. But we would here seem to have exited any normal understanding of 
specifically civic governance at all (1286a, 1287a-b). As Donald Morrison notes, ‘since the 
monarch is the only citizen, his self-interest and the interest of the citizen body are 
identical.’141  
 
141 Donald Morrison, “Aristotle's Definition of Citizenship: A Problem and Some Solutions”, History of 





However, Morrison is sceptical of the view that different degrees of citizenship are inherent 
to Aristotle’s theory, and instead leans towards a univocal account of citizenship as ‘a share 
in happiness’. He is too swift to dismiss the alternative accounts of citizenship as merely 
formal, or as obvious debasements, such that the tou archomenou politou (1278a) or ‘ruled 
citizen’ becomes for Morrison clearly contradictory. Given the inherent tension in Aristotle 
between citizen as virtuous ruler and citizen as passively participating in rule without any 
necessary virtue, this is not so clear after all.  
 
Morrison places much weight on Aristotle’s remark that the refusal of a share in public 
honours to some men living within certain regimes is disguised by a fiction of formal 
citizenship. But as we have seen, the term citizen is also applied by Aristotle to those like 
wives and children of citizens who have no prospect of a real share in public honours. At the 
same time, Aristotle contradictorily narrows the definition (1278a) in saying that properly 
and by ancient tradition only those released from manual labour can fully be citizens. It 
follows that, by definition, even in a democratic regime, citizenship in the ‘full’ sense of 
politically virtuous reciprocity not only is not, but cannot be, extended to all those who enjoy 
the formal status of citizen.  
 
Citizenship in Aristotle is somewhat varying and analogical, but the analogical continuities 
sometimes involve outright contradictory tensions. Above all, the phase of ‘being ruled’ is 
ambiguous, because it seems to suggest a sinking into non-virtuous passion, incapable of 
phronesis, that must be extrinsically and so in a sense ‘tyrannically’ controlled. Thus, the 
more the city is dominated by virtue that must be active, the more it becomes sheerly 
aristocratic and even monarchic. But with the consequent loss of reciprocity, of the ‘turn by 
turn’, not just democracy, but citizenship and so the city itself, the politeia, is abandoned. For 
justice is here offended, in the sense that too many citizens are excluded: something which 
seems neither fair, nor safe for the city as a whole. If it is unsafe to allow the non-virtuous a 
share in ruling, to exclude them altogether would be still more perilous (1281b). 
 
Such a perceived affront to justice in the very name of virtue  (the excess over justice of 
magnanimity and nobility) reveals that, for Aristotle, the good is just one factor for licit 
citizen-participation in civic life; the others are freedom, birth and property: ‘wealth and 




government’ (1280a).142 For Plato, in comparison, with his more elevated view of passion 
and more metaphysically extensive account of methexis, virtue can remain coextensive with 
valid citizenship, because his account of virtue makes it coincide more with that just division 
and distribution which constitutes nomos.  
 
If, for Aristotle, pure virtue threatens democracy and legitimate politeia as such, then, 
conversely, the more democracy prevails, the more a pragmatic constraint of the many by the 
whole tends to displace the virtuous constraint of passion by reason. Pure mass force starts to 
substitute for the mediating of reason by force. Whereas the solely virtuous monarch would 
constrain by force now apolitical subjects, under pure democracy an aggregated political will 
constrains everyone who is equally lacking in virtue. In contrast to Plato once more, the 
political and the virtuous no longer perfectly align.    
 
What is still worse with Aristotle, is that virtue narrowed to the exercise of real virtue by a 
few and then by the one, might be a sham virtue, reducible to a concealed self-interest, since 
he fails to provide a counter to such sophistic suspicion in the way that Plato does in the 
Republic by directly subordinating the ruler to an accessible and practically mediated divine 
transcendence. In other words, the wearer of the ring of Gyges is for Aristotle invisible even 
to the gods and therefore would truly seem to become a law unto himself, like the witty 
individual: how can we be sure that the latter is ironic in the name of the reserve of the Good, 
and not just his sense of his own superiority?   
 
 
4. Law as Resolution in Aristotle 
 
The thematic of law ties together the problematic strands of formalistic citizenship: the ‘share 
in happiness’, the ‘passive citizen’, and the question of a hierarchy of relative citizenhood. 
Aristotle tended to shy away from a dynamic hierarchy of citizenship, instead opting for a 
more scientific ‘locating’ of citizenship at different levels in different regimes. Yet it is his 
rejection of a more fluid order, and over-confinement of friendship to the egalitarian, which 
renders a wide sharing in ‘full’ citizenship impossible and transforms hierarchical 
relationships into those of outright command and obedience, masterhood and slavery. 
 





If the specifically political life of virtue is fated to penetrate only a part of the material city, 
then some second principle other than citizenship, and in some sense separate, is necessary 
after all to unite it.143 Law, for Aristotle, is none other than the stipulation that citizens should 
rule turn by turn (1287a). Yet we have already seen that the problem then arises of how far 
‘being ruled’ can fall within the compass of virtue and so of full citizenship - despite the fact 
that he declares that one can only learn to rule by first being ruled, as in the case of military 
training (1277b).144  
 
So, whilst the citizen body proper can be united by a shared understanding of the Good, the 
citizen body in formal terms, the ‘ruled citizen’, can only be governed, and acquire a ‘share in 
happiness’ by the habit of obedience to laws made by citizens proper. Even if the citizen 
body has a membership of one, as with monarchy, the unity of the citizen’s soul will be 
mirrored in the justice of the laws he sets down. For clearly the virtuous ruler will respect his 
own laws that derive from his virtue (1287b). Thus, law tends to synthesise the rule of virtue 
proper with an order contrived through regular obedience to something extrinsic. 
 
In a sense Aristotle followed Plato in pursuing a turn towards law and the law-governed city 
as the solution to the failings of the Kallipolis, which was itself based upon self-rule under 
the aegis of virtue. As against the risk of a lack of personal wisdom on the part of self-
interested rulers, and a failure to heed wise council on the part of the ruled, the more regular 
operation of law offers a more certain constraint: ‘he therefore that recommends that the law 
shall govern seems to recommend that God and reason alone should govern, but he that 
would have man govern adds a wild animal also’ (1287a). 
 
But one immediately notices the anomaly: for Aristotle we are inherently political animals 
and therefore the non-animality of law would appear to threaten also the essence of the 
political. Whereas Plato’s psychic tripartition stressed the mediating role of thumos between 
reason and passion (linked to eros as elevated passion), ensuring a preservation of an 
animality that is itself political, in Aristotle the two are more directly put in apposition, 
threatening an either/or construal of their relationship, such in subordinating the animal, the 
 
143 See Politics, 1326a-b.  
144 There seems no warrant for Kraut’s claim that there is, for Aristotle, a class of citizens who only rule and are 




political is also lost sight of. We have already seen how a more purely rational virtue tends in 
Aristotle to leave behind the practical and the political, something allied to his wondering 
whether the god-like noble man should rule alone, in abandonment of shared citizenship. 
Reluctance to do that and fear that this offends both justice and security, while continuing to 
fear the rule of the non-virtuous, leads Aristotle to favour the more impersonal rule of nomos 
as, in effect, a compromise between the rule of reason and the rule of the passions. And yet 
we now see, from this quotation, how the rule of law also tends to leave behind our animal 
inter-personality and reciprocity, rather in the way that the virtues are for Aristotle 
subordinate to the immanent theoretical balancing of his version of phronesis, which is also a 
kind of immediate presence of the divine. Even though, for Aristotle as for Plato, customary 
law is primary, a kind of reduction of law to the formulaic, or to the ‘mathematical’ seems to 
threaten here after all.  
 
Thus, what is meant by nomos in Plato and Aristotle is somewhat different. As Plato outlined 
in the Statesman (299b-e) and then the Laws (4.720a), law is analogous to the practice of 
medicine. The doctor for slaves has learned only a series of procedures to be applied in fixed 
circumstances, which are generally effective, but he cannot deal with more particular 
circumstances, or the needs of free men. The doctor for free men has the same facts at his 
disposal but understands the underlying principles and is able to modify and finesse his 
treatments for different individuals and circumstances. This doctor will propose a carefully 
calibrated regime of diet and exercise, rather than pick from a menu of treatments that he has 
been prescribed. Likewise, there are judges who simply apply laws, handing out the fixed 
penalty for theft, or the variations involving theft with a weapon, theft towards a slave, theft 
by a slave and so on. The better kind of judge, Plato suggests, is the one who can apply the 
law through an exercise of phronesis to particular circumstance, and this kind must, he 
argues, be a philosopher who understands the true nature of justice and the good.  
 
It is significant that, by contrast, Aristotle argues that the analogy fails, because the physician 
is a great deal less likely (and able) to pervert his position for person gain or desire (1282a-b). 
The fact that for him the magistrate becomes like a physician who is as likely to poison the 
patient as cure him is telling. To a subtle but real degree, Aristotle’s political pessimism, 
which qualifies the human and mediating element of governance, foreshadows modern 
constitutional theory’s hermeneutic of suspicion. By contrast, laws in the end are for Plato 





We have also already noted that, whilst Aristotle’s political unity was the traditional one of 
equal males in debate, Plato’s included all generations and both sexes, with each person 
participating in their own particular mode and life-phase.  In this way, as in others, the 
‘command’ aspect of law was subordinated to its customary function: the less sheerly male, 
the less sheerly adult and even the less sheerly human correlated with the less sheerly legal in 
the modern codified and explicit sense. Aristotle, on the other hand, considered the city to be 
unified if all the free men are gathered together, assuming them (we can say) to ‘represent’ 
their households, through their direct ‘presencing’ of it as an embodiment of it through their 
headship, since they rule in the oikos by a kind of monarchy (1255b). He accepted this model 
because his biology excluded women and slaves from being capable of full citizenship. In 
other words, Aristotle’s sense of nomos tended to make it more coincide with regime or 
politeia, and with arche or ‘sovereignty’.  
 
It should be explained here that our modern concept of ‘representation’ did not exist in 
ancient Greece.145 Though there were political leaders who ‘represented’ (as we would see it) 
their fellow citizens in governance and diplomacy, and public speakers willing to hire out 
their words for money (the infamous ‘sophists’), what they were doing was not classed or 
labelled as ‘representation’ (indeed there was no equivalent word). The concept of political 
practice being abstracted from its participants (the citizens) and from its proper context (the 
polis) was alien to the basic assumptions of Hellenic thought. Citizens either ruled (as in a 
democracy) or they did not (as in a monarchy). The idea of ‘representative democracy’ is not 
present in Aristotle, who speaks of what we would call ‘representatives’ but are in fact simply 
citizens ‘ruling in turn’, for themselves, though of course as citizens who are individual 
instantiations of this species. These ‘rulers by turn’ really do rule, and not, as with modern 
concepts of ‘popular sovereignty’ rule as somehow an extension of the people’s will or 
alternatively as its substitutionary alienation. 
 
Rather than ‘representation’, two possible categories of ‘extended rule’ operate within 
Aristotle. First, he assumes that the household is not so much ‘represented’ as it is embodied 
by its head when the citizens are gathered together. The head of the household is its rational 
and ruling principle, and thus is the only part of the household competent to act politically.  
 





The other category is the only aspect of our ‘representation’ that can be said to be fully 
present in Greek thought: pictorial and dramatic representation, or mimesis.146 So for 
Aristotle the slave, the woman and the child imitate the citizen, who himself is an ‘imitation’ 
of its laws (and vice versa). In as much as the adult male citizen is the most perfect ‘image’ of 
rational life, he is the architectonic principle of the city and therefore able to rule when his 
turn comes around (1255a-b). 
 
In this context, it is less obvious in the case of Plato that a true unity might emerge 
spontaneously from the mere assemblage of all citizens. Within Plato’s philosophy, unity is 
more continuously and sporadically realised: vertically as infusion and elevation; horizontally 
as the blending of like with unlike, as opposed to the ‘sortage’ into proper position that tends 
to be characteristic of Aristotle, even if the Platonic question of blending is involved in his 
consideration of proportionate justice as distribution and punishment. Aristotle’s sortage is 
more confined to the classing of like with like, allowing some imitation across these 
boundaries, but not a liminal participatory merging, conducive to a more radical unity. A man 
is for Aristotle united with his family and wider household in a bodily sense (by biology and 
economic necessity), but rationally is partially separated by the lesser capacities of the 
woman and child, and almost entirely separated from the existence of the slave who is 
alternately instrumental and idle, but not, like the ‘free’ citizen constantly answerable to 
customary civic constraints. 
 
How does this more rigid insistence upon classification relate to Aristotle’s treatment of law? 
Like Plato, Aristotle distinguished between law as given and law as in need of interpretation. 
Yet where Plato prioritised the second and so ultimately the more flexible personal rule of the 
wise, Aristotle, insofar as he favoured democracy and regarded pure kingship as unlikely or 
impossible, reversed this preference in favour of the given law and its anticipatory system of 
classification (even though he recommended that judges must prudentially apply laws to 
particular circumstances and sees customary law as more important than specific prescription, 








In Magnesia the drafting of the laws was coterminous with their application; it is the virtuous 
despot or an aristocracy who will devise the laws and proceed to rule by the application of the 
laws they have made. But in the case of Aristotle, who far more modelled his city on 
established precedents, there was a (somewhat proto-modern) fundamental rupture between 
the one who makes law and the regime that applies it. He gestured towards a Solonic model, 
in which the drafter of the constitution goes into exile in order that he may not then wield 
overweening power and yet that this constitution may then acquire a more impersonal force 
of authority (1284a-b).147 So insofar as he leant towards democracy, Aristotle compromised 
both continuously and critically renewed human participation in divine government and 
continuous citizens’ self-rule in the same gesture: the unquestionable nature of the original 
legal foundation, once the legislator has gone into exile. In this division of legislation from 
government one has, arguably, a very remote beginning of the legal thinking that will 
eventually lead, in modernity, to ideas of the state and of sovereignty.148  
 
 
5. Aristotelian Aristocratic Pessimism versus Platonic Democratic Optimism.  
 
Aristotle’s political approach nonetheless resembled more the approach of Plato in the Laws, 
than the Republic. This played out in three ways: 1) the continuous rule by ‘representatives’ 
from amongst the population who ‘take turns’ ruling; 2) the intermittent rule by the entire 
citizen population gathered in a single council and 3) the ‘representation’ of all the unfree, 
junior, foreign-born and unfree members of the city by the citizens (adult male landowners). 
We see in 1) a complete continuity of rule and an incomplete unity of rule, and in 2) a 
complete unity of rule and an incomplete continuity. These imperfections not only balance 
each other out but are further mediated by the use of constitutional modes whereby the unity 
in space is rendered into a unity in time by the ‘supplementary’ establishment of laws. It is 
the primary role of the continuous rulers to apply these laws justly, to ‘mend’ the aporia 
opened up in pure citizens’ rule between a favouring of unity on the one hand and a favouring 
of continuity on the other, even though both are equally needed. Finally, in the case of 3), as 
we saw above, we find a weak form of ‘representation’ in which the citizen actively rules the 
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household as a monarch and the household passively participates in the polis through their 
interests being considered by their ‘king’.149  
 
It follows that even the ‘completeness’ of the unity which Aristotle imagined was drastically 
qualified by his sequestering of the majority of the population from the fulfilment of 
citizenship and political life. In the case of the man of superior virtue, Aristotle was clear that 
monarchy entails the taking of this process to the ultimate: ‘hence it only remains for the 
community to obey such a man, and for him to be sovereign not in turn but absolutely’ 
(1288a). It is for the lions laughable if the hares try to make speeches in the assembly, after 
the story of Antisthenes - and yet the hares also belong to the political community and may, it 
is implied, both justly and dangerously find the leonine mockery intolerable (1284a). 
 
To resolve this aporia, as we have seen, Aristotle exalts the supposed neutrality of law. But 
if, for him, unlike Plato, the operation of citizenship is not continuously present across classes 
and generations, then the city itself in the full sense of the assembled citizens is present only 
intermittently, and the democratic normativity of mutual sharing is subordinated. Therefore, 
Aristotle’s philosophical assumption of the achievability of a limited but in its own way 
perfect finite perfection here runs up against an aporia of unity versus continuity which can 
only be resolved by a surreptitious generic switch: from the city defined by its citizenry and 
their self-rule to the city defined by the laws standing over-against the citizens and the 
‘political’ realm: a switch from politeuma to politeia. This switch further compromises to a 
degree the very notion of the polis and of the citizen. 
 
The Aristotelian resignation to the finite ensures that he proffers ‘Polity’, or a democracy 
tempered by aristocracy, dominated by the ‘middle classes’ who combine moderate wealth 
with virtue as the best regime likely to be attained, even though, absolutely speaking, 
aristocracy or the rule of the virtuous few is superior (1295a-b), or else (but problematically) 
the sole monarchic rule of an outstanding individual. Yet Aristotle’s relative pessimism with 
respect to our links to the absolute, and his account of the lower part of the soul as more 
unmediatably bestial (compared with Plato), ensures that he does not expect virtue to be all 
 
149 Aristotle distinguishes between several forms of monarchy, from the tyrant who rules purely for his own 
interests, through the limited monarchy of Sparta, to the ‘absolute’ monarchy (panbasileia) of the King who 




that dominant, and requires the lesser tyranny of the majority to temper democratically the 
likely worse tyranny of a minority.  
 
In one sense, for Aristotle, democratic rule is the maximum of citizens’ self-rule, since all 
citizens are involved. Yet this involvement of all citizens also qualifies the sense in which we 
are any longer talking about citizens at all. Normally, as we have seen, citizenship is defined 
by the capacity both to rule and to be ruled, turn by turn, and yet in the case of a democracy 
citizenship will be extended to any who are capable only of being ruled, but not of ruling 
(1289b-1290b). It follows that democracy is, for Aristotle, both normative for the 
understanding of citizenship as a wide sharing in rule, and yet simultaneously aberrant in 
relation to citizenship, insofar as the inevitably less virtuous and more menially employed 
men, elevated to this status within a democracy, also lack a crucial aspect of the reciprocity of 
citizenship and its associated exercise of active virtue. It is so associated because a lack of 
virtue is by definition a lack of an ability to govern both oneself and others. One could indeed 
call this Aristotle’s ‘aporia of citizenship’.   
 
Given that, in a democracy, or even the mixed constitution of ‘Polity’, the mass of citizens 
will not be all that virtuous, and perhaps even the virtue of the aristocracy is intermittent and 
unreliable, citizen self-rule and therefore the primacy of citizenship as such must be, as we 
have seen, heavily qualified by the more primary rule of law. Law is for Aristotle a meson, a 
mean (1287a) yet not a mean of virtue or between virtues, but in effect between virtues and 
the other factors of wealth and liberty. Law-making thereby belongs not purely to Aristotle’s 
understanding of ethics as intransitive, self-remaining action or praxis, but also to the 
architectonic and outgoingly transitive poesis, that is politics itself. Thus, he cites 
approvingly the sophist Gorgias: ‘just as the vessels made by mortar-makers were mortars, so 
the citizens made by the magistrates were Larisaeans, since some of the magistrates were 
actually Larisa-makers’ (1275b). The political and legal is for Aristotle inherently 
contaminated by inferior techne, just as inversely pure ethical praxis tends to escape the 
political. This strongly contrasts with Plato, where the entire praxis/poesis or 
intransitive/transitive action contrast is not found and the poetic and technical, when they are 
divinely inspired, enjoy a more ultimate dignity. 
 
Aristotle’s relative favouring of democracy as compared to Plato, is consequently also linked 




of citizenship in favour of the submission either of the majority of citizens to the ‘super-
participatory’ rule of a few or even of the one, or of all citizens to ‘sub-participatory’ legal 
foundations and processes ultimately bound by those foundations (1287a-1288a). 
 
By reason of this pessimism, he suggests (quite unlike Plato) that the specific functional good 
of the citizen with respect to the city is not equivalent to being a good man as such and even 
that the man who is good simply as a man (as fully noble and magnanimous) need not 
possess the virtue of citizenship, thereby seeming to open up already a ‘Roman’ vision of a 
perfectly good ‘retired’ life (Politics, 1276b). 
 
                
6. Monarchy and Empire 
 
Yet in other respects, it is arguably Plato who more anticipates Rome: indicating the extreme 
tensional duality that I shall locate there in Part Two. 
 
Plato’s love of ritual and symbolic order, whose temporal theocracy seems to recall the 
eternal, and the monarchic-aristocratic order that goes along with it, was closely linked with 
his admiration of Egyptian civilisation, in which a powerful religious and mythic narrative 
sustained the political order, through a ritual and artistic repetition which had allowed Egypt, 
Plato believed, to escape the forces of political entropy and maintain thousands of years of 
continuity.  
 
Thus, Plato perpetually relocated his narratives to Crete, Egypt or Sicily, but for Aristotle, for 
all the more apparently abstract and universal nature of his arguments, and his Macedonian 
birth, Athens was everything. Accordingly, he ultimately distrusted kingship (even while 
being paradoxically drawn to its absolute version) because the rule of one virtuous man over 
the non-virtuous many tends to approximate ruling to mastery over slaves (1255a), which is 
entirely non-reciprocal, rendering it apolitical. And this distrust could extend to imperial 
involvements, since we see in Book VII of the Politics that Aristotle regards ‘barbarian’ 
states as non-political and composed of slaves, not self-governing citizens, due to their 





Aristotle does allow that some non-Greek polities rise to the level of civilisation as he defines 
it (note his consideration of the Carthaginian constitution (1272b-1273b), but in general terms 
the polis is mainly exclusive to the Hellenes. Was Aristotle’s vision of the good life then at 
odds with his pupil Alexander’s military expansionism, indicating Aristotle’s criticism of 
excessive militarism and emphasis on balance and harmony? In fact, as Aristotle quite clearly 
lays out in Books I and VII of the Politics (1253b-1255b, 1328a, 1334b-1336a), he considers 
it desirable that the Greeks should attain military hegemony over non-Greeks and reduce 
them to something like tributary status.150 This view he readily justified in the same way that 
he justified slavery and patriarchal authority: just as the individual who has a natural 
superiority in virtue must rule the one who lacks it in the manner of a monarch, so must 
Greek society as a whole rule societies fitted (by their characteristics of habit and regime) 
only for slavery.151  All the same, we can assume that Alexander’s reported embrace of 
Persian customs was at odds with the Hellenocentric and constitutional model of politics of 
his teacher. So, we can legitimately infer that just as, in Aristotle’s thought, an excessive 
virtue in the city threatens civic justice, equivalently the international assertion of superior 
Hellenic virtue threatens to reduce Greek rule to sheer domination, with a consequent 
possible leaching-back of such colonial corruption and servitude into the heart of the mother-
city.  
 
We can contrast Aristotle’s attitude to both monarchy and empire with that of Plato, in 
preparation for our transition to Rome. Aristotle’s advocated ostracism of the excessively 
virtuous man follows the pattern of his ‘Athenian’ reception of Plato, in which he re-imagines 
the philosopher not as King but as founding father, in the manner of Solon – a father who 
must probably be exiled. Plato instead demonstrated and fully laid out the terms for the 
alternative ‘internal’ exile of the Philosopher within the city, into the citadel of the theoretic 
city within a city of the academy. Not only does he recommend an ideal model for both 
visible and invisible polis, he also later presents a method capable of perpetually drawing the 
polis back into virtue. Socrates, in refusing to leave the polis and instead facing death, 
contradicted the Solonic model, and proposed instead that philosophy must be living and 
human, academically perpetuated in his memory. Thus, the essentially ‘erotic’ model of 
education, philosophy and politics rejected the notion that any person can literally transfer a 
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truth (like a body of written laws), but instead implied that he can only be the occasion for the 
recollection of and participation in a shared and lived understanding.  
 
Thus, Plato’s love of monarchy, his concern (viz Cyrus in the Laws) with the education of the 
character of the rulers of great empires, his theoretical and practical interest in colonies and 
his notion of the hidden inner city of philosophers, all point to an ideal international order 
that is neither intermittent, as for Aristotle (1261a), nor lacking permanent central leadership.  
Plato was arguably proposing an altogether novel international order, unknown to both 
Greeks and Barbarians. The very paradox of unity and division within the Greek world, 
analogous to the vision of the cosmos as being both in motion and at rest, is the basis in Plato 
for an order that combines the depth and unique ‘political’ nature of the Greek city-state with 
the scale and divine stature of the empires of Egypt, Babylon and Persia.  
 
The shared mythic ‘grammar’ of the ‘second-best’ and colonial visible cities would be the 
basis for a grand interweaving carried out by a political elite that all shared in membership of 
a single esoteric city: the philosophical city of Kallipolis. The Platonic Academy in Athens 
was exactly a prototype for such a city, drawing students from across the Greek world.  
 
We can therefore perhaps infer from Plato’s teaching a vision of a Hellenic world united by a 
common ‘liturgy’, in which the divine theatre of the Gods contemplating the Good would be 
participated-in by a ‘chorus’ of Greek cities. Underlying all of Plato’s discussions of justice 
was arguably a tacit but idiosyncratic ‘imperial’ logic, whereby that which is differentially  
outside unity must also be paradoxically included within it; in which the unity of Greek cities 
would also be the fulcrum for a politically cosmic unity that could govern the world, in some 
anticipation of the Jewish Middle-Platonist Philo’s notion of a megalopolis.152  Plato was not 
concerned, any more than Aristotle, with politics only as the question of political dominance 
over a group of people or a territory. Rather, the purpose of political unity as the self-
government of citizens was directed towards the end of genuine mutual flourishing. In this 
spirit the international ‘imperial’ order envisaged by Plato was not a system of alien 
domination, but the more humanly universal sway of justice.   
 
We are ready for the transition to Rome. 
 





















Political life preceded political thought by some centuries, and it was only once political life 
in the defining sense of citizen-rule has started to become somewhat untenable, which stands 
slightly apart from the human person and so able to be regarded, that it could truly become an 
object of thought.153  
It was at the twilight hour when Athena’s owl was already taking wing, when the unthinkable 
had become thinkable, that citizens were forced to establish the nature of politics and 
conceived of it as a conscious philosophical project. In Athena’s city, Plato and Aristotle 
aimed at the possible restoration of a way of life compromised both by the growth of 
sophistry and the imperial expansion of the Greek polities. 
In turning eventually to the case of Cicero, we discover a series of resemblances to the 
circumstances in which political philosophy first emerged. He was writing at a time when the 
Roman Republic had almost ceased to be and was in its final crisis. Like the ancient Greek 
city-states, it was threatened by fraudulent mass politics from within and a vast imperial 
expansion from without. Cicero directly drew upon Greek thought and Plato specifically, to 
give a conscious philosophical shape to Roman ideals and modes of life that had been 
promulgated largely unconsciously up to that point and wrote his own ‘Republic’ and ‘Laws’ 
for this purpose.  
However, in order to understand Cicero, we must first understand Rome, and to understand 
Rome we must situate it with respect to Greece in terms of its version of both the city and the 
citizen. In what follows I shall, in successive sections, first try to comparatively situate the 
Roman city, citizenship, social and constitutional structure and religion, before considering in 
more detail Cicero’s political philosophy. In the case of both Rome and Cicero I shall identify 
an extreme oscillation between a fulfilment of the Platonic vision on the one hand, and a 
certain anticipation of the much later modern liberal outlook on the other.  
 
 





2. Religion and the Ancient City 
Ancient citizenship, as we saw in Part One, can actually be defined as having access to the 
worship of the gods of the city, and this worship was directly linked to rights of ownership, 
voting, marriage and burial.154 There was, as Fustel de Coulanges first perceived, no sharing 
of these rights with other cities worshipping other gods, unless the gods themselves were 
deemed to have entered into alliance and their cult was now shared. Such alliances could 
sometimes be fostered by shared class interests across civic boundaries.155 These alliances 
also concerned battles over degrees of access to citizenship rights that were immediately and 
indissociably cultic rights. But no inter-civic unity, transcending class, ever emerged, apart 
from the later imperial expansion of Macedon. A uniting religious perspective was lacking, 
and the experiments for transforming a more philosophical and universal vision of religion 
into political terms (as with Plato and Syracuse) were largely stillborn.  
The imperial expansion of Rome did not involve any abandonment of the tight association of 
cult with citizenship, even though later understandings of this expansion took more 
philosophical forms, both Stoic and Platonic. One can suggest that this expansion was rooted 
in the peculiar circumstances of its founding, which legend may, to a degree, accurately 
record.156 From the outset, Rome seems to have been an amalgam of local and invasive tribal 
groupings and therefore it involved more than one alliance of both gods and human cultus. 
For this reason, its seemingly ‘progressive’ impulse towards universality and inclusion was 
actually grounded in more primitive factors than in the case of Greece.157 As a tribal alliance, 
the originally familial centrality of religion (linked to cults of ancestors and territorial gods, 
guarding both boundaries and lineage) persisted more strongly: assuring a greater importance 
for the oikos within the polis. At the same time, initial tribal loyalties remained as inner tribal 
tensions, involving the constant stasis of struggle between aristocrats and their clienteles and 
between aristocrats and plebeians (originally, perhaps, families with a weaker sense of cult or 
lineage and little secure terrain). As with Greece, the inextricability of internal and external 
civic tensions propelled Roman aristocrats towards alliances with aristocrats in other cities, 
while the need to placate the plebeians with material rewards also drove expansion outwards. 
Conversely, this ever-greater rewarding propelled forwards the struggle of both plebs and 
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clients towards full citizenship, which eventually involved full access to the auguries, the 
census and the consulship, besides rights to sacral connubium and civic honouring in burial.  
Religion was central to both the external and internal development of Rome. There was no 
promiscuous political indifference towards local cult. On the contrary, the conquering of 
foreign cities was read as the yielding of foreign gods. Their cults were captured and often 
taken back to Rome in the process of evocatio, or ‘calling forth’ of the gods, in a way that 
was taken as strengthening rather than weakening the prestige of the original local deities. 
Naturally, alongside this capture went the removal of independent citizenship within 
outrightly conquered cities, or its weakening in those cities with which Rome entered into 
alliance.158  
In consequence, Roman territories were often governed by a mixture of permanent military 
emergency, direct volition of governors, subordination of local custom to Roman law and de 
facto toleration of continued local tribal law. The new cities in Gaul were sometimes outright 
Roman creations, and in general individuals across the far-flung empire sought above all, just 
like the clients and the plebs, entry into the privilege of Roman citizenship, which was still 
focused on the boundaries of the Roman urbs itself, even though from the outset the civitas 
was more transportable, as with Aeneas’ legendary carrying of the palladium. This 
imperative rendered the eventual barbarian capturing of Rome as much an internal capturing 
of the citadel by aspirant citizens as an external overthrow of the city by outsiders.159 
Conversely, Rome’s internal struggles were akin to those between entirely alien tribes, 
traceable back to different origins and alternative cults. The more agrarian rather than 
somewhat enterprising and artisanal economy of Rome, as compared with Athens, ensured 
that often the plebeians could just be bypassed like ghetto dwellers, since most of the crucial 
work required by aristocratic proprietors could be carried out by slaves: if anything, Rome 
was still more of a ‘consumer city’.160 Their initial exclusion from full citizenship in terms of 
their exclusion from the city’s primary cults was so absolute that, to begin with, the tribunes 
of the plebs could only be incorporated into the city’s religiously protected deliberations by 
the device of deeming them to be sacrosanct: at once religiously impure and yet as such not 
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be impeded in their activities.161 It was bizarrely this very ‘untouchability’ of the tribunes 
which assisted the social progress of those they represented.  
One can therefore conclude that, in terms of both local city and expanded empire, Rome did 
not, at the most fundamental civil-religious level, ever combine citizenship (even after its 
Antonine expansion) with a natural and plural universality. Instead of our assumption that an 
extension of citizenship would involve its being less culturally and religiously specified, 
antique pagan extension was more like gradual admission of everyone into a strictly local 
cult. Certainly, there were countervailing philosophical conceptions, but these were never 
fully incarnated.162  
Moreover, once a return to monarchy ensued, under the ‘tyrants’ in Greece and the Caesars in 
Rome, the civic aspect of religion, as against its natural and cosmic aspect, was actually 
reinforced. Both the power of the tyrants and that of the Caesars depended in part upon the 
support of the plebeians, whose condition was relatively alleviated. Thus, there was 
absolutely no automatic association in pagan antiquity of the popular and egalitarian with the 
anti-religious: if anything, the reverse. And nor was there usually any association, either, of 
the anti-religious with the republican and the democratic: for the prime initial guardians of 
civic religion were the aristocratic heads of the main families. To begin with, in the period of 
the Roman kings, one could almost say that it was their mode of power that tended (as it 
were, in anticipation of Montesquieu), to emphasise rather the political and the pragmatic, 
even if this was not true of the later emperors, who were after all not exactly kings. 
Conversely, the aristocratic chiefs who overthrew the kings thought of themselves as sacral 
monarchs on a small scale (like Odysseus).163 
 
3. The Roman Civic Difference  
We can see from the foregoing that whereas the Greeks were a people with a polis, or rather 
many politeis, the Romans were a polis with a people.164 The Roman people and the Roman 
city were coterminous, and Rome was able to extend a civic logic into its national operations 
and its national logic into its civic life.  
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Cicero indeed praised the Roman constitution as an example of an ideal mixed regime, but 
for him it also contained elements foreign to Greek ideals (Cicero, Republic, II.17).165 The 
mixture of oligarchy (the Senate and the Patricians), monarchy (the elective King and later 
the Consuls), and democracy (the various offices and assemblies of Plebs), included 
significant degrees of mediation unknown in their amplitude to the Hellenes. Most notably, 
Rome was organised into ‘centuries’, different bands of citizenship each with their own 
assembly, which cast a single collective ‘vote’ at the level of the republic.166   
The existence of this mediated rather than direct political sphere in Ancient Rome can be 
traced in large part to a radically different understanding of the relationship between oikos 
and polis, and between public and private citizen. 
The singular virtue of Rome identified by Livy as pietas, the Roman basis for civic loyalty 
and religious duty, was the same virtue as filial loyalty to a father within a family (History 1, 
xxi). Cicero accordingly made no hard distinction between public and private, household and 
political duties in his De Officiis (I.139-8, II.9-10) and seemed in fact to regard the art of 
‘household management’ as being of the same fundamental kind as that of politics.167  As 
Cicero’s concept of duty makes clear, even though lower forms of commerce  are to be 
scorned by respectable citizens, managing your country estate, your finances, making 
investments, and engaging in large scale trade, are considered acceptable and fitting, so long 
as they are done justly and for the common good (De Officiis I.150-1).The household was 
porous to political life, and consequently the Roman family was more political, while the 
Roman civitas was more familial in nature. 
But while Rome possessed an hereditary kinship elite claiming original descent from the first 
founders (the Patrician class), this class was not wholly closed, and in any case the Plebs 
enjoyed many of the rights of fully-fledged Greek citizens.168 Moreover, a third class of 
citizen - the ‘Equestrian’ (equites) or knightly class - was founded, so that wealthy citizens 
could bolster the Roman cavalry, in exchange for political preferment and office.169  
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Not only did the system of Centuries and various proto-representative offices such as the 
Tribunate render the Roman constitution heavily mediated, but the relationship between 
individual citizens was of the same nature. Whereas Greek citizen interrelations took either 
directly egalitarian or directly hieratic modes, usually the vast majority of Romans were part 
of complex hierarchies with multiple overlapping claims, tiers and systems of patronage and 
benefaction.170 And whereas Greek citizens were freed of childhood obligations to their 
father upon reaching the age of majority, Roman citizens remained far more firmly under the 
influence, formal and informal, of their Pater Familias.171  Few sons could hope to advance 
in Roman society without the sponsorship of their family, and its attached friends and clients.  
And crucially women exercised much more authority and held greater public status than was 
possible in Greek society.172 With so much of political life invested in developing 
friendships, cultivating wealth, managing slaves, coordinating the endeavours of freed slaves 
and arranging marriages, women inescapably held more influence. This was reflected in 
Rome’s religious and cultural representations of women and female roles, with the ‘Roman 
Matron’ possessing authority and status in her own right.173  
Royal/aristocratic ideas of the family granting political power were accordingly interwoven 
with republican notions of friendship and more universal civic familyhood right from the 
early years of Rome, perhaps emerging out of its unusual model of electoral Kingship, as 
described extensively and positively by Cicero in his Republic (2.21-34). 
Equivalently, Rome possessed no hard distinction between public and private morality. 
Because the more domestically-inclined Romans were less constantly before each other’s 
eyes, the importance of a moral code exercised under all circumstances, however invisible, 
became paramount. In this respect, Cicero did not invent but inherited a Roman ideal of 
justice as ‘keeping your word no matter what’. Whereas Greek citizens were unified by a 
shared life, the more numerous and divided Roman polis had perforce to be united in a more 
abstracted, contractual and symbolic sense, with a much-increased requirement for the 
internalisation of value. And where Greeks were directly united by their regime, the politeia, 
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Romans were united by the vinculum, or civic bond (Cicero, Republic I.49), which operated 
both vertically through pietas, a chain of obligation stretching up through clients, parents and 
political leaders to the gods, and horizontally through fides, a common sense of trust in our 
business partners, friends, colleagues, fellow voters, military comrades, spouses and religious 
congregants. Just as Rome was split vertically by the centuries, so it was laterally host to 
numerous other bodies that we would see as belonging to ‘civil society’ today: religious cults, 
political associations and funeral guilds.  
It has been assumed, in the tradition of Hannah Arendt, that because of this more distinct 
public realm, citizenship was stronger in ancient Greece, and yet one could wonder whether 
the relatively greater restriction there of the political to the non-productive, non-
administrative and non-trading actually confined also the scope of deliberative participation 
and ultimately subordinated this participation to the theoretical: encouraging eventually in 
Greece the Stoic private and inwards retreat.174 Therefore, the strong Greek separation of 
polis from oikos might be regarded as ambivalent from the point of view of the scope of 
citizenship.   
By more uniting the two, it is true that the Romans engendered a society that was still more 
riven by internal divisions, since something like private and tribal feuding was more 
sustained and even endorsed. The ancient family fates were much less chained up in Rome 
than they were in the Oresteia. Nonetheless, factional dispute was compensated for by a more 
implicit unity that was indirect and symbolic. The moral paragons praised by Cicero in his 
Republic are precisely those who did their duty in circumstances in which no benefit could 
flow to them, and rather much harm, since they were loyal to the invisible and almost pre-
political vinculum. And Virgil, writing shortly after Cicero, during the reign of Augustus, 
praised above all in his Aeneid the ‘unknown’ valour of those who died unwitnessed by any 
but the gods on the battlefield (XI.720-30). Stoicism (and its own Platonist influences) is 
strongly at work in Cicero on this issue and in many other Roman authors, but it often seems 
as if Stoicism was selling Rome its own ideals back to itself. In either case it is a matter of the 
birth of conscientia as ‘conscience’ in roughly our modern sense.175 As we shall see, one can 
identify both communitarian and proto-liberal aspects to this development. 
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In one respect, what Greek political philosophers claimed about the oversized city, that it 
would be not one city but several, and be perpetually afflicted with civil war and internal 
strife, seems to have in fact been true of the Roman Republic. Yet the same city that was 
perpetually at odds with itself was also more effective at resisting foreign subversion than 
nearly any other in the antique world.  Precisely because Rome had vast potential for having 
low public solidarity, it had to devise a culture and institutions that would hold muster over a 
large and diverse population, ensuring that loyalty was inherently linked to expansion. Unlike 
the Greeks, Romans were perpetually in the position of having to take things on trust in their 
public and private affairs, and every time that trust was rewarded, it was also reinforced. 
Not only the coterminous nature of family and polis in the Roman Republic, but the 
coterminous nature of people and city comes into relevance at this stage in our argument. 
Cicero describes Rome not just as a civitas but also as a populus, a people (Republic I.7). The 
Roman Empire had much in common with older, eastern, imperial entities: a shared cosmic 
vision, an ability to integrate and mediate diverse religious cults, besides mundane but vital 
aspects like roads, a postal service and an imperial bureaucracy.176 However, it was uniquely 
not based upon initial monarchic rule over a single people expanded outwards. There were 
several peoples to begin with, and the constitutional mixed civic government of Rome was 
later extended to many more peoples. It was not simply subjecthood that was imposed but 
citizenship that was proferred, spreading first across the Italian peninsula and culminating 
through various transitional phases in the Edict of Caracalla in AD 212, which extended full 
Roman citizenship to every free man in the Empire and gave every free woman the same 
rights enjoyed by Roman women.177 Rome was not merely a ‘city with an empire’ but a 
historically unique ‘city-empire’ in which membership was that of citizen as well as subject, 
however much this served to mask modes of domination and oppression.178 
Despite the extraordinary civic character of its empire, and the ethnically disparate character 
of its eventual citizens, Rome nonetheless fused its civic identity with its identity as a people 
in a way that the Greeks did not.  Although the Roman Republic possessed many of the 
elements that distinguished the polis, including the exercise of modes of democracy, it also 
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possessed, as a single city, the features of an ancestral ‘people’ or of a nation existing almost 
primordially, prior to any arising need or occasion. 
Thus the Romans did not see themselves as Italians,  as Athenians saw themselves as Greeks, 
but as identifiable incomers: in the case of Virgil’s rendering of Rome’s founding mythos, as 
exiled and colonising Trojans.179  Mythical or not, this self-perception indicated a clear 
demarcation  between Rome and its near neighbours.180 Rome was a city of refugees, both in 
its assumed migrant origins, and in its perhaps unique extension of citizenship granted to 
threatened neighbouring tribes, various diverse groups and later migrations: this being, 
according to Livy’s mythicised historical record, characteristic of Rome since its very origins 
(History I, viii-ix).181 
In consequence, the Romans’ self-understanding as an ancestral people was nonetheless 
formed entirely in the polis, in the single city of Rome. This coincidence ensured that both 
the polis and the nation were ‘familial’, comprised of ethno-political groups in which 
membership was largely a matter of birth and occasionally of marriage. The Roman republic, 
of its innermost nature, merged the categories of people and polis and rendered the 
boundaries of both extremely porous. You could be adopted into Roman citizenship, and into 
Roman nationhood. The Roman Republic was in one sense still more of a rational, 
‘intentional’ community than the Greek polis, yet a specifically and uniquely ‘civic ethnos’ 
was assumed to have an ancestral persistence stretching back into an untraceable and divinely 
engendered past. All the same this ‘Romanness’ had to be perpetually re-negotiated and 
redefined.  
That would seem to leave a great potential for radical disunity, total fluidity and social 
breakdown. But it was continuously circumvented, because the dovetailing of city and people 
itself opened up new modes of unity and stability that had to do with appeal to a more 
inchoate and more pre-political sense of the shared vinculum. As a result, the city of Rome 
was at once more extra-rationally ‘implicit’ than the Greek city-state, and nonetheless also 
more continuously and creatively ‘self-defining’ in its ability to perpetually expand and shift 
the boundary of citizenship.  
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This more fluid, unstable citizenship, unknown to Greece, was only endurable because it was 
buttressed by an equally alien conservatism, from a Hellenic perspective, in both law and 
religion. The Athenians, as we have seen, revised their laws codes several times. And as the 
legal order was a secondary tier to the lived reality of the community, a Greek citizen might 
escape the law at any time by severing himself from the polis, and yet remain Greek.182 But 
for the Roman there was no severing the civic bond, because Roman law was not bounded: 
its relative fixity within time coincided with its limitless expansibility in space.  
In the case of Cicero’s own emphasis on ‘the name of Rome being famous throughout the 
world’ there was present both a legal and a moral universalism that was implicit in the 
Roman constitution and worldview (De Officiis 1.82). The vinculum and the virtue of fides 
were for this reason also compromised when faith was broken between a Roman and a non-
Roman.183 Since civic trust could exist between citizen and non-citizen, the potential for 
anyone and everyone to be ultimately absorbed into Roman citizenship and republican life 
had been opened up, even if, conversely, the Roman fluidities could tend to approximate 
adopted foreign citizens to the status of children and slaves.184   
If law was more stable in Rome, then so too was religion. The Romans rarely threw out a 
religious practice once it had been introduced and retained many whose significance had 
since been largely lost sight of.185 And more than even the Greeks, with their Delphic oracle, 
the Romans built prophecy into their political life.186  When ill fortune, especially military 
defeat was suffered, the Senate would consult the Sibylline prophecies, besides the augurs, 
and generally the solution would  not merely be the distanced Greek response of ceasing a 
battle, performing a single sacrifice or making a peace treaty, but rather a series of  liturgical 
actions.187 The Romans would also revive particular religious functions that had lapsed, 
reinstate holy days, besides, as  we have seen,  importing alien or novel religious custom on a 
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regular basis.188 They were also  rather more animistic than the Greeks. Every place, and 
indeed every gathering or human institution, had a distinct spirit - a ‘genius’ whether of an 
individual or of a place - while the lares were their still-living ancestors hovering around 
them and over their activities.189  Fidelity to these customs bespeaks a greater heroic, pre-
civic inheritance than was the case with Hellas. They suggest the stronger Roman 
preservation of the religion-kinship-terrain bond that Fustel saw as lying at the origins of the 
ancient city.  
 
4. Citizenship, Republicanism and Empire in Rome 
By the edict of Caracalla in 212, all freeborn inhabitants of the Roman empire were declared 
citizens.190 This presents us with a fundamental paradox. Citizenship is a republican notion: it 
involves a notion of sharing in rule, of participation in self-government. And yet its widest 
extension was undertaken not under the Roman Republic, but under the Principiate, the 
Empire. Eventually, in Chapter Six, we will need to understand how Christian notions of both 
eternal and earthly citizenship relate to this paradox. 
But first we need to ask to what degree the paradox has to do with the contrasts between 
Greece and Rome that we have already invoked. Greece tied citizenship intimately to the 
bounded city: it had to do with a literal shared space and with partition amongst those 
familiar to each other. Just for this reason, Greece proved inhospitable to any imperial 
project: Alexander’s empire was the exception, but it was largely located far away from 
Greece itself. Moreover, it quickly collapsed after his death, in part because he had sustained 
the political autonomy of local territories.191 Thus, for the Greeks, citizenship remained non-
exchangeable: it was linked to access to territorially limited religious cults, which included 
rights to marriage, burial and property-ownership.  
Roman citizenship, as we have seen, was different from the outset. At the same time as Fustel 
was exploring the Indo-European legacy in the case of Greece and Rome, Victorian scholar 
Henry Maine included such a consideration in his own more comprehensive account of the 
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same legacy. His remarks on Rome help us to see how the paradox of ‘imperial citizenship’ 
can be linked to a greater paradox governing the whole of Roman history.192 As has been 
described, much more than Greece, Rome began and remained very tribal, giving greater 
explicitly political importance to marriage, family and kinship and to household religion. In 
Maine’s terms, this meant that it cleaved more to a primordial order based on ‘status’, 
nomadically somewhat indifferent to land and settlement. By contrast, the Greek city states, 
sacrally linked to cultic terrain (backed by myths of autochthony), involved from the outset 
an order of ‘contract’ based upon pacts between different families.  
And yet paradox already arises insofar as, in Greece, the family order of ‘status’ remained 
somewhat prior to and outside the political order of ‘contract’, whereas in Rome the two were 
fused. So much was this the case that the legend of the rape of the Sabine women suggests 
that marriage and family only arose as a secondary and included matter, within the scope of 
the political, in the case of Rome, in a way that we can almost compare to the arrangements 
of Plato’s Kallipolis.193 Thus there is, after all, a sense in which, from the outset, as many 
scholars of Roman law confirm, Rome was after all more really more contractualist in 
character than the Greek cities.194 In the case of Greece, inter-familial contract was 
sedimented by divided and shared land within the city-bounds, whereas in the case of Rome it 
started from the outset both to escape these bounds (thus the greater importance for Romans 
of country estates) and to assume a more non-territorial, directly inter-personal character, 
tending already to a certain focus upon the rights of individuals.  
Therefore, one could argue that, in terms of the status versus contract contrast, Greece was 
‘moderately modern’, whereas Rome was a strange blend of ‘more primitive and more 
modern’. And the one because of the other.  
Maine pointed out how the imperial extension of citizenship meant also a promulgation of the 
Roman Patria Potestas, or the absolute authority of fathers within their families, along with 
the extension of Roman sacral norms of marriage. Practices of incest and polygamy were 
seen by the Romans as particularly intolerable marks of barbarism.195 In this way, bringing 
huge numbers of people who in no sense belonged to the Roman city or even to its civic 
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offshoots under the sway of Roman law did not mean that no cultural concomitants were 
involved.  
And above all citizenship was a religious, cultic matter, as we have already seen. Thus 
Caracalla claimed to be issuing his edict as thanks to heaven for some act by which it had 
preserved his life, and the edict represented an offering whereby he was leading everyone 
‘throughout the inhabited world’ ‘to the temples of the gods’.196  More recently, it has been 
shown that whereas, prior to the ‘Antonine Constitution’ of Caracalla, everyone within the 
Roman empire indeed had to externally acknowledge the legitimacy of the Roman gods and 
the cult of the emperor, now citizenship demanded of everyone their own more direct and 
personal subscription to that cult.197 It follows from this that universalisation of citizenship 
was not necessarily, if at all, in keeping with the Stoic sense of the ‘cosmopolitan’, 
recognising the rights and dignity of all humans simply according to nature. To the contrary, 
this universalisation was more of a bringing of everyone within the bounds of Roman 
specificity in certain respects and could go along with an increased intolerance of alien cults 
and practices. Thus it bore down heavily upon Christians, who could no longer seek the alibi 
of loyal disengagement from Rome, eliciting the protests of Tertullian and others, along with 
their increased sense of alienation from the entire Roman republican-imperial project.198 
Practices of banishment and civil disqualification, declaring people peregrini dediticii were 
henceforth extended; originally republican citizenship mutated more into loyalty to the 
emperor, the ultimate ‘father’, with an equivalent extension of the crimes of maiestas and 
perduellio. The stasis of civil dissent was increasingly read as asymmetrical polemos or 
insurrection against the city itself, with one party to the civil war being consequently 
regarded as absolutely in the right.199  
On the other hand, this very recursion to the primitive also sustained something of a tendency 
towards a modern pivoting between an absolute sovereign centre and the atomic 
individual.200 Even though many Romans, including Cicero at times, had sought to construe 
Roman citizenship in more directly Greek terms of shared and involved co-ruling, from the 
outset it had in fact been thought of more than with the Greeks in terms of a contract between 
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the polity and the individual, bringing the latter under the rule of the law, understood both as 
command and protection.201 Roman law was in consequence more a ius sanguinis than a ius 
soli, a law of the soil.202 And in practice the contract was one-sidedly extended: first the 
peoples of Italy and eventually everyone in the empire was ‘granted’ citizenship, but one 
crucial aspect of this supposed beneficence was to render them subject to Roman taxation. 
Indeed, there had always been cives sine suffragio in Rome, citizens without the right to vote, 
more so than with Greece,203 and a main purpose of rendering non-Romans Romans was to 
remove their independent political dignity.  
To begin with, under the republic, this process was achieved through the conferring of 
citizenship to whole peoples en masse. Later, under the empire, it was instead offered to local 
officials, thereby bringing them firmly within the Roman orbit of control.204 
At the same time, one should not exaggerate the degree to which the Roman empire 
anticipated the structures of the modern state in terms of both sovereignty and individualism. 
The universalising of citizenship did not entirely imply the destruction of its originally 
ancient republican substance. For one thing, it opened up, as we have seen, a greater 
possibility of provincial individuals participating in the central political life of Rome itself. 
For another, the sheer diversity of peoples within the Roman empire encouraged an at least de 
facto federalism that was later to become more explicit within the religiously homogenised 
sway of Byzantium (and later of Islam) which rendered it more possible.205 Local regimes 
and laws remained in force, either in official subordination to Roman cults and laws, or in 
terms of a de facto toleration. And even though Clifford Ando stresses the oppressive 
character of ‘making Romans’, he also notes how, precisely under the empire, the individual 
grants of citizenship to local officials allowed them to adopt more democratic local 
structures.206 Additionally, they now received the power themselves to grant citizenship, 
increasing the plural, subsidiary and corporatist character of the Roman sway.  
And while it is valid to question the convenience of Greeks praising Roman rule, it is surely 
harder than Ando implies to dismiss the contrast made by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and 
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others when he contrasts the Romans making citizens of the conquered with their slaughter, 
ruination and enslavement by other, more typical aggressors. In the case of the Greek cities 
themselves, their self-government was sustained alongside the rule of Roman law.207 
In all these ways, the dual loyalty to native soil and to Rome celebrated by Cicero in the case 
of Italy was more universally extended. But as with Cicero, it was insisted that loyalty to the 
new fatherland of Rome had priority (Laws II.ii. 4-5). To this degree, citizens of other places 
(insofar as they possessed civic structures) remained citizens of those places in a participatory 
sense, while acquiring - albeit solely as individuals under the empire - the possibility of being 
also participant citizens of Rome. Imperial citizenship did not simply override a republican 
one, even if the Roman republican one had always been as much about contractual subjection 
to law as mutually involved self-government.  
 
5. City, Soul and Cosmos in Cicero  
In order to make full sense of Cicero, we have to make sense not only of the divide between 
Greece and Rome, but also their complex entanglements.  
Cicero himself in his Republic pointed to this shared history. He imported Greek concepts yet 
interpreted them in ways that are often alien to the context in which the ideas were formed. 
Greek philosophy emerged to serve a particular purpose and belonged to a distinct political 
and cultural setting. Philosophy was conceived of as truth-quest, certainly, but this was not 
strongly differentiated from a search for flourishing, for eudaimonia, and this ideal state was 
closely connected with life in the polis. A serious question can then be raised as to whether 
what the Greeks regarded as philosophy could be translated out of a Greek context at all.  
So, part of the central problem of Cicero’s life and writings is whether philosophy can 
‘become Roman’. Whilst philosophy had already spread far afield, it had so far done so 
alongside Greek civilisation and its enclaves, and not truly apart from it. A Roman could ‘do 
philosophy’ in the same way that he could learn and converse in Greek, but could philosophy 
exist outside of the conventional polis?208   
Cicero was accordingly caught between his several influences and projects. He was at once 
seeking to Hellenize the Roman Republic and at the same time trying to reinforce Rome’s 
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moral, traditional foundations by adapting Greek learning to the ends of Roman rule. 
Likewise, we find him caught not just between Greece and Rome, but also Platonism and 
Stoicism, realism and ‘naturalism’, piety and scepticism, elitism and populism.  
In his Republic, Cicero brings all these apparent contradictions together in the opening 
sequence of his dialogue, centred on the person of Scipio Africanus, and the object of the 
Greek astrolabe (I.15-22). A natural eclipse is invoked as at once cause/reflection/allegory of 
or for the political turmoil of the time and serves to tie together the origins of the Republic 
(with Romulus’ apotheosis as the god Quirinus) with the present crisis (and the Republic’s 
possible demise, I.25). The discussion proceeds with a measured critique by Scipio of the 
superstitious terror of many Romans towards the solar phenomenon, and he points to a series 
of examples of largely Greek figures who had explained similar events, and successfully 
calmed the mob through the use of their reason and rhetoric.  
A strange mix of ‘naturalism’ and Platonism is in evidence when Scipio describes the 
universe as ‘a home and fatherland which the gods have given us the privilege of sharing with 
them’, and for this reason he suggests that the study of ‘local’ affairs in our earthly and 
human spheres must be balanced by an equal concern with occurrences in the heavens (I.31-
2). This seems somewhat contrary to a Platonic approach that puts the earth and the heavens 
in tension, with human fallibility and frailty understood as a pedagogical exercise whereby 
we seek to imitate the changeless perfection of the metaphysical skies. Instead, a Stoic 
‘flattening’ arises in Cicero, whereby the gods ‘share’ with us in a kind of universal 
commonwealth.  
The great emphasis that Cicero will here go on to put on the common life and unity of the 
human commonwealth nonetheless echoes the transcendent moral universalism 
recommended in De Officiis. For Cicero, Roman rule was understood as stemming from the 
unity of truth rooted in both personal and public integrity and fidelity, watched over by 
patrons who guard their clients: ‘and so our government could more accurately be called a 
protectorate (patrocinium) of the world than a dominion (imperium)’ (De Officiis II. 27; 26-
28).   Given Plato’s own bringing together of divine, animal and human, as compared to 
Aristotle’s stricter separation of the three, we can see that Cicero’s emphasis on unity and 
universalism is in this respect not by any means alien to the Platonic legacy.   
In fact, we can regard Cicero as a reversal of Aristotle in some respects. Where Aristotle 




city and of mobile, physical nature, Cicero removed these boundaries. And whilst Aristotle 
limited the political and moral community to adult male humans and to the Greek institution 
of the city, Cicero suggested that there is a single universal moral and political community 
that exists by nature and is everywhere discoverable by reason (De Officiis III.23-31). 
 
Yet within this universalism, Cicero was poised between a focus on the individual and a 
focus on the community, or, one might say, between ‘subjectivism’ and ‘citizenship’. He 
envisaged a universe wholly comprehensible and discoverable by human reason, and yet one 
in which meaning and morality are defined by a reflexive and internal self-integrity, almost a 
case of ‘to thine own self be true’.  
 
Thus, in De Officiis he argued not only that each person has a different nature to which they 
must adhere, but even that what may be right for one person is wrong for another, depending 
on their nature. Decorum is nothing more than ‘uniform consistency in the course of our life 
as a whole and all its individual actions’ and ‘this uniform consistency one could not 
maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one’s own’ (I.111-2).  He 
deployed the example of Cato the Younger, who chose to take his own life rather than 
surrender to Caesar, whilst simultaneously defending the actions of those senators who chose 
to return in peace in the hopes of continuing to strive for the Republic. Cato had been 
‘endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief’ and he ‘strengthened it by unswerving 
consistency’.  
 
But the two perspectives, universal and individualist, are not as distanced from each other as 
may seem at first glance. Since, for Cicero, the universe is a single ‘homeland’, with the 
difference between the earth and the heavens one of degree, there is little sense of Plato’s 
concept of the world as shadow or image of a higher reality (Republic I.19-22). Rather, 
Cicero adopted an explicitly Pythagorean and ‘Italian’ reading of Plato and of the cosmos, 
and saw the universe as composed of a single comprehensible ‘language’, a sacred geometry 
(Tusculan Disputations, I. 39-41, 61-2; IV.2-3).209 So rather than Plato’s relational and 
participatory sense of ontology, we find a reading of the world as univocally linguistic and 
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mathematical, fully legible and numerable within its own immanent terms (Republic VI.15-
17).  
This ‘Pythagorean realism’ sought to establish words as having a stable meaning, yet risked 
descent into sophistry because these meanings are self-generated, albeit at a higher level of 
reflection, and sustained as true by a form of self-reference which concerns a self-consistent 
survival within a world of flux and inconsistency, even if (on a Stoic model) this self-
reference ultimately coincides with and echoes the self-reference of the cosmic totality. For 
the point is that, in terms of the individual, something purely natural is touched upon by 
Cicero, for whom extreme subjectivity nonetheless coincides with the ultimate objectivity of 
the cosmic totality itself. That is to say, with universal principles of harmony, proportion and 
symmetry that are akin to sheerly immanentized and more measurably fixed Platonic 
forms.210   
The emphasis on the nature of reality as mathematical and legible, and of an ultimately 
natural and individual conformation to this reality, suggests a form of subverted citizenship 
that far less requires directly reciprocal relationships. Sheer sociability, or gregariousness, 
more than individual insufficiency, is the ultimate cause of civic existence (Republic I.39-41), 
yet with regard to political unity under justice, the extrinsic bond of law is more fundamental 
(48-9). The unity of the commonwealth arises then not necessarily from a direct exchange of 
thoughts and words as for Plato and Aristotle, but rather inheres in a shared natural integrity 
and set of definitions that nonetheless require to be rhetorically instilled.  
The greater emphasis on power in the Roman political context makes itself known here: the 
Roman Republic as envisioned by Cicero draws its legitimacy not from the adherence of all 
citizens to a single immediately shared common interactive experience of co-constituting 
citizenship, but rather from a common and strictly immanent rational ‘word’ that involves, in  
Cicero’s case, a fusing of philosophy with rhetoric.211 This can be seen as in keeping with the 
general Stoic approach to language, which thought of meaning in terms of an achievement of 
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signifying force within a chain that was ultimately determined at a cosmic level, rather than 
as something that attains to an immediate external and spatial reference.212  
Such an immanentizing, naturalistic and power-orientated approach places Cicero within the 
Stoic tradition in many other ways. The Stoics in general shunned, with their trademark 
indifference, political thought, in contrast to the Neoplatonists who had a more active 
political vision.213 This can be ascribed to Stoicism’s quietistic logic, whereby the individual 
seeks a total and totally private rule of reason over the passions to most closely resemble the 
unchanging cosmic logos operating in the midst of the chaos of worldly affairs.  
Cicero’s political Stoicism is also evident in his concern for the stability of property (and by 
implication the propertied classes) as being at the heart of a just political order. Every person 
has a set of duties, closely tied to property and family which he saw as constituting the 
political as a true commonwealth. Yet in his understanding of duty, Cicero was at once at his 
most and his least Stoic. Effectively, the Stoic vision of the soul was expanded into a total 
vision of political and social organisation by Cicero, in which the undisturbed psychic 
harmony was realised for society as a whole through the integrity and rigour of a set of public 
and private offices. This projection relied somewhat on the specifically Platonic parallelism 
of the order of the soul to that of the city. And not only in Cicero’s vision of the ideal city as 
an image of the soul is a Platonic element at work, but also in his understanding of soul and 
city as ‘mixed constitutions’, whereby the ideal form of both is a matter of the full 
expression, articulation and integration of three hierarchically related elements: as regards the 
soul, of force or self-regard, appetite and reason, and as regards the city, of oligarchy, 
democracy and monarchy. 
The paradox at the heart of the Roman Republic, which manifests itself in the case of Cicero 
in the Stoic/Platonic tension, is laid out in his account of what constitutes a ‘commonwealth’, 
as at once a common property, but more fundamentally, a common good (Republic I.34, III. 
43-5). According to this combination, the web of duties, of suffrage, clientage, enslaved, 
military and contractual bonds constitute a republic in as much as they all ultimately mediate 
the good. It is this concept and passage that Augustine will criticise in the Civitas Dei on the 
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basis that Rome in reality lacked a common good towards which all could strive.214 For this 
reason, Cicero’s grand political vision seems to fold in on itself, and its ultimate 
contradictions arise perhaps from its insufficient Platonism, such that he is unable to properly 
articulate a transcendent and absolute justice and goodness that his vision seems to require. 
 
6. Cicero, the Republic and Caesarism.    
More fully to understand these Roman and Ciceronian tensions over citizenship and the 
character of the Roman city, one must explore further its mixed constitution, its greater 
monarchism as compared to Greece and the eventually emergent tension between 
republicanism and Caesarism.215 We will see how this tension connects, though does not 
exactly coincide, with the tension between Stoicism and Platonism in Cicero’s writings. 
The latter tension amounts to an exceeding of Aristotle in opposite directions: on the one 
hand, an immanent ‘flattening’ (to both the self-contained cosmos and the self-contained 
individual), on the other, a transcendent ‘heightening’ whereby, on a more Platonic model, 
politics and citizenship are again more cosmically inclusive and all is ultimately referred to 
participation in transcendence. As we saw in the case of Plato, the first characteristic can be 
somewhat linked to empire, and the second somewhat to monarchy.  
In the course of his life, Cicero sought to uphold Roman civic traditions with the same valour 
as Socrates sought to cleave to the eternal truth, if with far greater pragmatism. Rome had 
possessed in her early years a semi-electoral monarchy and a mixed constitution and Cicero 
was not shy of praising the early Roman Kingdom, attributing its fall not to the weakness of 
the monarchic constitution, but to the character flaws that emerged in the Tarquins (Republic 
II.26-32). In effect, Cicero suggested that they actively and consciously sought to be absolute 
rulers within an already republican system, in the deepest sense.  
As something potential to all humans, for Rome and for Cicero republican citizenship had a 
democratic bias, yet as something exercisable in different qualitative degrees it also had an 
aristocratic and even a monarchic one. Augustus therefore became ‘princeps’ (first citizen), 
besides being elevated to princeps senatus and pontifex maximus, and he held the supreme 
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tribunicia potestas: the power of a tribune who could put legislation before the Roman people 
or veto a law proposed by the Senate.216  
Besides upholding this monarchic/republican view of citizenship, Cicero also shared a 
common Roman understanding of customary law as existing prior to written law.217 He 
departed from much Greek philosophy in arguing that the city is formed not first from 
necessity or lack, but from a positive desire for communal existence. The contrast with 
Aristotle here is instructive. Although the Stagirite saw politics as the properly human 
activity, providing us with our true higher life (bios), he also believed that citizenship was an 
emergent property that arose only after the animal realm of necessity (mere life, zoe) had 
already gathered us into a social body.218 The Stoics, by comparison, thought that prior to a 
deliberative politics, people lived in a state of individualist anarchy. Their sense of a ‘pure 
nature’ was stronger, but also their sense of a coincidence of the social with the political and 
of the political as positively constructing the social as such.  
But Cicero implies something different from both, and something perhaps more Platonic, if 
we bear in mind the primordial cosmic role of guardianship and the legendary Egyptian 
antiquity of monarchy in Plato. For Cicero, in some sense, true humans are always already 
citizens, since Rome traces imperceptibly backwards into mythical foundations in a 
primordial time. It is for this reason that his political philosophy appeals not to normative 
ideals, but to Roman history (a mixture of fact and legend) which acts for him, especially in 
its foundations, like a revelation of the inherent human truth.    
Yet a complication arises out of this Ciceronian perspective.  If we are always already, as 
Romans, in an ancestry traceable back to a primordial age, citizens, then the tensions that 
Plato and Aristotle saw as emerging subsequent to the founding of the city are actually 
epistemically prior: the very founding of the city is coterminous with its contradictions of the 
city and its dialectical relationship with faction and civil war (stasis).  
These tensions have their source for Cicero in the concept of equitas: a requirement that 
every citizen have not only his physical needs fulfilled, but also his desire for respect, status 
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and honours in relation to humans and gods, and that these be met in ways that do not put him 
at odds with his neighbour (Topics, 90).219 The Roman merging of oikos and polis here 
continued to have vast implications for him: the city is taken to be coincident not so much 
with the termination of conflict, as with its constant mediation, and the conflict concerns as 
much the disputed physical and economic as it does disputed spiritual dignity. Lurking within 
this outlook is both a potential individualism and also its opposite: a potential collectivism 
whereby the physical and economic concerns come to assume political full political 
pertinence.  
Against this background, Cicero discussed in the Republic how each of the possible three 
regimes creates irreconcilable problems because of their lack of equitable dignity where 
wealth and power is hoarded at the top in the case of aristocracy or monarchy, and the equal 
offence done against the dignitas of leading men with their natural superior virtue, when they 
are robbed of all priority, in the case of democracy (53-60). In recommending the mixed 
regime, Cicero was not merely arguing for a synthesis at the end of a long road of shifting 
regimes in the wake of Polybius but was also pointing to Roman exceptionalism insofar as 
she possessed a mixed constitution from the time of her foundation. By starting out as a 
mixed regime Rome staked a claim to an original justice, that, however rough and imperfect, 
established for Cicero a sustainable superiority to every other city ever known. 
Thus while, on the one hand, Cicero’s Rome possessed from the outset a ‘Stoic’ tendency to 
fragmentation and conflict, capable only of a formal, legal and monetary mediation, on the 
other hand, it also possessed from its untraceable, and so natural origins, a ‘Platonic’ balance 
and unity. Specifically, in the wake of Polybius, this included a more emphatically monarchic 
moment than in the case of Aristotle. Since he mediates the transcendent, a monarch can 
more readily transcend the subordinate degrees and seek to integrate the physical and 
economic concerns of the plebeians with the more spiritual and honour-seeking ones of the 
aristocrats.  
All the same, Cicero’s understanding of citizenship as merging the economic and political 
opened up modes of citizenship that Plato and Athens at most anticipated. Direct participation 
in the assembly was no longer the gold standard: the citizen now had an immediate political 
stake by way of property and even participated in the dignity of the leading men as a kind of 
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spectator. Attaining citizenship was now indeed understood as acquiring rights (adipisci ius 
Quiritium), especially of marriage (connubium) and appeal (provocatio) (Republic II.53-4).220 
Cicero cited Scipio as at least positing the possibility that a just city must admit everyone to 
citizenship by dint of sheer equal legal belonging, as the basis of the vinculum, rather than on 
account of merit (Republic I.48-9.). 
In this respect, Pierre Grimal suggests that for Cicero politics is a kind of performance and 
game, in which the dignity of every part of society must be not only tangibly upheld, but also 
spectacularly manifested.221 Just as the Roman city was constituted by an affective bond 
rather than by pure necessity, so it was maintained much as connubium, by constantly 
repeated displays of affection, recognitions of worth and a perpetual but subtle negotiation of 
boundaries. This ‘sentimental’ vision is inherently linked to the Roman pursuit of the ultimate 
goal of otium, a pastoral condition of leisured peace and harmonious tranquillity.  
However, citizenship, the sufficient giving of honours, the proper dignity of the citizen, the 
ideal of otium and the need for equity were eventually rendered more difficult of achievement 
by the sheer size, power, wealth and militarisation of Rome. It was in part to resolve this 
crisis of mediation and distribution that the Caesarian moment emerged.  Since the giving of 
triumphs to all but the sole Imperator ceases, a more modest and measured distribution of 
honours could now arise.   
This development can be considered unavoidable to the degree that the deepest desires of the 
Republic, the very things that made it a republic, were also what caused it to periodically 
descend into chaos, and to plunge it into stasis, bellum civile. Cicero himself could not fully 
resolve the Roman tension between the desire for dignitas and the need for equitas and his 
vision of an eternal mixed constitution ultimately failed in practice. 
What was the reason for this failure? One can argue that it is because it was insufficiently 
Platonic. Just because, in the case of Cicero’s Rome, historical legend displaced ideal 
normativity, there was no clear philosophical equivalence to the religious reference to 
normative transcendence which prevents the absolutizing of anything finite, and indeed the 
religious horizon remained itself too pre-Socratically intra-cosmic. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that eventually the monarch, in the shape of the emperor, should be deified and 
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should appropriate real transcendent height to his own immanent status. Given this 
development, there is also no equivalent distinction in Cicero, as with Plato, of the highest 
power of psychic reason or political authority from a mere sophistic highest force, in terms of 
a guidance of reason and the rule by the realm of the Forms. Just for this reason, Caesarism 
itself was ambivalently poised between a ‘Platonic’ harmonisation allowing a greater 
distribution of dignified roles and sufficient resources, and a ‘sophistic’ exercise of sheer 
autocracy, corrupting and half-obliterating the republican legacy.   
In fact, specifically Platonic versions of a Roman monarchic empire were indeed articulated 
within the Platonic tradition from Philo’s megalopolis through to the Neoplatonists of 
Alexandria and Rome itself.222 Cicero and Philo shared a conception of a universal moral and 
political order as being fundamentally psychic, and in Cicero’s case the notion of ‘right’ 
concerns a customary and pre-legal dimension that had to do with mutual recognition of the 
dignified ‘personhood’ of each citizen with respect to every other.223 For this conception, a 
certain pre-political and natural legitimacy of personal ownership is directly linked to the idea 
that the Republic is the collective ‘property of the people’ or ‘shared thing’ (res populi) by 
virtue of their association  (Republic I.48). 
This understanding is far from a modern sense of foundational subjective ‘rights’, yet at the 
same time in Cicero’s writings it could sometimes slide more, under Stoicising influence, in 
that direction, towards the isolated protection by each of ‘their own’ (as later assaulted by 
Augustine) such that reciprocally acknowledged ownership appeared to overwhelm the 
priority of the common good. Thus, in De Officiis Cicero declared that it is the very proprium 
of the civitas ‘to guarantee to every man the free and undisturbed control of his own 
particular property (suae rei cuiusque custodia).’ (II.78). 
We can read in Cicero’s great and repeated emphasis on giving to each man in the Republic 
his proper dignity not merely an abstract republican sense of civic justice, but also his own 
immediate struggle to balance the egos of the members of the first triumvirate with the 
dignity of the Optimates and the people. To an almost unique degree Cicero himself lived out 
his own political philosophy and enacted its theoretical crisis.224 
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Following the fall of the First Triumvirate and the assassination of Caesar, Cicero re-emerged 
as a political force in dramatic manner, and wrote De Officiis at around the same time. For 
one strange moment, like the centre of a storm, he seemed to bring his vision about, winning 
over Octavian, the Senate and the People (monarchy, oligarchy and democracy) to the cause 
of his Polybian mixed Republic, only to be murdered as a consequence of Octavian’s betrayal 
through the forming of the Second Triumvirate.225  
Given that, for Cicero, violence, if unlimited, seems to destroy the possibility of justice, how 
to prevent the desire for glory fuelling perpetual civil war? One possible solution is the 
Augustan one, which involved a monopolisation of glory at the centre. Yet this moment, 
however half-entertained by him, sat uneasily with Cicero’s desire for the equitable if 
proportionally mixed distribution of offices and honours and he clearly denounced any 
aspiration to outright kingship (De Officiis III.83).226 
However, if one can read Cicero ‘Platonically’, as at times not totally averse to the Caesarian 
moment, one can inversely read this moment itself Stoically’, insofar as it acted as a final 
guarantee of a more formal individualist order through the monopolisation of force. Looked 
at critically, we could read the Augustan revolution as granting only a passive form of 
participation rather than Plato’s active one, and of itself prefiguring the modern political 
subject (and the ‘thin’ form of citizenship operative in liberal democracies). With the 
disintegration of republican values, the web of duty and the universal need for justice and 
dignity devolve into something more like a Hobbesian state of nature, with each man in 
potential conflict with every other (De Officiis I.20-24). In this situation, the only way to 
provide a universal moral system, universal dignity and honours, is by a universal 
disarmament, and monopolisation of power, both literal and figurative, as Hobbes required. 
Though nobody is fully satisfied, the opportunity for gaining immoderate honour and 
immoderate power is now excluded by the emperor’s ‘virtuous monopoly’ of all honour.  
Yet the central power of this ‘dark Ciceronian state’ remained somewhat restrained by 
constitutionality, now itself more tending towards a ‘liberal’ balance of powers, and more 
absolute property rights, somewhat anticipating the liberal monarchism of Montesquieu. As 
with honour, eminent ownership and ultimate patrimonial benefaction was now concentrated 
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in the hands of the ruler precisely in order that no individual could place himself above the 
lawful authority.227  
 
       7. The Experimental Theatre of Empire  
We can only fully understand the emergence of Caesarism against the background of the 
previous history of Roman monarchy, which reveals once more an intense and peculiar 
oscillation between inside and outside, nature and artifice, as integral to the entirety of 
Roman mentality and practice.  
The constitutional monarchy that originally resulted (according to Livy) from popular 
demands, was sustained, to a degree, as a permanent system.228 Yet there were peculiarities.  
In the Republican period, the Roman ‘king’ - the Consul (although there were two) - was in 
times of war granted military imperium, which gave him the powers of a true absolute ruler 
(immunity from prosecution, total dictatorial authority). But this was only to be held outside 
the city, not within it. Rather than exile following kingship in a ‘Greek’ manner, the consul 
became a ruler by leaving the city: another mode of diffusion of political contradiction. When 
he returned to the city he was crowned, but at this very moment his ‘kingship’ paradoxically 
ceased.229  
The Romans regarded military life in just these odd and contrary terms, with war seen as 
‘outside’ politics and law, and yet perpetually reintegrated into it in retrospect.  Having 
reigned as a god, a bloody-handed Mars, the victorious general, the Imperator, must cast off 
his mantle, and submit to the senate, and to the law, and it is they who will determine if his 
actions were divine. Yet he was first hailed as Imperator on the field of battle by his troops, 
and in recognition of his divine nature, his virtus. The link between the oracular and war was 
equally clear, as it was the general who most of all tested the efficacy of oracular predictions 
and lived out their consequences.230  
Insofar as the emperor became the supreme citizen, he was in this way also the supreme 
‘experimenter’. For one could say that Rome advanced according to a  kind of experimental 
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dialectic, adapting its religious, ritual and political constitution to the emergent conditions, 
growing ever closer to a truth revealed by reason in nature (sometimes described as ‘natural 
law’, as by Gaius and Cicero: Laws II.10)231 and attaining a moral perfection that at once 
participates in a universal morality, and becomes more perfect by becoming more 
universal.232 If Athens was a theatre, Rome was also a laboratory and an operating table, just 
as its literal theatre tended notoriously to Grand Guignol. Thus, victory on the battlefield and 
at the strategic level were, in a Ciceronian logic, moral and rational vindications of the 
legitimacy and mission of the Roman Republic. The navigators of the Republic in the civilian 
realm were likewise augurs and experimental combatants, who had to adjust the constitution 
and the liturgy of the Republic in order to ensure victory both military and civic. The 
emphasis on victory reflected the double-edged boundary of the Republic, for unlike the 
Greek polis which often entered the battlefield in order to preserve an internal harmony, the 
Republic must for Cicero perpetually uphold the ‘good name’ of Rome and legitimate its 
constitution on the world stage through the pursuit of virtuous renown (De Officiis II.26-28; 
III.83).233  
Clara Auvray-Assayas traces this ‘experimental’ dimension of Cicero to his reading of 
Socrates as ‘philosopher of the city’ rather than of nature. 234 A rejection of a certain form of 
ontological certainty derived from nature may seem an odd starting point for establishing a 
case for Cicero as a proto-scientific proponent of natural law, but it follows quite coherently 
from his attachment to the sceptical school of Platonism of the second academy. Cicero 
claimed that we cannot know what is, only what is ‘probable’. Thus, in De Officiis he argued 
that ‘as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others uncertain, we, differing 
with them, say that some things are probable, others improbable’ (II.7).  Auvray-Assayas 
suggests that Cicero privileged the city as the ideal realm for the study of the ‘probable’, as it 
stands between the divine and the natural worlds. In the city, the statesman can continually 
‘test’ propositions about truth, human nature and the divine because he has the opportunity to 
put them into practice and will observe and indeed suffer or benefit from the results.235  
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To extend the analogy, we can think of the citizen as being at once scientific observer and 
test- subject, the city as a laboratory of life, the constitution as a shifting set of variables and 
inputs. The city occupied the middle realm of conveniens, a Stoic concept of the world as an 
uncertain realm to be ceaselessly renegotiated (De Officiis, 1.144). This is most clearly 
conveyed in Book II of De Officiis, which treats of the theme of the expedient and the 
inexpedient (utile and inutile), but Cicero departs from Stoicism in seeing recourse to the 
expedient as a minimal concession, which remains Platonically in agreement with the highest 
possible good, so long as the expedient is directed towards it.  He argues that if we are wise, 
we realise that the expedient and the good are always ultimately the same thing and only 
appear sometimes to be at odds (De Officiis 2.9). The realm of contemplation is here not so 
much abolished as radically reoriented, becoming (as we see in Scipio’s dream in Book VI of 
the Republic) less a realm of knowledge, than a source of wonder. The divine is at once 
sublimely elevated beyond us, but also endlessly translated through experimental 
approximation into the realm of the graspable and the attainable, inspiring in the statesman a 
restless desire for greatness. Because the political has become a shifting approach to the 
‘real’, the city is envisaged as something more radically constructed, and as a consequence 
the self as citizen becomes likewise a kind of artifice.  
 
Yet for Cicero the Roman city remained akin to the Platonic city in being an image of the 
soul. However, the Roman soul was also more radically external than the Greek soul: genius 
had more to do with verbal reputation than did pneuma; it was something existing mainly in 
the eyes of others, mortal and immortal.236 The Roman consequently discovered his soul by a 
kind of experiment, ideally manifest in victory and civic honours. It must be given to him by 
friends and won back from foes, just as the legion as a whole, casts its genius, embodied by 
the Eagle, into the ranks of the enemy to ensure victory. Cicero accordingly spoke of the 
notion of a ‘civic self’ as one mode of the human persona, or ‘character’, which originally 
meant a theatrical mask (De Officiis I.107-21).237 Just as the Roman soul was more 
‘externalised’, so the Roman more tended to embrace the idea that different selves can be 
picked up and cast away depending on context.  
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How does the experimentality and theatricality of Rome concur with its greater givenness, as 
already discussed, both in terms of the primordial coincidence of city and people and of the 
always pre-given relational vinculum? In either case, there is a greater relation to time than in 
the case of Greece. As earlier suggested, on the one hand, everything for Rome is always 
already begun and given to us from the past; on the other, everything is always available for 
active re-shaping in the future. By comparison, as the myths of autochthony so vividly show, 
the Greek city was relatively more spatial: sprung by a preternatural process from the earth, 
fixed forever in its laws by a mythical legislator, or a king then forced into exile. The 
temporal and imperial city of Rome was by contrast at once more at one with natural 
temporal origins, and yet more of a continuous artificial construct, given that physis itself is 
defined by the mobile. 
In both respects one can speak of a Platonic anticipation of Rome: of the primacy of time as 
recollection and prospect in Plato, of an appeal back to Egypt and to the cosmos against the 
spatial civic present, and also of a demand for poetic reshaping of the city by the wise. And of 
time as the moving image of eternity, whose participatory ordering encompasses both natural 
and human development.  
Yet in another respect, Rome and Cicero are not fully up to the level of the Platonic 
anticipation: for without real transcosmic guidance, Rome is split between the absolute 
command of a chthonic religious past, and the all-too open possibilities of the future. Again, 
without a clear appeal to participation in the Forms it cannot integrate its natural and past 
excess over Greek spatiality with its artificial and future excess over the same.   
Thus, one can argue that it was doomed both to a rationalising naturalism, on the one hand, 
and to an increasingly arbitrary theatricality, on the other. The same alternative figures also 
manifest as an oscillation between dignitas as removed interiority, and dignity as the dutiful 
wearing of an appropriate personal mask in due circumstances. In both respects one can 
identify in Rome a proto-liberalism, which monarchy and empire at once sometimes qualified 
and yet at other times intensified.  
 




Given all of the foregoing, we now need to examine with more precision whether Cicero’s 
account of Roman constitutionalism was truly Platonic and organic, or whether it tended 
already in a modern liberal direction of the pragmatic ‘balancing of powers’.  
The latter conclusion would seem to be favoured by the fact that he is almost uniquely 
implicated in the history of liberalism. For by reference to Cicero we can weave together 
more coherently the often apparently disparate threads of its history: from Machiavelli 
through Grotius, Hobbes and Locke to Montesquieu and Hume. Machiavelli and Grotius 
drew on Cicero to justify their political realism; Hobbes and Locke looked to him to justify 
the fundamental role of property rights; Montesquieu combined Cicero with Polybius to help 
form his idea of the separation of powers; Hume and others regarded Cicero as a champion of 
the dignity of the individual perspective and vocation, and as a proponent of epistemic 
scepticism who linked freedom not to an unattainable truth but to the useful and the 
decorous.238 
More recently, Benjamin Straumann has argued that the Roman constitution in general, and 
Cicero’s and Polybius’ interpretation of it in particular, is the ultimate origin of the modern 
Lockean account of the constitution.239 He stresses Roman thought as ‘constitutional’ as 
opposed to the ‘virtue-based’ politics of Greek thought and practice. This view renders 
Cicero a theorist of the legal subject rather than the participating citizen. 
For Straumann this means specifically that Cicero salvaged a new balance of forces between 
the One, the Few and the Many by looking less to the traditional primacy of virtue and more 
to the balance of powers, linked to an admission of the ultimately individual and self-
interested basis of social action, in which virtue and unity are replaced by pre-political rights, 
supplemented with the operation of mutual sympathy.240 
Straumann is alert to the risk of his own analysis, insofar as Cicero has been so heavily cited 
by a more authoritarian strand of liberalism that emphasises, after Hobbes, the necessity of a 
strong autocratic power supressing the violent ‘state of nature’, and which takes, after 
Machiavelli and Giovanni Botero, a positive view of the supremely ‘realist’ statesman.  
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In particular, Cicero appears at several points both in his writings and his own career to have 
justified extra-legal ‘police action’ by executives in emergency contexts that look uncannily 
like the Schmittian ‘state of exception’.241 Accordingly, Straumann seeks to re-orient 
Cicero’s ‘state of nature’ understanding of emergency powers away from a proto-
Machiavellian and Hobbesian scenario towards a more Lockean and regular constitutional 
vision. For this perspective, the ‘external’ moments of brutal exigency and exception can be 
shifted from foundational positions towards an ‘internal’ balancing of powers, such that 
political foundations arrive only with this balancing, rather than from the outset with a 
sheerly natural brutality.242  
But we have already seen reasons to doubt that Cicero was straightforwardly a proponent of a 
proto-liberal position. Did he not also, in his more Academic or Platonic mode open the way 
to the pre-liberal, corporatist global moral and economic order of Christendom? If he was 
often cited by the moderns, he was also frequently cited by Aquinas and many other 
scholastics. We need now to explore the corporatist dimension in Cicero’s political thought as 
a new development of antique articulation of citizenship and to see how this may cast further 
light on the tensions between his genuine civic republicanism and his seeming tendencies to 
inaugurate a liberal individualism that have already been considered.  
 
       9. Cicero’s Two Cities 
We no longer possess the text of Zeno’s Republic, but as an idea it not only survived but 
crucially informed what became normatively modern notions of political order. In this city 
we are all expected to be equal in material circumstances and rights; morality is to be 
rationalised in a way that ignores traditional taboos and citizenship will be granted only to the 
virtuous who will rule over the phauloi.243 By making the moral order pre-political, Zeno’s 
Stoicism rendered the political equivalently sub-ethical, with the role of the polis becoming 
merely to regulate the relations of those who are already moral agents, and to restrain those 
who by the operation of the very natural law itself are incapable of full participation in virtue.  
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Zeno’s extreme Stoic vision haunted later Stoics, who, as their philosophy reached greater 
mainstream respectability, sought in various ways to modify and qualify it. The universal 
rational and moral order came to be contrasted with the way in which each person possesses a 
uniquely particular and individual nature. In consequence, an equal application of a universal 
principle to all persons can still issue in totally different practical consequences and 
outcomes.244 The effect of this qualification is to disturb the virtuous/non-virtuous binary of 
Zeno, going so far as to suggest that each individual has a particular nature such that what is 
good for one person is bad for another. This development, which centred on Panaetius, 
besides Cicero, can suggest a liberal privatisation of morality and the reduction of the 
political to a rational framework required to preserve individual rights.  
However, this stress on individual difference, in terms of its concreteness, can be read instead 
as a modified Platonic element, invoking the principle of the alloyed natures in the 
Statesman, whereby contrary dispositions are (figuratively and literally) ‘wedded’ to one 
another. In Plato’s dialogues, and even in later Stoicism, we find the notion of 
complementary differences as being crucial to political harmony, rather than a simple appeal 
to a formal mediation that would treat differences of dispositions and roles as politically 
irrelevant or pernicious.245 
Cicero in part took up this tradition, and allied it, in the wake of the Greek historian of Rome, 
Polybius, with the Roman constitution. Polybius saw in the Roman constitution a balance 
between various rivalrous factions that together preserved liberty and checked each other’s 
excesses.246 As a Greek, he seems to have regarded Romans as ‘noble savages’ - their 
constitution emerging by happy chance and native virtue but producing through a kind of 
resultant organic harmony an ideal mixed constitution.247 He also appears to have been 
caught between a Peripatetic preference for the more rationally planned mixed constitution of 
Sparta, and a Stoic bias towards Rome as a constitution shaped by the forces of natural law 
(Histories 6.43-60).  
Many of Cicero’s central contentions can be seen as an attempt to adjust this classical 
account of the Roman political project. He fused divergent Pythagorean, Platonic and Stoic 
strains to construe the ‘organic’ development of the Roman constitution as a providential 
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process in which Rome is guided by nature and divine reason through a process of 
nonetheless unconscious experimentation and adaptation. This account both adopted and 
qualified Polybius’s vision of a constitution shaped by natural law more than by human 
reason. Nevertheless, Cicero also considered that in his own day the new helmsmen of the 
Roman state must now endeavour to render this a conscious process, in order to arrive at a 
perfected harmony with the cosmic order, imitating the life of the gods: ‘For there is really no 
other occupation in which human virtue approaches more closely the august function of the 
gods than that of founding new States or preserving those already in existence’ (Republic 
1.12.). 
Straumann correctly notes this fusion of Greek political philosophy and Roman history, both 
in the case of Polybius’ naturalistic account and of Cicero’s more conscious reformism but 
reads into it a modern constitutionalism based on checks and balances. Although he says that 
Cicero’s order is ‘not as obviously the result of constitutional conflict’, he declares that it is 
nevertheless the ‘outcome of social conflict’ [my italics] – which might seem to render the 
agonistic element still more fundamental.248   
However, the missing element in Straumann’s reading is the overwhelming influence of Plato 
and Platonism on both authors. Polybius admits that his entire historical analysis of the 
emergence and cycle of regimes is in fact a simplified version of Plato’s historical categories.  
His account of the regimes corresponds closely with those of Plato, although is also clearly 
influenced by Aristotle’s regime-analysis and by his recommendation of the mixed 
constitution in his Politics.249  
Straumann is not unaware of these complications, but seeks to deal with them largely in terms 
of a hybridity between Greek and Roman political philosophy, which he thinks can be 
distinguished in terms of virtue polity versus constitutionalism.250 He derives his account of 
Platonic political thought almost entirely from the Republic, and misreads the Laws as 
representing a narrowing of citizenship and a rejection of the pre-political.251 By contrast, 
Polybius said that ‘it would be unfair to admit [Plato’s Republic] into the discussion’ and that 
it cannot be so admitted ‘unless or until it proves that it can act in the real world’.252  
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How is it that Polybius presents his own analytical historical structures as an elaboration of 
Plato, and yet excludes Plato’s own apparently favoured regime? This is readily answered 
once we understand that Plato and Polybius alike understood the historical and the 
philosophical as operating at differing levels of analysis. That is to say, that the Kallipolis is a 
tool for thinking about the nature of justice, abstracted from the circumstances of history; it is 
not a study of the underlying principles of history which accompany it.  
The apparent contradiction between Plato and Polybius seems to lie in the natural unity that 
the former identifies with justice, versus the agonistic relationship between the parts of the 
‘mixed regime’ of the latter. However, the three parts can be read as working in a dynamic 
harmony, and even the principle of correction (Straumann’s ‘checks and balances’) readily 
fits with the corrective role of the guardian class in Plato, and the role that thumos plays in 
the tripartite soul.  
The differences between Platonic versus Polybian and Ciceronian political thought can be 
even further broken down if we take into account the contrast between Plato’s Republic and 
Laws. In the Laws the three classes are far less strictly divided, with many temporary offices 
and posts decided by various forms of election, and the unity is of a dynamic and cyclical 
nature, as with the mixed constitution of Polybius. Likewise, Plato presents here an involved 
account of natural justice, with moral character formed by a balance of pain and pleasure 
incurred through the operation of natural and historical exigencies.253  
It follows that the two driving forces of necessity and sociability identified by Straumann as 
prototypical of the various liberal states of nature could be understood instead in Platonic 
terms, which involve at once a more variegated and situated realism and yet also more 
genuine ideality. The difference with Polybius and Cicero to an extent concerns the 
application of Plato’s own ideas of natural justice and historical forces to a novel context, that 
of the Roman constitution.  
As we have seen, the Roman civitas was like a Greek polis in many respects, but it broke 
with the constraints and assumption of immediacy inherent to the Greek city-state. Rome 
manifested a more temporally and spatially mediated corporatist politics which Roman 
Stoicism was able specifically to articulate, thereby revealing its own less individualist and 






city-state in terms of his focus upon different roles within the city and attention to sub-
associations. Yet the theory of corpora was of specifically Stoic provenance, revealing that 
not even Stoicism can be taken as unambiguously ‘proto-liberal’.  This theory gradually 
merged and in part developed in parallel with Rome’s own legal traditions.  
Stoic philosophy in general recognised three kinds of ‘body’: a unitary body like the human 
form or a statue, an ‘assembled’ body composed of separable parts like a building, and a 
group of individual bodies that, though physically separated, are considered a real and not 
just nominal unity, like a flock of sheep.254 In Roman law, the first kind was not considered to 
be legally divisible, unlike the second, whilst the third class, despite having no physical 
existence, could be treated as legally a single body, even though not only separable but 
already physically separated and dispersed. Crucially, following Rome’s own animistic 
traditions, each unitary object of the first class was regarded as having an individual spiritus, 
the assemblages of the second class were not, but the groups of the third class were 
considered to have a group spiritus as well as individual ones.  
This background throws an entirely different light on the tangled knot of Cicero’s res publica 
and his theories about property.  George Patterson has plausibly argued that one can relate the 
three kinds of Stoic corpora to the Roman legal categories of proprietorship, partnership and 
corporation.255 Viewed in these terms, it becomes clearer what kinds of individual and 
common ownership Cicero has in mind, and those which he does not.  
In this context, Straumann’s postulated Roman constitutionalism, which alienates polity from 
soul, and virtue from law, risks projecting backwards the modern idea of the polity as a 
‘state’ separate from the community and grounded on a contractual partnership, intended to 
guarantee the security of individual proprietors.  Cicero rather identified the polity as a 
corpora of the third kind, analogous to later medieval ideas of the corporation (Republic 
3.37). The one possible arrangement that allows the collective ownership to be a single form 
of ownership with an infusing spiritus, rendering it comparable to a soul-informed human 
body, is the third type of corpora. Only if the individual components are themselves fully 
discrete bodies of the first kind can they together form a body of the third, as we see in 
Scipio’s account in Book III (43-45) of Cicero’s Republic of the nature of the res publica. 
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The second Stoic body therefore, the artificial one, is not considered by Cicero to be of such 
political relevance, as it would need to be if he was clearly a proto-contractualist.  
Far from unambiguously proposing a pre-political system of natural rights, Cicero instead 
identified the microcosmic justice of the human soul (embodied by the extended corpus of 
private property and the household) with the macrocosmic justice of the commonwealth, 
which is a greater corpus. Which was given priority in Cicero is unambiguous; as he made 
clear in De Officiis 3.31, even private property can be seized in case of necessity for the sake 
of the common good. Most importantly though, Cicero rejected altogether the liberal 
antagonism between the justice of the individual and that of the state and followed Plato in 
identifying them as one: ‘This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest 
of each individual and of the whole body politic identical. For, if the individual appropriates 
to selfish ends what should be devoted to the common good, all human fellowship will be 
destroyed’ (De Officiis 3.26).  
The character of the res publica is illuminated more fully in the De Officiis through the 
extended formula of the totum corpus rei publicae. This semantic redoubling involves a 
qualification: there is both a ‘public thing’ and a ‘public body’ combined, in a passage where 
he cites two of Plato’s rules. First, to keep the good of the people so clearly in view that 
regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to that; secondly, 
to care for the welfare of the whole body politic over against sectional interests. Cicero is 
explicit in identifying ius with Platonic justice as unity, and not with pre-political 
‘constitutional norms’.  
Moreover, the whole purpose of the discourse on property in De Officiis is to establish that 
private property ownership is not primarily a right, but a duty. Each citizen has his share of 
property because each man has his duties to the republic which is the common property of all. 
Even the Stoic switch to a ‘cosmopolitan’ perspective still rendered politics ultimate and 
sustained the political as prior to property rights.256 Thus Cicero declares in De Officiis 1.21b: 
‘there is, however, no such thing as private ownership established by nature’. Concomitantly, 
the Stoic world-scope for Cicero was the city-empire and not an international order of 
independent states, any more than it was an international order of private individuals.257 
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Cicero’s totum corpus rei publicae is a political order whose bounds are universal and whose 
model is eternal.  
It was this aspect of Cicero’s vision that allowed it to be taken up by Augustine and to 
become an influence upon the medieval world view, where his ideals of civic duty form one 
important component of the corporate, ecclesiastical, monastic, chivalric and Christian civic 
republican ethics and politics.258  
Yet, while Cicero’s texts do not always support Straumann’s reading, his work is given to a 
number of contradictions that risk degeneration from the corporate ideal of the totum corpus 
rei publicae to being after all a corpus of the second, artificial variety, a mere partnership. In 
his more Platonic register, Cicero locates the exercise of citizen dignity within a universal 
and divine moral hierarchy and an overarching providential purpose in which it participates. 
Yet like Polybius he was also influenced by the immanent tendencies of Stoic metaphysics, 
which, as we have seen, more than Platonism regarded the soul and the city as things 
comprehensible by a humanly-accessible rational calculation.259  
Stoicism accordingly encouraged a sense of the cosmic totality and the temporal process as 
determined by a non-teleological logos identical with a personal fate. In this way, it did not 
integrate the individual in a transcendent and purposive order with which the person could 
resonate.260 The individual rather links resignedly to the cosmic whole through interior 
withdrawal, while as to his exteriority, as we have seen, this is increasingly considered in 
terms of a sheer idiosyncrasy of character.  The harmonisation of these differences, so 
essential to social order, was thought of within Stoicism more pragmatically than within the 
Platonic tradition, for which it imitated the blending amongst the Forms themselves.  
The central tension of Stoic politics which emerges is the question as to whether any 
politically pertinent whole really is a whole, a true corpus, or if in fact it has produced an 
unstable harmony. This is later underwritten by a politics of mere mechanical calculation and 
prediction, resigning the city to a fatalistic natural law; a construal of the political whole after 
all as merely a partnership, and not as a true res publica.261 In terms of this isolation and the 
primary Stoic ethics of interiority, one has a deontological emphasis on absolute obligations, 
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less teleologically regarded than with Aristotle. But in terms of the idea of differences of 
outwards character or ‘personhood’ there is a certain drift towards a kind of proto-utilitarian 
emphasis upon the ‘sympathetic’ co-operation of disparate tendencies and forces.262   
In this way, political harmony in Cicero could be regarded as a real participation in divine 
transcendence, but it could also be seen as a mere vitiation of individual primitive 
accumulation, resulting in conflict after the lapse of the Golden Age.  
All this confirms that Cicero is the godfather of two very different systems of constitutional, 
ethical and political thought. The first is embodied by Augustine, who develops the Platonic 
and corporatist potentials in Cicero to argue for a global politics of non-domination, that 
would ultimately underwrite medieval Christendom.263 But for the late Renaissance 
Protestant jurist, Hugo Grotius, Ciceronian principles would be used to justify violent 
colonialism based on original seizure as supposedly granting property entitlement.264  Shortly 
afterwards, Thomas Hobbes re-conceived the corporate body as the entirely artificial 
Leviathan, whose absolute arbitrary powers were required to safeguard original seizures at 
home as well as abroad.265 
Indeed, insofar as there is a tension between a ‘Roman corporatism’ and a ‘Roman proto-
liberalism’ in Cicero, it is less one between Plato and Locke than between Plato and Hobbes. 
Despite Straumann’s attempt harshly to distinguish Locke and Hobbes, and align Cicero with 
the former, it is exactly a violent pre-political ‘state of nature’ that Cicero seems at times to 
indicate. One interpretation, following Polybius’ ‘primitive monarchy’, is to read Cicero as 
implicitly calling for a placid state managed by a strongman monopolising force and 
guaranteeing the property rights of his subjects. This Caesarian element (with which Cicero 
the statesman flirted in practice)266 was then in turn balanced by Republican elements, now 
reworked in Stoic and Polybian terms of a balance of forces between ruler and patricians, 
amongst the patricians themselves and between them and different social classes. 
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9. Conclusion: Beyond Plato and Cicero, Beyond Athens and Rome 
A further ambiguity in Cicero is whether his vision of the mixed constitution inclines him 
straightforwardly against the Caesarian ‘populists’ of his own era, and if so in precisely what 
manner?  
His buttressing of the Republican constitutional order is open to a monarchic potential: 
‘When a considerable war is undertaken, and discord is likely to ensue among the citizens, let 
a single supreme magistrate be appointed, who shall unite in his own person the authority of 
both consuls, if the senate so decrees, for six months only’ (Laws 3.8-9). Cicero, following 
Polybius, imagines the intermittent dominance of the monarchic function as a feature of his 
ideal constitutional order. Crucially, this is a departure from a strict constitutional formalism, 
as it does not represent merely an area in which the executive exercises total power, but the 
wielding of exceptional power for a duration. Although this duration is limited, its allowance 
assumes a cyclical dynamism that well reflects Platonic and Stoic ideas about cosmology, 
politics and history, but does not easily mesh with modern day liberal constitutionalism.  
One could object at this point that such dynamism proved nonetheless open to capture by the 
early modern Grotian and Hobbesian account of an ordered use of force as both exceptional 
and foundationally normative. So long as the internal stability is maintained, violence can be 
freely and pragmatically applied, and norms of justice fade into the overriding needs of the 
state. This, however, is not necessarily how Cicero saw the matter. For him the supreme 
magistrate embodies all three parts of the regime: he is appointed by the senate, who in turn 
rule on behalf of the people, while he takes on the executive functions of the two consuls. 
Following Plato, we can imagine a class of rulers or in certain cases an individual ruler, who 
in their own person(s) embody not one part of the republic, and therefore of justice, but its 
entirety.  
As Cicero notes, the whole problem of the rule of law is that if justice is seen as identical to 
law it becomes arbitrary and sophistic, whilst if we acknowledge a ‘natural law’ we then fall 
into the problem of human fallibility and disagreements about the nature of the good (Laws 1. 




the entire city as a pedagogic enterprise and philosophic quest for the Good, following Plato. 
However, it can also be more emphatically resolved, in a proto-liberal fashion, by 
reconceiving of law as a sub-ethical discipline, focused primarily on the mutually convenient 
defence of property rights, where property itself was not originally established on clearly 
ethical terms.267  
And yet Cicero proclaims that ‘it is not true, as certain people maintain, that the bonds of 
union in human society were instituted in order to provide for the needs of daily life…Every 
duty, therefore, that tends effectively to maintain and safeguard human society should be 
given the preference over that duty which arises from speculation and science alone’ (De 
Officiis 1.158). Furthermore, there can exist no distinction between the right and the 
expedient, and no conflict between the moral duties of the polity and those of the individual 
(De Officiis 1.159, 3).  
In other words, for Cicero there exists primarily a hierarchy of natural duties: our first duty is 
to the gods; our second, to country; our third, to parents; and so on, in a descending scale. 
Understanding this, we can see his account of property in a new light: it is not primarily that 
rights must not be infringed by the polity, but rather that the ever-greater identification of the 
good of citizen and city, and of property itself all fall within the scope of duty: it is the 
responsibilities, the duties, of the citizen that are protected, along with accompanying 
legitimate property-ownership.  
This model cannot be readily slotted into a politics acceptable to a modern-day Rawlsian. The 
ambiguity nonetheless remains as to whether the alignment of citizen, duties, polity and 
property is a kind of quasi-utilitarian, liberal calculation, and whether the identification of 
right and expedient cannot only be alternatively read in terms of cynical expediency, 
foregrounding both private and national security and justifying foundational and continuous 
rule by emergency.   
Yet it is clear that what was central to Cicero’s politics was not, as Straumann suggests, 
‘constitutional norms’, but rather a class of constitutional guardians: the νομοφύλακες, 
invoked by Cicero with the Greek word (Laws 3.46). The same term, coming from Athens, is 
used of the guardians not of Plato’s Republic, but rather of his Laws (966b). For there, law 
was granted a pedagogic role and this was sustained by Cicero when he declared that the 
 




Roman guardians should not only ‘[keep] watch over the text of the law’ (the limit of this 
role in Cicero’s time) but also imitate Athens in which ‘they observed men’s acts and recalled 
them to obedience to the laws’ (Laws 3.46).  
The vital role of a guardian class was recommended by Plato, and further re-imagined by 
Cicero, but neither ever succeeded in putting it into practice. In Cicero’s case, a gulf between 
the actual imperial city and the ideal cosmic city could not really be bridged. In a too circular 
fashion the cosmic norms, when taken in a corporatist idiom, could only be derived from the 
contingency of Roman history, society and tradition. Alternatively, when taken in a more 
purely Stoic, proto-liberal idiom, the local particularity and even sacrality of that tradition 
tended to be suppressed, in favour of a more formal universal order, such that the cosmos 
loses its political aspect and sinks into a natural vacuity, nurturing primary violence and 
exception. Only with reference to an eternal order could a stable reference point be 
established, but this too seemed to collapse back either into the pantheist impersonal 
naturalism of Stoicism, or else into the reflectivity of Roman civil religion, which saw in the 
cosmic order merely a mirror of its own regularity and power.  
Cicero was explicit in presenting a kind of Platonic imperial theology, which perhaps comes 
the nearest to a Roman resolution of these dilemmas. As he narrated it in the famous ‘Dream 
of Scipio’, his idea of a class of law guardians is related here to the Plato’s theurgic notion in 
his own Republic and Laws of guardians as living daemons (Republic 6.13). But it required 
Augustine in theory, and then the Church in practice, to take up and make final sense of the 
more Platonic potential of the Ciceronian constitutional project. 
In effect, this new monarchic and imperial qualification of the mixed constitution of the 
ancient polis, involving both a democratization and a cosmopolization of virtue, could only 
be truly realised by the Christian religion, which was able to rethink participation, both 
metaphysical and political, in a more popular form, by its higher evaluation of love, mercy 
and forgiveness as attitudes and practices that can be cultivated by all. Equally, this religion 
was able to subordinate even monarchy to a spiritual hierarchy pursuing reconciliatory social 






Chapter Five: From Livy to Augustine: Decoding Civic Origins 
 
1. Introduction 
The ancient city had sought to be a mode of immortality for its citizens: it aspired to eternity 
and for this reason was entirely suffused with continuous religious practice.268 Both Greek 
and Roman political projects were driven by a coherent logic whereby the citizen desired 
above all glory in the eyes of his fellow citizen, which at once drove its economic, political, 
military and cultural activity, whilst drawing the citizens necessarily together. Yet as the 
Greeks understood well, citizenship of this kind possessed a dialectical logic whereby 
citizenship required a negative as well as positive definition, and the moral horizons of the 
city must be drawn close about it. The very mechanism which drew the citizen to a moral life 
- the judgement of his fellows - alienated him from a more universal moral order, and so he 
suffered a moral deterioration when he departed the walls of the city, or when he hid himself 
from the gaze of his companions in the privacy of his home. Moreover, as Aristotle and 
Cicero realised, the very pursuit of glory could all too easily be perverted into vaunting 
ambition, both individual and collective, that sought nothing but domination and repute at 
any price.269 The more strongly the polis was insisted upon, the greater the heights of virtuous 
conduct that became possible, though also the greater the possibility of distortion became. 
Meanwhile, the more weakly the polis was defined, the more the citizen had to fall back upon 
a private moral consistency (issuing eventually in Stoicism) and the more limited was the 
virtue that could be obtained collectively.  
Not only did the exiled citizen suffer morally but also spiritually: when he departed the 
bounds of the city he no longer supped on the fruits of immortality.  Outside the collective 
memory that kept his name alive and the recognition of his often-ambivalent moral 
excellence that might promise him a place amongst the gods, he would, as Aristotle said of 
the man without political community, become a beast and perhaps less than a beast (Politics 
1253a1-18). The problems of combining citizenship with human universality had not been 
resolved.  
But it will now be argued that Christianity, and especially Augustine, carried out just such a 
resolution. In the present chapter we will consider Augustine’s relationship to Rome in terms 
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of his account of its foundations, showing how his critique in some ways intensifies one 
already carried out by the pagan historian Livy. This will then be contrasted with his account 
of the angelic foundations of the City of God. In the final chapter we will consider 
Augustine’s new and Christian account of citizenship 
 
 
2. Augustine’s Attitude to Rome  
From the New Testament onwards, early Christians supposed that Rome had a providential 
role to play. This was significantly double-edged, rendering Rome at once an incubator of a 
salvific destiny, merciful delayer of the fearful end-times, and the vehicle of the anti-Christ, a 
body that would be brutally judged, divided and punished by divine providence. Tertullian 
notably identified Rome as the ‘slayer’ of the Anti-Christ, by sustaining a provisional quasi-
order, rather than as the Anti-Christ himself.270 For all his revisionism, Augustine to a degree 
sustained this exegesis. By the same token, he continued to link order as such with the 
international order provided by empire (CD XX.19). 
Paul had declared that ‘our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting 
a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ. He will transform the body of our humiliation that it may be 
conformed to the body of his glory, by the power that also enables him to make all things 
subject to himself’ (Phil. 3.20-21). Already this suggested a somehow alternative Christian 
citizenship and city. But it was not until Constantine that the idea of a polity defined, 
organised and ruled by Christian principles became a serious possibility, and it was Eusebius 
who was the strongest proponent of an Empire positively defined as an instrument of divine 
providence.271 He proclaimed Constantine to be God’s regent on earth, who by raising up the 
‘victorious sign’ of the cross across the Empire and founding a Christian Rome in 
Constantinople, had consecrated the entire Roman imperial project. All the theological 
significance that pagans once attached to the Emperor and Christians conspicuously did not, 
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was now affirmed in a new sense, with the single Emperor ruling over a united empire 
presented as a reflected image of God’s reign as king of the heavens.  
Eusebius’s overly-apologetic account is often contrasted unfavourably with Augustine’s City 
of God.272 Yet it was Augustine who, confronted with the collapse of the Empire in the west, 
wrote, as a Christian, what can ironically be regarded as the single greatest work of Roman 
civil theology. For he made a different sense of Rome’s legendary and historical past, 
employing a profound narrative logic to justify and guide a new Roman order in the future. 
273  
Augustine began by speaking of the organisation of pagan Rome, taking the various historic, 
poetic and philosophical justifications to their logical conclusions, and thus dialectically 
revealing their fatal flaws, separating what was good from what was bad, and locating where 
inferior goods had been placed above superior. As he redeployed the elements of the pagan 
city into a new metaphysical and theo-political structure, he turned from the records of the 
historical city to the theological claims of paganism, beginning with Varro’s threefold 
divisions of theology into ‘mythical’, ‘civic’ and ‘natural’ (CD VI-VII). From there he 
proceeded to discuss the nature of the angels which marks the start of his direct discussion on 
the nature of the city of God, which concludes with an account of creation and its long 
aftermath (CD IX-XX).  
We can see here a certain parallel to Plato’s narrative structure in the Republic which 
commenced with the origins of the city, then turned to the question of the poets, and 
proceeded from there to the contemplation of the good itself, concluding with a 
cosmological/anthropological account of both the origin and destination of the human soul.  
At the core of Plato’s revisionary treatment of the city and citizenship lay a displacing of 
civic ‘poetic’ religion. The same thing remained at the core of Augustine’s Christian revision. 
But where Plato left much of the pagan origin narrative in place and merely altered the 
attributes of the gods, Augustine framed such narratives by an altogether different one and 
sought to reject the cult of the gods altogether. Where Plato re-thought polytheistic cult in 
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terms of philosophy, Augustine offered a new ‘Christian philosophy’ that was also an entirely 
new and newly universal cultus.  
As we shall see, this is not a stepping back from the primacy of citizenship for humanity, but 
a new resolving of the ancient tension between cultic citizenship and philosophical 
universality. Beyond Stoicism, Augustine showed how Christianity offered a truly universal 
citizenship that retained, albeit in a new way, the positioned locality and specificity of shared 
cult that was endemic to antique notions of what it was to share in civic governance.  
Before Augustine, Plutarch in his Lives had made a series of moral and political comparisons 
between major Greek and Roman figures that already pointed to the issue of origins and 
renewals. In stressing the limitations of these law makers, he vindicated Plato’s view in the 
Laws that a class of truly wise legislators capable of perpetually interpreting and re-enacting 
good laws is crucial (Lives 39-97). 
But just as the fixed law becomes corrupted in the course of history, so also good character is 
eroded by the passage of time and circumstance. Augustine was therefore grappling with a 
central conceptual and practical barrier that had already been recognised: the location of the 
city in time. However, he newly regarded this as more than the generic problem of political 
decadence and corruption by suggesting that the entire religious foundation of the ancient city 
misconstrued the relation of time to eternity by spatialising and absolutizing merely temporal 
realities.  
Yet he did so, as we will gradually see in this and the following chapter, not by denying the 
city in favour of an apolitical construal of time and eternity, but by newly linking the city to 
both, rather than primarily to space. In this way, he avoided the Stoic isolation of the 
individual in solitary direct connection to the cosmos, which threatened the primacy of 
political existence. For Augustine, as a Christian, this existence had become more imperative, 
insofar as it is impossible to love God without loving one’s neighbour in this life and the 
next.  
It is in this context that we must consider his famous critique of Cicero’s definition of a 
republic after Scipio: ‘Where there is no true justice, then there can be no association of men 
“united in fellowship by common agreement as to what is right”’, and therefore no people in 
the proper sense at all. ‘And if there is no people’ Augustine concludes, then ‘there is no 
“property of a people”’ (in the sense of a ‘commonwealth’) ‘but only a multitude of some 




Liberal and ‘realist’ readings of Augustine, most classically that of Robert Markus, take him 
to be questioning Cicero’s definition, because he goes on to suggest that one can have a 
people without justice but simply bound together by any old ‘object of their love’ to form 
some sort of societas or other, perhaps just based upon pragmatic mutual convenience and 
toleration.274 The postliberal critics like Rowan Williams, John Milbank, Oliver O’Donovan 
and Robert Dodaro have suggested instead that he is rather arguing that Rome has failed to 
live up to the definition, or to achieve a real ‘politics of virtue’, a true republicanism, that 
Augustine by no means abandons.275 A third minority of commentators suggests that 
Augustine scarcely modifies Cicero at all at the level of political theory and commitment to 
republican ideals.276  
The truth is somewhat more complex than this third group suggests.277 Certainly, Augustine 
adopted the Ciceronian views that civil rule in principle differs from the governance of 
slaves, that the prudent man has a duty to contribute to public service (CD XIX. 2), and that 
the customary law should be in keeping with natural law in order to be just (CD XIX. 4, 
15).278 He also broadly endorsed the legitimate variety of the republic alongside the ideal 
normativity of mixed constitution, involving a musical harmony of the classes, after Scipio 
(CD II.21), while sustaining the Ciceronian (and Platonic) emphasis on the virtue of the 
individual ruler (for example, Moses and Theodosius) as more crucial than any constitutional 
framework (CD V.26; XVIII.11).         
His even-handedness with relation to republican and monarchic virtues could also be seen as 
reflecting Cicero’s hesitation between republic and empire: for Augustine the virtues of an 
aristocratic few like Cato are one positive reason for Rome’s power and prestige (which is 
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willed by God), while on the other hand the republican oligarchs were more guilty of abusing 
and excluding the plebeians, and the age of primitive monarchy was the age of a pursuit of 
glory and honour, relatively to be preferred to the pursuit of outright domination, which is 
unrestrained even by the opinion of others (CD II.18; III.10,17; V.12-13, 19). 
 
This Ciceronian hesitation in Augustine extends to his perhaps unrealistic imagining that the 
ancient virtue of a small, relatively confined city could have been combined, without 
violence, with a universal reach that had in reality only been achieved by empire (CD V.17).        
Such a utopian back-projection on Augustine’s part had three components, as Hervé Inglebert 
has pointed out.279 First, Augustine thought that the benefits of Roman law were so evident to 
all that it could have been voluntarily accepted without conquest. Secondly, he also thought 
that a concomitant Roman citizenship could have been earlier extended to all: whereas, in 
reality, the later universal appeal of Roman law and citizenship presumed the violent Roman 
destruction of other cities and of tribal self-government. Thirdly, he also imagined that this 
double appeal would have been always so strong as to persuade other client territories into 
fiscal support of the Roman plebeians, whom Augustine falsely assumed (following 
contemporary Roman historiography) to have been earlier entirely landless, although he 
correctly supposed that the rewarding of the plebs had been both one motive for, and a 
consequence of, foreign conquest. 
On this basis, Augustine distinguished between just and defensive wars that Rome had had to 
fight and illegitimate wars of aggrandisement and usurpation (CD II. 10). Yet he never 
doubted the providential benefit of the universal extension of the Roman civic ideal, nor that 
Roman plebeians were entitled to a special treatment that would not be too much at the 
expense of the privilege of Roman aristocrats. In his letters, he protests against the 
enslavement of people within the Roman empire in the outright name of ‘Roman liberty’.280 
As Inglebert puts it, ‘Augustine disapproved of Roman imperialism, but not the Roman 
Empire’.281 He also suggests that Augustine’s dream of a combination of republican 
government with imperial administration is peculiar to someone on the western margins, 
whereas the centre was more outrightly republican and the eastern margin more monarchic by 
inclination (in the tradition of the later Greek tyrants). Yet here Cicero’s equestrian origins 
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had pointed him towards a not altogether dissimilar oscillation and idealism. And despite the 
seeming unlikelihood of Augustine’s synthesising aspirations, they foreshadowed in some 
ways the looser imperial and ecclesial confederations of the Christian Middle Ages.  
Moreover, Augustine’s identification of the more ethically neutral ‘social’ can be understood 
as simply an interpretation of the Ciceronian ‘multitude’ as in reality always more than some 
sort of mere aggregation. As Rowan Williams argued, there is no sign whatsoever that 
Augustine thinks that a legitimate earthly city deserves to stand if it is less than just, or less 
than a republic, as opposed to a system of outright oppression. His levelling of polities with 
‘bands of robbers’ (CD IV.4) is only supposed to show that the pagan polity or republic was 
not fully such, as being not fully just without the ‘true religion’ which is also complete 
justice.  
Nor is there any sign that any participation in civic life is valid if it is less than an exercise in 
citizenship. On the contrary, his case against Cicero is simply that Rome had failed to achieve 
full republican participation. At the core of this critique are the accusation that Cicero already 
saw justice in too ‘liberal’ terms of the individual having a right to ‘his own’ (CD II.20) and 
that Cicero thought of immanent fate as being in competition with human free will, denying 
the governance of the cosmos by conscious providence (CD V.9).  At a metaphysical level, 
this repeats the political tension between the private and the common. But for Augustine, 
there is ultimately no such tension: the referral of history to the governance of the one true 
God and of politics to the ultimate eternal peace of Jerusalem means that we must understand 
perfect justice in terms of a loving and peaceful harmony. Without this referral, Cicero’s 
republic is resigned to permanent conflict and tension (between the private and the public, 
citizen and stranger, ruler and ruled, reason and the passions). It is therefore not a true 
commonwealth, not a true city containing true citizens.  
 
 
3. Augustine’s Roman Re-Founding 
For Augustine, this metaphysical blindness on Cicero’s part has ultimately to do with the way 
in which, like all pagan philosophers, he was still captivated by the structures of polytheistic 
religion. Augustine accordingly sought to discover the secret founding logic of Rome, the 




temporary to eternal goods, thereby absolutizing them and their possessions and rendering 
full distributive justice impossible.   
Augustine commences with the origin of Rome, and continually returns to this question 
throughout. In the latter half, he turns to the City of God and its commencement, beginning 
with the origin of the angels and of their city, the heavenly Jerusalem.  
He begins his critique of Rome’s origins as part of his discussion of the theological 
controversies attending Rome’s sack by the Visigoths in 410 AD and links this event with 
Virgil’s account of Rome emerging from the sack of Troy: ‘Virgil, then, speaks thus of the 
gods: he says that they were vanquished and commended to a man so that, though 
vanquished, they might somehow escape. Is it not madness, therefore, to suppose that Rome 
could wisely have been entrusted to such protectors, and that she would not have been sacked 
had she not lost them?’ (CD I.3). For Virgil, Rome began as a city in exile, pre-existing its 
foundation by Romulus, existing already under the aegis of the household gods of Troy that 
Aeneas smuggled out of the city as the providential promise of a New Troy destined to rule 
the world. He plays with the ironies of Rome’s pre-existence when he has Aeneas camp 
amidst the hills of Rome, portrayed as a pastoral, pre-civic realm, inhabited by local spirits, 
set apart as the site where Hercules retrieves his stolen cattle from a cunning shepherd who 
had hidden them in a cave, having dragged them backwards to conceal their tracks, a story 
also narrated by Livy in the first book of his History of Rome.282 Aeneas did not in fact found 
Rome at all, but the city of Alba which always cast a shadow over Rome’s identity , as 
Augustine noted (CD III.14) .        
Virgil’s irony shows us, as we have already seen in the case of Cicero, that the Romans were 
not incapable of their own self-critique. Augustine is not just offering a Christian critique of 
Rome, but also continuing this Roman tradition.  
 
The Precedent of Livy 
As Michel Serres showed, another forerunner in this respect was Livy.283 He wrote his own 
book-length gloss on this writer’s treatment of the history of early Rome, in such a way as 
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effectively to render Livy’s implicit critique of Rome more explicitly approximative to 
Augustine’s own. Serres did not mention this but must surely have be aware of it.    
His account in his interpretation of Livy of a privative and cyclical sacrificial logic accords 
with Augustine’s own critique of ‘that ritual and service which the Greeks call latreia’ 
(sacrifice) (CD, VI, Preface). Like Augustine, Serres invoked Varro’s and (effectively) 
Livy’s division of myth, civic history (legendary or real) and nature that corresponds to 
Varro’s mythic, civil and natural divisions of theology. The mythical or ‘fabulous’ is for 
Serres’ coding the ‘white’ - a realm of radical semiotic interchangeability in which ‘divine’ 
elements can stand for any other, an infinite kaleidoscope of symbolic interchange, capable of 
‘making sense’ of anything and everything, according to a kind of divine and daemonic logic  
which perpetually curves back on itself.284 It is coded white after the city of Alba Longa, 
which Serres diagnosed as being the ‘repressed other’ City that remains inside Rome: the 
‘timeless’ city of archaic myth, violently repressed and concealed by the Roman founding 
legends which Livy somewhat suspiciously records (History I.iii).  
Livy’s text can accordingly be read as a closed circle which perpetually locates Rome in its 
ever-repeated origins. Romulus is only justified as founder because he repeated the founding 
pre-civic cultic gesture of Evander: ‘to other Gods he sacrificed after the Alban custom, but 
used the Greek for Hercules, according to the institution of Evander’ (History I.vii). This rite 
is especially apposite, as it entails Hercules being forgiven for murder due to his divine 
status; already Romulus was translating himself into godhood in order to justify his fratricidal 
crime. Every gesture or act is thronged with symbols and pious self-exculpations: Romulus 
‘called the people together and gave them the rule of law’ after the Greek manner, so that 
they would become a single ‘body politic’, but this is insufficient for a ‘rustic people’ who 
must be persuaded by ‘emblems of authority’ (History I.viii.1-3).  
The circular rationale of Livy’s text is that every origin is retrospectively rendered an 
anticipation of Rome’s universal imperium, and Rome’s subsequent history and 
contemporary glory are explained through the pre-destination of its peculiar origins, which 
Fustel de Coulanges plausibly argued also makes secular historical sense. The multiplicity of 
Rome’s origins renders them inescapable, leaving only the deep logic of power and ritually 
mediated violence as a point of stability and coherence between them, including the origin of 
sacral marriage in the rape of the Sabine women. Thus, Augustine could write: ‘What 
 




marriage rites were these, what incitements to war, what ties of kinship, affinity, fellowship 
or divinity! And finally, what a civic life, under the tutelage of so many gods!’ (CD III.13).   
The ancient Greek cities had sought directly to relate themselves to myth, with stories of 
divine founders and of autochthony. Before Plato, they did not conceal their complicity with 
divine violence, but openly celebrated it. By comparison, Rome was more aware of its 
contingent human origins and its break with myth, and yet, also, rather more sought to 
suppress the violence of these origins through concealment. At the same time, one can validly 
say that this very concealment bespoke a certain new shame and ambiguity concerning 
founding brutality. In this way, an originating disguise of origins was itself in a sense a 
beginning of later self-suspicion.  
Augustine registered just this by noting both that Rome, unlike Greece, did not allow actors, 
who represent the obscene deeds of the gods, to be citizens, and that the Romans borrowed 
their laws from the Greek Solon, rather than receiving them from divine founders. In either 
case, he suggests, their sense of human decency outran their sense of acceptable religiosity 
(CD II.9,13,14,16). 
The only way initially to escape from myth was to speak another language, that of historical 
legend, corresponding to Varro’s ‘civil religion’.  In the language of legend, a single element 
of ‘black’, for Serres’ coding, is set amidst the white. He selects ‘black’ because it invokes 
the cave that concealed by a ruse Hercules’ stolen cattle and the interiors of all the later 
hidden victims after which Rome was founded. One could add to this list something recorded 
by Augustine: the pyre that consumed the records of the secret oracles commanding Numa’s 
laws by order of the senate: what they disclosed was deemed too horrific for public 
advertisement or preservation (CD VII.34).   
The black is irreducible: it cannot be anything other than what it is, because it is unknowable, 
and as such unexchangeable, like a single, unrepeatable and impenetrable event. Thus, the 
black is folded back on itself also, but invisibly so, unlike the white. The exchangeability of 
the white elements renders them ‘linguistic’ and ‘logical’, in a Greek idiom, and gives them 
the capacity to render everything by infinite re-combinations and divisions. The black, by 
contrast, is all object, and so when introduced into the white origin, creates singular 
connections with the white elements. If the white elements are divine, then the black element 
is mortal, but when put into relation to myth, becomes quasi-divine and therefore both 




way in which Augustine understands the functioning of what he sees as the diabolically 
demonic within Roman logic. 
It was also, for Serres, the rogue element within a mathematical set that is greater than the set 
itself, even though it is contained within it: the rational aberration that reason does not want 
to acknowledge.  In this way, he linked the Girardian theme of scapegoating to the 
problematics of set-theoretical violations of the excluded middle: to sustain its rule both in 
theory and practice, reason must reduce a natural and peaceful (if paradoxical) escape over 
the civic-rational borders to a violent expulsion, and then suppress the fact of this exclusion: 
thereby concealing both its own violence and its own substitution of a totalising quasi-peace, 
for an infinite peace without borders, which is clearly just what Augustine most wanted to 
celebrate.285  
The hidden founding victim was thereby also for Serres, after Girard, the dark secret of 
Western rationality. For this reason, if the Romans were less mythical, they were also less 
rational than the Greeks, in their superstitious obsession with the dark legendary 
impenetrability of the sheerly contingent, the sheer obscurity of the singular event. Yet as 
with the half-admitted shame of concealment, this very obsession was already on the cusp of 
a rational grasp of the paradoxes lurking at the margins of reason itself and of human claims 
to rational self-control. These were just what Augustine began to unmask.  
For Serres’ essentially Bergsonian perspective, this also related to the greater Roman 
awareness of time - whose aporias of interfused moments of past, present and future appear 
also to escape the laws of identity, as Augustine reflected upon in the Confessions. Once 
again, prior to Augustine, this is a half-suppressed awareness: the at once semiotic and 
eventful tracks of the cattle appear to lead only forwards to the future, ‘leading out’ the City, 
as in the resonant title of Livy’s book: Ab Urbe Condita. Yet really, they point always 
backwards - since the always already openness of the present moment to the future (as 
released by Augustine) has been suppressed - to a reiteration of the founding gesture of 
violence and violent concealment, which Rome was doomed to repeat: locked always back 
into the darkness of the cave, even when it appeared to be emerging into the glorious light. In 
this Rome was doomed to see the present, as Bergson warned, as an interred past: the tout 
fait.286  
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And yet the Romans’ very sense of the present moment as always folding back upon itself, 
thereby negatively breaking with the laws of substantive containment and self-identity, in a 
dark and haunted fashion, implicitly suggests a potential to see the primacy of the other 
aspect of presence as of itself unfinished, as opening towards the future. But in order to 
realise this, one has to cease to imagine that the present can only emerge (from the black 
cave, as it were) by suppressing and sacrificing the past as ‘other’. An alternative non-violent 
logic would open continuously towards the future by letting the past remain as a stimulation 
of future meaning.287 All the same, Rome, by newly seeing violence as a contingent human 
foundation and by suppressing its instance, had negatively opened up the possibility of our 
human realisation of the sheer contingency of the logic of violent foundation and imitation.  
Gradually, we will be able to indicate how Augustine’s civic reflection brought together 
Plato’s suspicion of mythical violence, Livy’s glimmering of a suspicion of legendary 
violence and the biblical exposure of both. His new sense of an eternal city that exists on 
earth more in time than space can be intrinsically linked to his new sense of the aporia of 
temporal presence and his understanding of this in terms of a musical and liturgical 
participation in the eternal, which always goes back to a still open and typological (Hebrew 
and pagan) past in order to re-think the mystery of a never-present present as the ceaseless 
open striving towards the future eschaton.288 
But for the pagan Romans, the ambiguous black element already acted like a ‘transformer’ 
capable of redirecting the narrative of myth from its circular fluctuations towards a more 
linear, historical and dialectic logic by way of the mediation of legend. Serres understood this 
‘dialectic’ process as a ‘parasitic’ logic in which violence is folded back into itself but 
remains operative outside itself, serving a narrative game that empowers the one who 
successfully wields it. Because one legendary black element is ‘immovable’, the mutable 
world of the mythical white must move and adjust in relation to it.  
Following Livy, Serres traced this sacrificial logic throughout the founding Roman legends: 
in the murder of Remus by Romulus, Cacus by Hercules, and in the suppression of Alba by 
Rome.  Since the black element cannot be exchanged for another, its movement is not 
‘innocent’. Rather than the equal exchange and the conservation of energy at work in the 
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white mythic world of circulation (however shamelessly violent), the black element always 
has its finger on the scales, tipping them arbitrarily in its own sullen direction.  
Sometimes this is manifest for the Romans against their own interests, as in the case of the 
figure of Brennus, the Gallic leader who successfully invaded Rome and in response to 
Roman complaints about his demanding gold using the Gallic weights/measures, threw his 
sword on the scales with the words ‘Vae Victus!’ - woe to the conquered. According to the 
Roman black logic their gold should trump Gallic measures, but for the cunning and already 
Romanised Gaul the darkness of the sword trumps even gold (Livy History I.v.14). The very 
logic of a dark extension by which Rome expands through capture, as noted by Fustel and 
many others, can be inverted and turned against her, while yet sustaining her sway differently 
and even in perpetuity, as history was to prove. The black element remains through this 
process a rule giver, never a rule taker: its forceful imposition always interrupts gift or 
contractual exchange by the sacrifice of the rival other in an extension of the inner sacrificial 
rivalry that founded and repeatedly refounded Rome itself (CD X.19, Livy History 1.v. 5-
vi.2).   
But Serres’ account of Rome’s sacrificial legendarium was not complete until he introduced 
the other half to the logic of war: the logic of hospitality.  What makes historical legend to be 
legend rather than metahistorical myth is not violence - endemic enough to mythic logic - but, 
as we have seen, a kind of meta-violence whereby violence is concealed and deployed in such 
a way as to turn even apparent defeat into victory.  
This trickery is manifest in the rape of the Sabine women, whom the Romans had invited, 
along with the Sabine men, to games in honour of Neptune (Livy History I.ix.2-15). Taking 
advantage of the separation of women, they abduct them and retrospectively legitimate this 
seizure by marrying them. This puts the Sabine men into the double bind of either having to 
attack the Romans, in which case they will be defeated (as the Romans assume, in terms of 
their own destiny) or accept the sanctification of rapine. Moreover, for reasons we have seen, 
once they have accepted intermarriage between the cities, they have accepted civic alliance in 
general: in practice a subsumption into Rome.289  
In the event, the outcome of the Sabine military attack proved inconclusive, but the Sabine 
women themselves made peace between the two peoples. It would seem as if Rome was so 
 




coded as to turn any ambiguity to her own advantage: though not without internal sacrificial 
cost. Already, with inversion, black violence trumped gold because the Sabine men crushed 
to death the vestal virgin Tarpeia with the gold armbands for which she had been prepared to 
betray her city. The loaded dice involved always a turn of sacrifice, but the very loading 
could be turned against Rome ultimately - and yet after all not so, insofar as the conquest of 
Rome often sought not to destroy but to sustain her logic on behalf of the barbaric victors.  
In this story, Rome turns the ‘parasitic’ guest or hostis into hostis in the sense of enemy. Yet 
this inversion is brought about by a power that is itself more ultimately parasitic: Rome 
appeared to be the ultimate host because from the outset it was the ultimate guest: Rome was 
Aeneas and the Trojans of Alba as much as it was Romulus and the Romans establishing the 
new city of Rome as a refuge for several peoples. 
This logic also inheres in sacrifice. What sets the sacrificial victim apart is his ‘black’ status: 
the sacrifice must by its nature be an offering, a sheer one-way gift like that of immediate 
hospitality. Because the black element is irreplaceable, it is not simply given, but given up. 
For this dimension of the black legendary logic, therefore, the black element is not the 
conquering sacrificer, but rather the black box or tomb of the sacrificed dead victim: Remus 
rather than Romulus. Yet Remus was almost as equally sacred to Rome as the deified 
Romulus, or defeated Alba. It was its inert condition of possibility, as Augustine critically 
notes in saying that Rome inverted the significance of the biblical Cain and Abel story, which 
seeks to found the divine city not on the sacral character of the victim as sacrificed, but as 
innocent and wrongly murdered (CD X.4). 
Even though the chances of combat, as between Romulus and Remus, seem equal, in fact 
each of the brothers secretly assumed, by benefit of prophecy, that he enjoyed an advantage 
which would give him the victory. Thus he only pretended to be prepared to sacrifice himself: 
both sides think to cheat the other by making it appear they may the one self-sacrificing, 
when they have assumed that the other will be the victim from the outset, to conceal the 
irreplaceable black beneath the fluctuating white and to advance in this way, by the irruption 
of random but concealed certainty, from the free-floating signification of myth that offers 
eternal equal chances through legend that cancels them, to history that is built upon 




Thereby, Livy, as Serres realised, had half-decoded Roman history as involving not just the 
difference between fact and fancy, but always the difference between concealed fact lurking 
behind founding fact and sign, and the actually transparent though unreal signs of myth.  
Not only did he freely admit the ethnically variegated origins of Rome; he was quite willing 
to see Romulus’ deification as a fraud undertaken to calm the masses (History I. xvi.2-8).   
His emphasis on the necessity and yet compromised character of such gestures of might and 
superstition paralleled Augustus’ own ambiguous constitutional role. Thus, in relation to the 
election and rule of Numa, Livy both praised and criticised the Senatorial class who upheld 
liberty, but could not capture popular support and martial honour, and also praised and 
criticised the monarchy that had populist appeal and military success but neglected liberty, 
law and peace (History I. xviii-xxi). Just this critical balance was later repeated by Augustine. 
And this double sense of incompleteness can surely be linked to Livy’s semi-exposure of the 
Roman legendarium.  
With Livy (as with Cicero) we find already some of the same critiques (albeit in far milder 
form) that Augustine levels at Rome and its mythology. The crimes of its heroes really are 
treated as crimes: Livy records that Horatius murdered his sister for mourning the death of 
her betrothed at the hour of his victory saying: ‘So perish every Roman woman who mourns a 
foe’ (History I.xxvi.1-5). His prioritising of patriotism over family was not, however, 
according to Livy’s record, anciently praised in Spartan fashion, but rather caused a conflict 
for the Romans, who condemned the ‘horrid deed’ by someone who was nonetheless a 
saviour of the state. He was, moreover, not merely punished for murder, but for treason, as in 
taking it upon himself to punish his sister he had committed an act of lèse-majesté. Livy also 
has the raped Lucretia’s relatives make humane arguments for her to refrain from killing 
herself that closely resemble Augustine’s’ own: ‘they tell her that it is the mind that sins, not 
the body; and that where purpose has been wanting there is no guilt’ (I. Lviii.8-9). The 
authority of family and polity, the crimes of murder and treason, fidelity to husband, brother 
and republic are all at play in these instances and are as ever massaged by ritual. Livy 
presented such matters frankly, as dilemmas in which rival legitimate moral claims clearly 







Augustine, Trojan exile and Roman Refuge 
A sacrificial logic of trickery, of the kind diagnosed by Serres, can pertain also to the 
interactions between gods and between gods and humans. This is seen in the case of the 
Trojan war and its epilogue in the Aeneid, in which Juno was cheated of her absolute revenge 
against Troy by the creation of Rome. Venus, her enemy, has sacrificially traded a temporary 
revenge by her divine enemies against a single city, for its descendants being given universal 
imperium.  In her striving against the ‘black magic’ of sacrifice, Juno proves as impotent as 
any mortal. Thus, Rome’s pre-foundation was linked to a ruse (a sublime counter-ruse to the 
Trojan horse), just as all her later offerings of her sons as victims in wars more seriously 
sacrifices her enemies, for the sake of her eternal survival. It is significant here that Aeneas 
lacked both the valour of Achilles and the cunning of Odysseus, but was rather the hero as 
king-priest, exemplifying pietas, including a magical ability to invoke heavenly assistance.290 
This kind of mythological circumstance was well noted by Augustine in his critique of not 
only the supposed righteousness, but also the powerlessness of the pagan gods, who are for 
him demons, manipulating the forgotten divinisation of heroes (for Augustine’s semi-
euhemerism: CD VII.18) and subject to the calculus of violence and deceit. The Romans’ 
deceits from the outset were in reality outwitted by providence’s deployment of their trickery 
towards its own ends of universal benefit. 
Augustine initially divided the pagan legacy in accord with Varro’s distinction between 
poetic, civil and natural theologies and gods (CD IV.12,VI.6) and appeared to ascribe all that 
is good about it entirely to the philosophical mode of pagan piety, which is in turn only really 
exemplified by the Platonists (CD VIII.5). This was to praise Rome insofar as it managed to 
achieve inklings of a true ‘natural religion’, following Varro’s tripartite division, but 
attempting, beyond Varro’s admitted mixtures, to purge natural and civil religion of their 
poetic-mythical corruption.  
Nonetheless, Augustine did not so entirely disparage the legacy of the pagan civic within 
Rome, nor even the mythical, as might at first appear to be the case. Like Plato in the case of 
Homer, he subtly reshaped the Virgilian narrative to his own ends.    
Virgil’s narrative, and his moral account in general, including his understanding of fate, was 
somewhat closer to Plato’s ideals and further removed from the cruelty and randomness often 
 




at work in Homer.  He created an ironic distance from the bloodshed of war and cultivated a 
sense of its every aspect being watched, recalled and marked by a perfect divine justice. Like 
Livy (who insisted that Aeneas had always opposed the Trojan capture of Helen: History I.1), 
he conveyed the traditional Roman association of Aeneas with hospitality and with attempted 
refuge (Aeneid VII. 212-48).  For Virgil, Aeneas was a foretype of Augustus, the peacemaker 
seeking to escape the embroilment of war, to be contrasted, like Numa for Livy, with the 
bloodier, more rivalrous figures of Roman history.  
This thematic was at once sustained and criticised by Augustine. He also associated the figure 
of Aeneas with hospitality and refuge, linking Aeneas and his son Ascanius to the more just 
city of Alba, ‘the white’ (CD III.14), while pouring some scorn on Aeneas’s supposed 
virtues: weeping over one’s enemy is all very well, but better not to have slaughtered him in 
the first place. There are no adequate Roman foretypes of the true man of peace, who is not 
Augustus, but Christ, only some oracles, including supposedly the voice of Virgil himself in 
his Fourth Eclogue (CD X.27). All the same, Aeneas’s city of Alba, of the attempted peaceful 
settlement of exiles, despite the hostility of locals, is implicitly contrasted by Augustine with 
Rome, the city founded by vagabonds and stained by rivalrous sacrifice. Alba is said to be 
‘more truly Rome’s mother’ than the guilty Troy (CD III.14).   
As to the asylum offered by Romulus in Rome the ‘black’ city, scholars debate the exact 
meaning of Augustine’s account of the Roman asylum: was it a merciful protection of the 
outcast or a disgraceful offering of sanctuary to the guilty?291 But insofar as Augustine sees 
this as a foretype of the pagan Barbarian protection out of awe of Christian sanctuaries and 
Christian lives during the sack of Rome (CD I.34), it seems likely that it was both: a foretype, 
as with Old Testament examples, at once anticipates the perfect type to come and negates its 
import in its more deluded literal aspects.  
 
The Parallel Histories of Rome and Jerusalem 
Besides such invocation of Roman historical examples as providential foreshadowings, 
Augustine regularly cites instances of Roman self-critique from Sallust, Seneca (CD VI.10) 
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and others, in order to make his own points.  We could convict him of disingenuous polemic 
here, along the lines of ‘even the Romans didn’t really think so highly of themselves’, but 
something more subtle is at work.  
Just as Plato proposed a revised ‘text’ - or rather poetic speech - of Homer for his ideal city, 
so Augustine proposed a revised city of humankind, including a revised history of Rome. He 
was not simply deconstructing Roman history, but also creating for her a new semi-salvific 
history that recentred the God of Abraham as the concealed parallel locus of her story, 
displacing the Greco-Roman pantheon. Just as with the Hebrews, whose Jerusalem is 
declared to be one part of the earthly city, and only ‘an image of the heavenly city’, ‘by 
symbolising something other than itself’(CD XV.2), so Roman greatness was allowed by God 
to pursue his hidden purpose in history (CD IV.23) and Rome’s defeats were allowed 
instructively to chastise Rome (just as God periodically chastised the Hebrews in the Old 
Testament) for their service to the ‘unclean spirits’ that they worshipped (CD V.21).  
Thus, we see in Books Five, Seventeen and Eighteen that the growth of Israel and the 
dominion of Rome develop in parallel and finally run together (CD XVIII.1-2) when Israel 
falls under Rome’s domination and the law enters a new period of captivity (CD XVIII. 45-
46). All this, according to Augustine, reveals God’s hidden providential hand at work in 
history. The apparent defeat of God’s chosen people really marks the completion of the 
promise to Israel in the final and most perfect revelation of the law as embodied by Christ 
(CD XVIII.45-46).  
In the same way, Rome, having formerly been allowed dominion, and been spared the 
consequences of its accompanying lust for domination for the sake of the coming of Christ 
has, with the joining of these two channels of history, taken on some of the symbolic truth of 
Israel. Just as Jerusalem was still a part of the earthly city, even though it was allegorically 
the promise of the heavenly city to arrive in time with Christ, so conversely Rome, although 
it is the continuation of the fallen, perverse city of Cain and Babylon, was always to a lesser 
degree a city of promise in terms of its offering of refuge, citizenship and legal justice. Even 
its early pursuit of glory and renown was not only more admirable than its later pursuit of 
outright domination, but also prophesied the Christian priority of our gracious glorification 
by God over our own delusions of having achieved ‘virtue’ as self-control.292 With the 
 




merging of Jerusalem and Rome, this symbolic foreshadowing is intensified and in the case 
of both earthly cities elevated into actual participatory ‘pilgrimage’ of the celestial Jerusalem.  
One mistake would be to imagine that the two cities on earth are simply Rome and 
Jerusalem/The Church. Yet Augustine explicitly says that the term ‘city’ is used 
‘allegorically’ (CD XV.1). Another mistake would be to imagine that therefore the allegory is 
just about good and bad people. To the contrary, Augustine means ‘allegory’ in the patristic 
sense of pointing towards Christ, and he regards the symbolic register of lived existence as 
still more real than its literal level by virtue of this indication: thus, the Church was already 
present in the true sacrifice and martyrdom of Abel (CD XVIII.51). Ultimately, when the 
allegory is fulfilled in Christ, the true Jerusalem genuinely takes root on earth, with Christ as 
its literal king and founder (CD XVII.4), so that ‘the Church even now is the kingdom of 
Christ and the kingdom of heaven’ (CD XX.9). 
Understood in this way, for Augustine in one sense both Jerusalem and Rome belonged to the 
same earthly city, while in another, the political-liturgical life of ancient Israel uniquely 
prophesied Christ and yet the political-liturgical life of Rome also did so, albeit in a far 
weaker positive and predominantly negative degree. There is therefore no Augustinian 
abandonment of the Christian sense of the providential destiny of Rome, rooted in the New 
Testament itself, only a significant mutation: ‘God revealed in the wealth and fame of the 
Roman empire how powerful are civic virtues even without true religion; to make it clear that 
with the addition of this human beings become citizens of the other city, whose king is truth, 
whose law is love and whose limit is eternity’.293   
For this mutation, Rome remains the cursed Babylon and yet not without parallel to the way 
in which, for the always Pauline Augustine, the Hebrew law, which cannot save, nonetheless 
retains its validity in ethical, including generally paradigmatic political terms, as an integral 
part of the new Christian order, whose prime character is transition towards the eschaton. So, 
the sack of Rome is not to be seen as the defeat of a Christian city, but rather the recurrence 
of the moral price paid for the libido dominandi (CD XVIII.52) that persists within the 
Roman spirit.  Just as an equivalently backsliding ancient Israel was allowed to fall to its 
enemies so that the law might live even when its dominion died, similarly the Church, the 
City of God on pilgrimage, is for now yoked to the fate of Rome. Even should Rome perish, 
 




not only can the spirit of the gospel thereby all the more survive, but also the law and justice 
of Rome insofar as they were in keeping with the gospel and the natural law.   
 
 
5. The City of the Angels 
As we have seen, for Augustine, in a novel but biblical fashion, it is citizenship that is most 
universal and divine. No longer is the human city but partially just, it is also but partially a 
city at all (since the civic coincides with unlimited heavenly harmony and peace) both 
because of our finitude and because of our fallenness.  Several of the Church Fathers, 
including later Boethius, ascribed the creation of human beings to the need to replace the 
missing citizens of Jerusalem after the lapse of some of the angels: ‘because the Creator did 
not wish the number of the angels to remain diminished, that is of that heavenly city whose 
citizens the angels are, he formed man out of the earth’.294 In the case of Augustine, part of 
the purpose of the redemption of humankind was to supply this lacking angelic number, so 
that ‘the heavenly Jerusalem, our mother and the republic of God, shall not be defrauded of 
her full quota of citizens’.295 For such an outlook, it is no longer, as for the pagans (in 
different ways), that human beings are called out of their natural birth into the city, but that 
they are born and baptised more emphatically from the outset as citizens;296 raised by grace 
from their beginnings to a now angelic vocation.  
The Romans, as we have seen, seemed to move towards a moral universalism, both in aspects 
of their practical institutions and traditions, and their intellectual development. However, 
Augustine teased out the unreality of the unitive aspects of the Roman state: the mythology 
that bound Rome’s past to its future, and the civil theology that bound Rome’s citizens to its 
gods, were distorted, falsified by the demonic and the magical. The problem was that the 
vinculum, the magic thread connecting the Roman people, did not lead out of the maze, but 
back to the minotaur. The Romans, like all pagans, were mired both in ‘love of self’ (CD 
XIV.28) and in perpetual shame at their loss of rule over self, or mind over body, consequent 
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upon the denial of our being ruled through a sharing in the rule of the one true God (CD 
XIV.14-19). 
Augustine approaches the third of Varro’s religious categories, that of ‘natural’ or ‘physical’ 
theology, in terms of the theology of the philosophers, which in the case of Platonism he 
largely celebrates, but in some respects criticises. The aspect of his critique which most 
relates to religion is his assault on the pagan alliance with the daemonic, the mediating spirits 
and gods through which Platonists believed that we approach the singular divine principle, 
often through theurgic rituals and contemplative practices.  
Augustine’s argument was that a demonic, transactional, sacrificial and suppressive logic 
hopelessly corrupts the otherwise worthy vision of Platonism, especially from a social point 
of view. His critique here was crucially as much liturgical as it was metaphysical. As he made 
clear (CD X.5), what distinguishes the sacrifices given to the true God from those given to 
the pagan gods is the principle of necessity. God does not need our sacrifices, so sacrifices to 
God are gift and sign; there is no possible ‘exchange’ of flesh that might pay the debt of sin. 
The only true sacrifice that can be offered is a ‘contrite heart’; the means to salvation and the 
fact of salvation being intertwined, like the returning prodigal son, such that all that we can 
give to God for the sake of our sins is what he has given us, namely ourselves.  
So, whilst pagan sacrifice was premised on an intendedly win-win magical logic whereby one 
side deceives the other, who is simply ruined (as Serres well divulged), the Christian sacrifice 
is infinite and super-abundant; it is not consumed even as it gives, breaking apart the 
‘parasitic’ logic of sacrifice which was inherently linked to the bondage of debt and the 
agonism of a debt economy. Thus, the history of Rome was full not only of endless sacrificial 
expedients and superstitious promptings, but also of the contradictions introduced by multiple 
and contradictory indebtedness, as we see in Livy’s account (History II.xx) of the debt-
bondage crisis sparked by the war with the Volscians. The moneylenders justly demanded 
their debts repaid, and the veterans with no less justice demanded to be excused, as these 
debts were accrued because they were in the field fighting for Rome.  
Augustine offered, nonetheless, his own mode of theurgy: his Christian liturgical purification 
of the soul and of Roman history and religion.297 The reason why he engaged at such length 
with this seemingly alien topic was not simply to do with a polemic concerning the 
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operations of providence, although that is certainly important. It rather had to do with his 
retention of one aspect of Roman religious sensibility, even though it converged with a 
parallel root in the Christian and Jewish traditions. Augustine thought, precisely as a Roman, 
that we can only be saved as a city and as citizens, even though this view is equally Hebraic 
and biblical.298 One can even say that his own theology was at once mythic, civic and natural, 
but that he brought these categories into a new harmony and alignment beyond their 
reciprocal pagan tension.   
Cicero had described the world as ‘a home and fatherland which the gods have given us the 
privilege of sharing with them’ (Rep. I.xiii.19) and Augustine took this vision, purified and 
sublimated it. Whilst the origins of the City of Man seem multiple, repetitive, cyclical, violent 
and untraceable (like the cattle tracks in Virgil and Livy), the origin of the City of God is 
singular and eternal. Like the soul that learns by illuminated recollection in the Confessions, 
human political community recalls the original city, which is neither human nor temporal; it 
is instead the angelic city that was formed on the first day of creation, with the separation of 
the light and the darkness.  
Yet this very division also brought time into being by creating the first day, which for 
Augustine stretches from Adam to the flood. Augustine divided all of time according to the 
seven ‘days’, starting with this first day, continuing to our present age, the sixth, and 
concluding with the seventh day of creation, the eternal sabbath where the souls of the saints 
dwell perpetually (CD XI.30-31) and which has no evening other than the eighth day, when 
soul and body shall rest with God (CD XXII.30). 
As Augustine points out (CD XII.25), the Christian angels play a role not unlike that of the 
daemons in the Myth of Er: they do not create, but rather husband creation; nor does 
Augustine remove from the angels their role as divine mediators and channels of worship. 
Only the latreia is removed, which he renders as servitus: literally service or slavery. We are 
not alien from the angels as we are from the god-daemons, but the opposite: they are our 
fellow citizens. As he puts it, in retention of the Greek Christian theme of deification, God 
‘makes his worshippers gods’ (CD X.1), and he cites Plotinus as arguing for the shared nature 
of divine and mortal souls (CD X.2). 
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The gods cease to be our masters, our parasites, as are those who divide. They become 
instead, as angels, our elder siblings, our fellow citizens, our friends, jointly participating in 
eternity, albeit through different modes of temporal extension. So, by purifying ourselves of 
the original stain of sin through the sacrifice of the mass, we again become fellow citizens 
with the angels, and thus become gods. For Plato, the mode of life described in the Kallipolis 
echoed on earth the great procession of divinities ‘orbiting’ the perfect good, and so likewise 
for Augustine the life of the angels corresponds to this ideal. They are not born but made; 
they are unchanging and perfectly unified; they are ordered into a hierarchy, but equally share 
in God; they are the original citizens of the eternal Jerusalem.  
By contrast, the divisions between the pagan gods are exactly what reveals them to be fallen 
angels, and Augustine deploys a classically Platonic critique of the warped and distorted 
divine hierarchies in Greco-Roman theology. Fortune, Augustine said, would seem to rule 
Zeus, rather as Plato shows the over-ruling power of love and necessity in the Symposium 
(195c) and the Sophist (259b). 
By maintaining the angelic role however, as the positively daemonic (‘by using the word 
“angel” we might have avoided the offence given by the word “demon”’, CD IX.19, 23),299 
Augustine maintains in effect the best aspect of pagan religion, which he most sees present in 
Platonism: liturgical cultus, religio and pietas in all their aspects are also sustained in the 
Civitas Dei.300 The religious devotion of child to parent, citizen to citizen, subject to 
monarch, are all continued, and as sacred (CD. X.1). 
What is ‘removed’, or rather reserved to God in a way that transforms and re-orients all other 
‘horizontal’ modes of religion, is sacrifice/service itself. Instead of the intermittent human 
black, we have the now inscrutably blazing all-white of the One (a perfected Platonic non-
violent mythic, trumping the fallen legendary), now including Dyadic difference and yet 
without conflict in the Trinity, which, through incarnation and passion occupied, like a saving 
but suffering arrow-shot, the black position only to release its contingency from tyranny.  
Thus, Augustine says that there is a collective cogito of Jerusalem, spoken of as a single 
hypostasis, which like the individual soul echoes the Trinity as the triad of being, 
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understanding and willing that is also the copula of love: ‘It has its form by subsisting in him; 
its enlightenment by contemplating him; its joy by abiding in him. It is; it sees; it loves’ (CD 
XI.24). He adds that the division of education within the earthly city into physics, logic and 
ethics echoes this social and psychological Trinitarian identity and is inherently linked to the 
further triad of aptitude, art and application (CD.XI.25).  
It is therefore clear that for Augustine the harmonising of existential unity with apprehended 
and lived difference is now, at last, a reflection of the most ultimate truth. Our relational life 
in space and progressive life in time shares in the specifically social life of the saints in 
Jerusalem, and that in turn participates in the relational dynamic life of God. Beyond Plato 
yet perfecting his vision, the Dyadic is now as ultimate as the Unity, along with their 
mediation. In consequence, even God has been ‘politicised’.  
It is this political God who concernedly sacrifices himself, such that everything is 
encompassed by the logic of his sacrifice. Thereby, the partiality of a sacrifice that prevents 
exchange whilst covertly reversing its own apparently generous and unilateral gesture (the 
pre-foundation and foundation of Rome) is replaced by a sacrifice so complete that it is in 
some sense without loss, a sacrifice that does not divide but unites, a sword that saves, a cross 
that gives birth to new life (CD X.6). What is more, for Christianity and for Augustine, God, 
through the Incarnation, becomes at once and uniquely the ultimate citizen, civic founder and 
king (CD XVII.4), who judges us as father and brother, and rescues us as father, brother and 
fellow citizen: ‘The Principium, then, having assumed soul and flesh, purifies both the soul 
and flesh of those who believe in him’ (CD X.24). Indeed Porphyry (unlike Iamblichus) 
thought that theurgy was needed only to purify the body, while the soul was purified by 
contemplation.301 But Augustine sees the entire human person as requiring the medicine of 
the eucharist.  
Augustine’s most crucial quarrel with the Platonists, and especially with Porphyry, concerned 
the question of mediation. Essentially, he argued that, without a full doctrine of creation, 
Platonists still imagine that God and the gods are remote. By contrast, Augustine strikingly 
insists that God, just because he is totally ‘outside’ our reality, can also be present to us with 
absolute immediacy, invoking the Platonic concept, originally from the Parmenides, of the 
‘sudden’ intrusion of the divine upon the wise in a moment snatched out of time in ‘a briefest 
flicker of lightning illuminating the darkness’ (CD IX.16). Therefore, Augustine did not 
 




regard the Incarnation as a total exception, but rather as the hyperbolic fulfilling of this 
immediacy (CD IX.15), just as he had a very strong doctrine of the sustaining of the 
Incarnation in the body of the Church, most of all manifested in the Expositions on the 
Psalms. It is God himself who most intimately communicates himself to us and his angelic 
messengers convey his very own presence in various degrees.  
They are not, like the pagan daemons, inadequate substitutes for the unreachable divine 
distance. As such, argues Augustine, the daemons cannot be fully good, because they 
represent not just a weakening but a distortion of the divine goodness, as they are already 
involved with the inherent perversity of fallen matter and do not enjoy direct access to the 
divine mind (CD IX.16.22). For this reason, they do not unambiguously lead us upwards to 
the divine, but are greedy and self-interested, happy to leave or confirm us in our bodily 
delusions. It is therefore intolerable that the city of Rome still worships amoral or depraved 
gods, who do not conform to the Platonic image of divinity. These gods must rather be 
ambivalent Platonic daemons, whose worship is bound to corrupt the citizenry.  
Yet even here, Augustine perceives a certain natural alliance between the metaphysical 
aspirations of Platonism and the civic aspirations of Rome. As we saw, he stresses that 
Greece allowed actors to be citizens, where Rome forbad it, as if out of half-admitted shame 
at their ritual depictions of divine debauchery, even though these had their origins in the 
temple.  Similarly, Rome rather more ascribed its laws to human as opposed to divine origins, 
as if it already sought to be better than the gods, albeit through its Stoic divinisation of nature. 
Only Christianity fulfils the Platonic impulse by purging the demonic sphere and abolishing 
the theatre of shame altogether. In the way that for Plato the city was ‘the true tragedy’, now 
for Augustine Christian citizens perform in the theatrum mundi and the exemplary citizen 
Paul, with the martyrs, is notably spoken of in terms of the language of ‘spectacle’ (CD 
XIV.9). 
This is possible for two reasons. First, Christians now reconceive the Platonic nous, or the 
sphere of purely intellectual beings, as the eschatological end that is the City of Jerusalem: 
‘the daughter of Zion…the most glorious City of God…the city which knows and worships 
the one God. She is proclaimed by the holy angels, who invite us into their fellowship and 
desire us to become fellow-citizens of her with them’ (CD X.25).302 Secondly, they see that 
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the one way to this end is via Christ the true mediator. God is naturally close to us in an 
immediate mediation of his immediacy, but since we are fallen, he must cross the gulf of 
rupture and identify with us an incarnate victim on the Cross and in the perpetuation of this 
sacrifice in the eucharist and the Church (CD X.24). The angels do not wish us ‘to sacrifice to 
them, but to become a sacrifice to God with them’ (CD X.25). 
Christ reigns in Jerusalem where there is no longer any need for the four natural cardinal 
virtues which we still require on earth, since they are virtues of resistance and control and 
there is nothing there any longer to be resisted. Only love prevails there, beyond the lapse 
even of the two other theological virtues of faith and hope (CD XIX.4). But the gulf between 
the earthly city and Jerusalem cannot, for Augustine, be crossed by our striving: Christ’s 
Incarnation and suffering shows rather that the true trace of charity in a lapsed reality is 
kenotic mercy, whose positively contagious impulse was now sensed and followed even by 
pagan barbarians when they reached the gates of Rome (CD I.34). Christ was the only true 
and universal sacrifice and yet ‘we ourselves are that whole sacrifice’ because Augustine 
posited an extreme identity between Christ and the Church (CD X.6). Yet these ‘true 
sacrifices are acts of compassion’ and what raises us into eternal citizenship is the exercise of 
forbearance, forgiveness and care (cura: CD XIX.14,16). 
Therefore, through his ultimate ‘theurgic’ descent, Christ overcomes the problematic gulf that 
for fallen humanity seems to divide the eternal from worldly citizenship, disguising the 
greater civic character of heaven itself. By entering into our city to be rejected by it, God 
discloses, beyond finite pagan political imaginings, that heaven itself is a city and is able to 
re-inaugurate the temporal path of this heavenly city upon earth.  
It is, for Augustine, above all a city where citizenship is constituted by musical praise of the 
true God, by worship offered in, with and through Christ in his body, the Church, the totus 
Christi. He considered David’s psalmic music inherently political, involving ‘the mystical 
representation of a great thing. For the rational and measured arrangement of diverse sounds 
in concordant variety suggests the compact unity of a well-ordered city’ (CD XVII.14). In the 
Confessions, Augustine had concluded that the only answer to the enigma of time was 
Christ’s living of time as musical praise of the Father and thus he resolves confessionally his 






collective living out of Christological time by the Church.303 For this reason the last two 
books of this work, as Hans Von Balthasar argued, appear to transit towards the matter of the 
City of God: eternal Jerusalem and the Church’s temporal participation in her reality.304 It is 
as if the living out of the problem of time, of memory, presence and expectation, was now a 
collective concern.  
For Augustine, this temporal praise of the eternal transfigures all civic life, since only the 
offering of what is due to the Supreme Good can be a just and generous worship, free of all 
sacrificial calculus and idolatrous absolutizing of the finite, and thereby the ground of 
possibility for all inter-human justice and reconciliation (CD XVIII.54; XIX.22).305 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this way, we begin to see how Augustine moves beyond the pagan aporia of citizenship 
and citizen-morality without a universal basis, on the one hand, and universal ethics removed 
from civic belonging (the ‘Stoic option’), on the other. Instead, he has more perfectly 
conceived (in the wake of Plato, Neoplatonism, and Rome itself) of a new cosmic citizenship, 
which is also that of a city travelling through time as Israel and then the Church. This time-
travelling city can survive every sacrificial loss and death because in reality it lives by these 
things. And this mode of life-through-death, rather than a spatialising trickery, is now seen to 
be what echoes and participates in the divine order.  
The pagan city, as Roman history and authors had begun to diagnose, was commenced as the 
sacrifice of myth to history, and of eternity to time, under the aegis of the rivalry of the gods 
themselves. If Plato successfully criticised and renewed myth, then, as we have seen, some of 
the best Roman authors, and supremely Augustine, criticised and renewed legend as the link 
between myth and history. With Augustine, a true story of human civic origins can at last be 
told, because he invokes an alternative, recovered pre-lapsarian origin that was never about 
merely ‘staying’ and repeating an original violence, a celestial origin that was recommenced 
in time by the Incarnation. The pagan legendary origins suppressed the violence of sacrificial 
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deceit, whereas Augustine was able fully to decode this in terms of an alternative origin of 
non-rivalrous mutuality.306  
This non-rivalry is possible in the alternative human city that is the City of God only because 
the City encompasses also the angelic and escapes the pagan founding rivalry between the 
divine and the human, heavenly and earthly. Such rivalry had ensured that either the City lays 
a claim to divinisation that condemns our natural birth (as in Kallipolis) or alternatively, as 
for the Stoic tendency, earthly civic life precludes our participation in a natural cosmopolis 
that is external to the real possibility of earthly citizenship, handing worldly politics over to a 
more individualist and formal-utilitarian-sympathetic order.  
By ending these rivalries, Augustine not only salvaged and perfected the pagan view that the 
highest humanity coincides with citizenship but also overcame the oppositions between the 
civic and the proto-liberal, the corporatist and the individualist, albeit to the primary 
advantage of the former respective pair of alternatives. For now, it is every fully unique 
person, created in the image of God, who is also thereby a member of the eternal civic 
community. What this means in finer contextual, conceptual and practical detail, we will 








Chapter Six: Augustine and Citizenship Beyond the City 
 
1. Introduction  
The Christian Church was able to constitute a universal citizenship in a way that the Roman 
Republic ultimately failed to do. Oikos and Polis were more effectively blended than by 
pagan Rome in a structure that was both civic, as people were members by choice and will, 
but also fully familial, as all joined the Church by adoption into the Body of Christ. This 
body was fully political precisely because it was liturgical; it sought to make a community in 
the image of an idealised image of the soul, a perfected body that communicates the highest 
good.307 
Augustine most fully articulated this new Christian fulfilment of the antique city and 
citizenship. In this chapter I will move from general Patristic accounts of the latter, to 
Augustine’s own account of citizenship and of the city and from there to his real 
understanding of ‘the two cities’, the relationship of the heavenly to the earthly city as both 
republic and empire. In conclusion, I will briefly consider Augustine’s anticipations of 
medieval politics.  
 
2. Christianity and Citizenship  
Many Christian texts responded to the legacy of the Antonine constitution of 212.308 It was 
commonly regarded as playing a providential role in salvation history. As the Roman empire 
was seen as rendering possible a universal Christian mission, so the extension of citizenship 
was seen as a figurative foreshadowing of the enrolling of all redeemed human beings within 
the citizenship of heaven. As with all figurae, this could be a matter of negative as well as 
positive contrast, but after Constantine especially, the latter aspect naturally came more to 
prevail.  
It was emphasised that Paul had been a Roman citizen, and for Augustine’s disciple Orosius 
this was thought to be true of all the apostles, with Paul and Peter the new and true founders 
of Rome, their non-rivalry being contrasted with Romulus and Remus. Orosius additionally 
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believed, like many in the Greek and Syrian East, that Christ himself had been a Roman 
citizen (in reality he would have had the status of a peregrinus). More commonly, reference 
was made to the circumstances of Christ’s birth in connection with Augustus’s census 
recorded in Luke’s birth narrative, viewed as either having been for taxation alone or also for 
citizenship recognition.309 Again, this was regarded typologically, and with both negative and 
positive stresses: as an albeit too limited act of political inclusion that nonetheless 
foreshadows a far greater divine inclusion, at once political and cosmic in character.  
In the case of both Eusebius in the East and Orosius in the West, the positive harmonisation 
of Roman and heavenly citizenship went along with an assumption that the destinies of Rome 
and the Church were so intertwined that the Roman empire was destined to increase along 
with Christianity.310 The Roman emperor in actuality took on all the characteristics of the 
Greek Basileus, a sacral prince who sacrifices on behalf of the body politic: a master of the 
science of rhetoric and a strategos entrusted with the military affairs of a free citizenry, 
expected to achieve regular victory over barbarian civilisations.311 And Christ himself was 
regarded in one aspect as the supreme imperator.312 Even when Rome fell, the now 
Christianised Empire continued in Constantinople for another thousand years, and with it the 
dominance of the Eusebian outlook. Much of it was also assimilated in the West, as the 
historical theologies of both Orosius and later Otto Freising serve to prove.313  
It is clear that Augustine partially, in the face of growing imperial crisis, drew back from any 
such presumptive conclusion and remained agnostic about the destiny of human political 
arrangements: the pilgrim city on earth could live (or not) with any of them (CD XIX-XX). 
And yet the  incorporation of Rome into the heart of the sacred story is rooted in the New 
Testament: not only is there the link of the nativity to the census and the recording of Paul’s 
appeal to Caesar (again viewed either negatively as contestation or positively as recognition 
of imperial authority), there is also Christ’s injunction to pay the imperial taxes, his 
submission unto death to Roman law, Paul’s injunction to obey Roman laws and the 
representation of Rome as the new anti-city of Babylon in Revelation. 
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It is perhaps too easy to suppose that the latter simply represents an alternative and purely 
negative current with regard to the Roman empire: it can be read more as a protest against its 
current decadence. Similarly, as Peter Leithart has argued, it seems too simple merely to 
suppose that originally anti-imperial (and supposedly pacifist and anarchist) stances towards 
secular authority conveniently gave way to pro-Imperial ones with the conversion of 
Constantine. In reality, as we have seen, it is much more evident that from the outset there 
was ambivalence about Rome (whose overrule had, after all, been accepted by the Jews) and 
that relatively negative or positive emphases come to the fore in response to circumstance.  
The greatest evidence of the truth of this interpretation is the outlook of Origen: he is 
regularly cited as evidence for pacifist and anarchistic early Christian stances, and yet 
Eusebius was only extending his teacher’s celebration of Rome’s providential destiny.314 For 
both master and pupil, as for so many pagans, Jews and Christians at this period, there was a 
natural link between monotheism and universal empire.315 Origen’s hesitations about 
Christian involvement in Roman litigation and fighting would appear to have been primarily 
about cultic involvement with polytheism, combined with a sense of Christian life as 
anticipating and witnessing to eschatological peace (a dimension that never disappears).  
 
 
3. Augustine, the City and Citizenship 
Contrary to what is sometimes suggested, there is no real reason to suppose that Augustine 
entirely rejected, as opposed to strongly qualified, the figurative association of universal 
monarchy with the arrival of monotheism. He celebrated the reign of the Christian emperor 
Theodosius and put most weight politically upon the requirement of good character, stressing 
especially the character of the person at the top. It can validly be assumed, in terms of 
prevailing mentalities, that such an acceptance of the importance of kingship went along with 
his commitment to and practice of episcopacy within the Church and his acceptance of the 
primacy of the See of Peter. Similarly, while Augustine did not suppose Christ to have been a 
Roman citizen or provide such strongly figurative readings of the Lukan census or Paul’s 
citizenship, we have seen in the previous chapter how he did, indeed, like other Christian 
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authors, imagine that Roman citizenship and the sway of Roman law were providential 
boons: both his writing and episcopal practice bear this out.  
This observation opens the way to a final question about Augustine’s attitude in general 
towards the antique city and citizenship, and in particular towards the Roman city and Roman 
citizenship.  
A still dominant line of interpretation, as already mentioned, reads him as rejecting both and 
as pointing political thought in a liberal-realist direction: politics is secularised; religion is 
internalised and is now primarily to do with individuals and their eternal destiny.316 In a 
sinful world, little practical consensus can be hoped for and the political is about compromise 
between inevitably competing wills. On this view, Augustine is taken as exacerbating the 
Roman tendency to view citizenship in purely contractual terms as subjection to the rule of 
law. It implies, as Hannah Arendt supposed, that he rejects altogether the antique republican 
polis experiment of shared self-rule, relatively independent of ‘economic’ concerns.317  
On the other hand, an alternative exegetical tradition has sometimes blamed Augustine for a 
later supposed ‘political Augustinianism’, involving a totally ‘integral’ approach to politics, 
making no essential separation between this-worldly and religious matters. This perspective 
would seem to be considerably at variance with the ‘proto-liberal’ reading, except perhaps 
with regard to Augustine’s supposed pessimism and stress upon the discipline of recalcitrant 
souls.318 
And yet, the extraordinary thing is that when we actually read Augustine’s texts, there is 
patently very little justification for the first rendering of his thought and only for the second 
with qualifications.  
This is most obvious if we begin with the occasioning of the writing of the Civitas Dei which 
we see in Augustine’s correspondence. He is trying to rebut a double charge: first, that 
Christianity weakens the virtues required for citizenship, and second that conversion to 
Christianity has caused the gods of Rome to abandon the city of Rome. 
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Thus, at the very least, Augustine is not saying that either worldly citizenship or the earthly 
city is of no importance for Christianity. To the contrary, he argues to Marcellinus and then in 
the City of God that Christianity produces better citizens of Rome than did paganism (CD 
II.25).319 Similarly, he argues that the true God can better protect the city of Rome than did 
the false ones who were really demons: ‘if all…were to hear and embrace the Christian 
precepts of justice and moral virtue, then would the commonwealth (respublica) adorn its 
lands with happiness in this present life and ascend to the summit of life eternal, there to 
reign in eternal blessedness’(CD II.19).   
The fact that he also thinks that there is another citizenship and city of more ultimate 
importance does not alter these exegetical facts: to the contrary, the nub of Augustine’s 
specifically polemical and apologetic case is that it is only if one recognises this superior city 
that one can adequately secure the earthly one; only if one is already a citizen of heaven can 
we be adequate citizens here on earth.  
Part of the problem of interpretation here has to do with the pervasive assumption that the 
Civitas Dei is a confused text: either it is seen as primarily about politics with lengthy 
distractions, or else as a theological history that is but incidentally to do with politics.320  
However, this assumption neglects two things: first, Augustine’s Roman and biblical 
recasting of politics as primarily to do with time rather than space. Secondly, his revisionary 
attention to the religious dimension of the political. We have seen how fundamental this was 
in the ancient city, and if pagan political writers like Cicero relatively neglected the gods’ 
civic role, then this was largely because they took it for granted. Therefore, Augustine’s 
questioning of this role represents political theorising at a more fundamental level, involving 
a politico-religious revisionism that can only be compared to that of Plato, rather than to the 
more limited enquiries of Aristotle and Cicero.  But the point of this revision, as his rhetoric 
would suggest, is not to question the polis along with polis-religion, but to propose (again, 
like Plato) a different polis-religion that will more adequately sustain and realise civic 
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With respect to citizenship, as we have seen, Augustine clearly agrees with the republican 
tradition, and with Cicero in his more republican mode, that character has primacy over law 
and constitution in building up a strong city. He faced the proto-Machiavellian charge that 
Christianity weakens the virtues of strength and loyalty that the strong city requires. But his 
initial line of defence was not at all that the strength and security of the earthly city is a 
matter of indifference to Christians, but that in actuality the pagan virtues are just not civic or 
political enough.  
Indeed, for Augustine, more radically, as we have seen, the very notion of ‘virtue’ too much 
involves an assertion of strength in deploying reason to quell the passions, whose perversion 
was wrongly assumed by pagans to be ineradicable (CD 19.4).321 Both in self and city, this 
implies a resignation to a permanently unruly element always on the verge of rebellion. He is 
clearly aware that in the civic dimension this encourages an ever-further extension of 
unjustifiable conquest to throw sops to plebeian discontent, instead of treating the plebs 
properly at home. Moreover, he has a Platonic sense that without a sufficient public 
advertence to the supreme good, the assertion of rational virtue is all too likely to reduce to a 
sophistic self-assertion of mere glory and repute, both individually and collectively.  
By contrast, the Christian transvaluation of virtue renders it no longer a matter primarily of 
resistance or suppression, but of the transformative power of love in response to others and to 
the supreme other, God.322 Within this perspective, one can hope for wholly good desires 
springing ‘from below’, whether of the soul or the city. The relation of Platonic eros to 
transcendence is here accentuated in terms of a more receptive grace and self-sacrificially 
relational agape. Augustine argues that the Christian metaphysical horizon of ‘ontological 
peace’, as John Milbank puts it, opens out an unlimited prospect of civil peace and security 
that was not present before.323 There are no longer any inevitable internal enemies, nor 
external ones in terms of incorrigible barbarisms or not completely assimilable alien cults. 
And obviously peace is strength: even wars are only for the sake of an eventual peace, as 
Augustine repeatedly insists (CD XIX.12). 
In this context, he argues that the peculiarly Christian virtues of mercy, care, forbearance and 
readiness to be reconciled are not evidence of weakness but are linked to a patient 
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preparedness to build up a total, unassailable strength without any intrinsic limit. It is just 
here that Augustine is frequently misread on all sides. There is a tendency to suppose that in 
one register he recommends peaceability, but then as a matter of realist concession he insists 
that in certain contexts coercion is unavoidable. Yet one can alternatively suggest that for 
Augustine both forbearance and tempered punishment belong to a continuum of tactic (a kind 
of sacral pragmatism) that assumes faith in and hope for the arrival of the ultimate reality of 
fully harmonious peace.  
Thus, he does not moralistically recommend being peaceful as a matter of private probity, 
and then reluctantly and realistically qualify this injunction by saying that it cannot always be 
sustained. To the contrary, forbearance and tempered punishment alike are related to these 
theological, New Testament virtues insofar as they are a matter of eschatological expectation. 
Mercy allows an interval for repentance, but so does moderate punishment and relatively 
restrained warfare, which should always be instructive and is only justified as such.  
This politics of mercy and of personal care regards the advocacy of Christ to the Father in the 
Trinity as being repeated and relayed through our dual citizenship within this world. As 
citizens of the diabolical worldly city, we cannot be rescued, even in terms of that city’s own 
‘natural’ norms, except through the constant intercessory pleadings of the City of God. So, in 
his letters to Nectarius and Marcellinus Augustine distinguished between the defender and the 
intercessor. The defender, like the accuser, tries to spin the argument: in order to win, he 
plays the mimetic game of rivalry. The intercessor, by contrast, agrees on the guilt, yet seeks 
to relieve the punishment.324 In this way a more genuine justice becomes possible as the hope 
for reconciliation.  
Augustine thereby distinguished between the strictness of the secular arm which punishes and 
the mercy of the ecclesiastical intercessors. The sentence of guilt performs a meagre justice, 
unlikely to engender repentance or to forestall revenge, but the suspension of punishment 
promotes the good and escapes a mimetic repetition of violence.  
In the context of dealing with pagan rioters, Augustine adopts this double, but integrated 
approach.325 Their property is to be removed as a mark of their crime and recognition of their 
sinfulness, of which they should be afraid: they cannot simply be pardoned without redress, 
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as Augustine’s pagan correspondent Nectarius pleads. On the other hand, their due capital 
sentence should be suspended, in imitation of the mercy exercised by the perfectly good man 
(Christ) who commanded to the adulteress, ‘go and sin no more’. Yet this outward mercy 
instigates an inner punishment of self-accusation, inaugurating an inner purgatory that drives 
the offender to repentance.  
No longer able to externalise wrongdoings in the unending debt economy of sin, each person 
is driven to relieve their debts by sharing in (assuming and repeating) the sacrifice of Christ 
(The Trinity, IV. 2-14). This process is, for Augustine, not just manifest at the individual 
level, but also through the operations of social agents and classes, in an overall ‘economising’ 
of political rule which is now merged with the caring role of Church as household. The 
secular arm which punishes inspires fear in the wicked, who cannot for now be restrained by 
virtue, thereby to a degree allowing solid and reliable citizens to live in peace. Yet in order 
that the wicked may be reconciled, the Church goes further and acts, not indeed to overturn 
the sentence of guilt, but to alleviate the punishment, thereby inwardly inoculating the sinner 
against the external reality of mimetic contagion.   
This new interval of patience between guilt and punishment is produced by Christ’s 
crucifixion, because he had no guilt and yet was punished. As an inverted consequence, our 
guilt need not automatically result in the counter-violence of punishment, but can, instead, be 
assuaged by mercy. Every act of mercy towards a guilty man becomes thereby a participating 
repetition of the divine sacrifice: ‘He undeservingly suffered [in order that] we might pay the 
debt owed, if He, too, was able to bear it unowed on our account (De Musica VI.18-19).’  
This specifically Christian logic nevertheless, one could argue, extends more generously the 
civic and religious mores of Ancient Rome, which had parallels elsewhere in the ancient 
world. The indebted clientele citizen could traditionally escape slavery and destitution if he 
could attach himself to a patron, who would settle his debts, by a kind of alchemical 
transmutation in which the worldly obligation of financial debt was exchanged for the 
spiritual debt of honour, underwritten by obligation to the gods.326  
Augustine’s Christian gloss takes this hyperbolically further. The debt of love and of worship 
demanded by the true God more absolutely trumps the debt of sin owed to the devil, our 
inevitable death, since God infinitely cancels even this infinite debt by choosing to freely to 
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die our human death even though, as God, he was ‘not able to die’ (The Trinity IV.13, 17). 
Thereby we receive again the infinite in its positivity as grace. Benignly robbed of our finite 
seizures of ownership we receive entirely that which we can, however, never own, since it is 
boundless.  To own is to divide, and in receiving all, we all of us lose all selfish ownership, 
all rivalrous possession. A different city is inaugurated.  
Viewed this way, one can better understand how the morality of tactics, and of an infinitised 
economy, is also an ethics of specifically political tactics. The more patient Christian citizen, 
slow to anger, is ultimately helping to build up a much more stable polity: something to 
which Augustine adduces immediate evidence.327 This also explains why for him the border 
between persuasion and coercion does not fall neatly between the ecclesial and the secular 
arm, even if there is an important relative difference. To the contrary, the ethical and political 
tactics are also salvific tactics: Augustine was no Marcionite, and so the Christian exists 
always on the cusp between the Old Testament enforceable moral and political law and the 
Gospel law of charity and reconciliation. The necessary rule of the city of this world 
coincides to a degree with the persisting religious validity of Old Testament law, just as for 
him the Hebrew Jerusalem, as we saw, was a part (albeit a special part) of the earthly city. 
After all, it was the Jews’ submission to the one true God that enabled their earthly success to 
the degree that they did not apostasise (CD XVIII.27.45). For Augustine, such a promise still 
holds good in his own time, as in the past (CD V.15), also for Rome, even if it is of infinitely 
lesser consequence than the promise of eternal salvation.328 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Such a sense of the primacy of tactics in relation to faith in an ultimately real peace is shown 
in Augustine’s reading of Christ’s injunction to turn the other cheek.329 This appears to be an 
example of sacrificial and symbolic action entirely in excess of the tactical: something always 
allied to a kind of warfare, albeit spiritual (CD V.23).  But not on Augustine’s reading: for 
him it is notable that more specifically we are enjoined (in Matthew’s version rather than 
Luke’s) to offer our left cheek if the right cheek has already been struck (Matt. 5.39). This 
therefore must mean, not that if abused in one respect we should offer up more of ourselves 
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for further abuse, but rather that if what most matters for us has been attacked then we should 
offer up also what matters less, just as Paul for this reason appealed to his Roman citizenship 
when he was persecuted. To do so is to indicate to the assailant an order of priorities. For 
Augustine this meant, allegorically, that if matters to do with the heavenly city are under 
assault, then one should renounce those to do with the earthly to indicate their far lesser 
value. Paul was not therefore trying to hide his Christianity under the protective cloak of his 
Romanness but was sacrificing the latter to the former.  
In this case, then, tactics required passive renunciation. Yet the point of the latter is 
instruction: in other instances, instruction might involve a degree of active coercion in order 
to hold open an interval for persuasion to take effect. In either case, violence is now a hinge: 
whether voluntarily undergone or inflicted. The only point of either its endurance or its 
imposition is its ultimate fading away. But just as Christ could not escape the Cross, so for 
now we have to continue to reckon with violence as sin and death.  
Punishment is thus also seen as transition. Although measures of coercion, including war, 
remain for Augustine necessary, if thoroughly imperfect and ambivalent, means for 
suppressing sin and subordinating sinners, they are never justified in ultimately punitive 
terms. Instead, they are seen as in themselves the continuation of sin as its inevitable 
consequence, and only turning in their counter-violence away from sin if they are ultimately 
self-negating. That is to say, if they are aimed in the end at reducing coercion overall, 
bringing about individual healing, economically corrective justice and social peace. The 
employment of authority of this kind is understood by Augustine not as a privilege enjoyed 
by the righteous, but rather a terrible burden that awaits its relief in: 
that heavenly home in where the duty of commanding mortal men, will no longer be 
necessary, because there will no longer be a necessary duty of caring for the welfare 
of those who now enjoy the happiness of immortality. Until that home is reached, 
however, fathers have a duty to exercise their mastery which is greater than that of 
slaves to endure their servitude’ (CD XIX.16).  
Punishment only ceases to be a sin when it is eternal: but Augustine’s endorsement of 
everlasting hell arguably conflicts with his overall metaphysics of punishment, by denying its 
transitional and purgative character, just as his admission that it is a state of eternal civil war 




cannot overcome their unjust willing: CD XIX.28), reintroduces after all an eternal and 
infinite dualism of ontological violence alongside ontological peace.   
Nevertheless, Augustine considered that the mistake of previous pagan citizens was to have 
treated violence and its inhibition as an ultimate horizon. For that reason, they have failed to 
be fully just: the only possible measure of complete justice is when everything is given its 
due in its right place, all accept this, and therefore there is perfect peace (CD XIX.24-7). Not 
to subordinate all action to this ultimate end, even though it is not fully achievable in this 
world, has to be to substitute something else for justice.  
For this reason, the citizens of Jerusalem on pilgrimage through this world and the earthly 
city are nonetheless the latter’s better citizens, because in worshipping directly the God of 
infinite peace and love they are not trying to appease lesser gods who are really selfish 
demons demanding sacrifices of blood to lessen their wrath. This, for Augustine, would be 
equivalent to absolutizing some finite goal such as the glory of Rome, when we cannot be 
sure that even Rome may not one day vanish. Astonishingly, Augustine says that if even 
pagan sacral images, like ‘the holy things of Vesta’ had been treated according to this logic of 
temporal use ordered towards infinite fruition, ‘not to secure temporal goods but as symbols 
of the eternal’, then they would have been unobjectionable (CD III.18).  
One day, indeed, says Augustine (following 1 Corinthians 13), there will be no need for 
prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, or even for faith and hope, because all will be 
charity. But that does not mean that for now charity displaces the need for the exercise of 
those cardinal virtues and the other two theological ones. This is because charity for 
Augustine is more a mutual state than an imperative, just as he indicates that the evils 
wrought by others impair one’s own ability to be fully good (CD XIX.27), while the life of 
the saints is supremely social, with a universally social remit, extending from the oikos to the 
cosmos (CD XIX. 3). 
Thus, entire charity has to be both prayed for and struggled for, at once through rhetoric and 
coercion. In a word, it must for now be fought for. The just struggle of Abel against Cain has 
replaced the unjust rivalry of Romulus and Remus. For this reason, Christians are not merely 




This is why Augustine does not merely contrast martyrdom with heroism, but views the 
martyr as the perfected hero, as Dodaro has argued.330 Pagan heroism for Augustine in effect 
substituted feats of arms and the glory of bravery for a more genuine facing up to death. Its 
activism was therefore a kind of evasion and courage in the face of the enemy rather than of 
death, which secretly continued to be viewed with trepidation. But Christianity for the first 
time frees human beings from the fear of death, both psychic and corporeal. This might, on a 
‘Machiavellian’ reading, seem to betoken the redundancy of civic courage. Instead, 
Augustine views martyrdom as its ultimate exercise. For now, even death can be bravely 
received, in active defence of the true city and its earthly representation (CD VIII.27). The 
cult of the martyrs does not directly defend the earthly city, as the cult of the heroes was 
supposed to: and yet in sustaining their witness to the ultimate horizon of eternal peace it also 
serves to build up the justice of the earthly city and so does, after all, indirectly defend it in a 
more ultimate heroic fashion.  
 
The City 
When it comes to the other accusation which Augustine is trying to parry, that the gods have 
deserted the city because of the Christians, then he is no more denying the importance of the 
earthly republic than he is trying to downgrade the value of earthly republican citizenship. In 
proto-Renaissance fashion he openly celebrates and rejoices in human ingenuity, art and 
technology as divine gifts:  
How astonishing are the achievements of human industry in devising clothing and 
shelter! What progress man has made in agriculture and navigation! With what variety 
are his achievements in pottery, painting and sculpture conceived and executed! What 
wonderful spectacles are displayed in the theatres…What ingenious methods do we 
find employed in capturing, killing or taming wild beasts!’ (CD XXII.24)  
Certainly, it is true that he insists that the inscrutable providence of God may not preserve 
Rome in perpetuity, but he equally (and literally) insists that it is the demonic pagan gods 
who have been inherently fickle and would appear to have endlessly betrayed Rome and led 
her into disaster in the past. Their encouragement of rivalry, and unjustified external 
belligerence from the outset, has meant that the entire history of Rome hitherto has been 
 




bloody, divided and insecure. The original Roman kingdom successfully overlaid the petty 
evils of its half-bandit mongrel founders, and ultimately through the Pax Romana Augustus 
ended the inter-city violence of the ancient Mediterranean. But this older peace amongst 
citizens fostered the growth of power and luxury, which in turn led to struggles for glory both 
internal and external that continually ruined the intermittent calm (CD III). 
If Rome is now more than ever threatened from without, then that is partly a coming to a 
head of ancient faults, and partly the consequence of a failure to live up to Christian ideals. 
By contrast, no city can really be protected except by the supreme God, whose power acts in 
this world directly and without (as we saw in the previous chapter) any need for 
demonic/angelic mediation in the sense of supplementary aid. It follows that the city should 
invoke directly the Triune and Incarnate God and comprehend itself, through its ever-
increasing unity with the Church (the celestial city on pilgrimage), as a sacrificial offering to 
God by its attempt to live in justice, care and mercy. This very attempt will tend to strengthen 
the cohesion of even earthly politics.  
 
4. What are the Two Cities? 
It is perhaps significant that Augustine’s book is not entitled, like that of Otto of Freising in 
the twelfth century, ‘The Two Cities’, but ‘The City of God’. For there is a real sense in 
which, for Augustine, there is only one true city, Jerusalem, the city of the Angels, with 
human members added to make up the lost numbers of the fallen angelic spirits. By 
comparison, communities of mortals on the earth represent but various degrees of 
participation in this city. Even Babylon is not wholly demonic, because that is impossible 
according to Augustine’s understanding of evil as privation, which must apply collectively as 
much as individually.  
Therefore, one can argue that the Augustinian political picture is fundamentally Platonic. The 
key difference from Plato is the ‘politicisation’ of the Nous, or the realm of ideas, which had 
already been inaugurated by Philo. The Platonic Forms, insofar as they are created wisdom 
are, as it were, now themselves people and not just people but also citizens.331 Of course this 
is due to biblical influence and Augustine stresses in the Confessions that what he did not 
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read about in the Platonists was not just ‘the way’ which is Christ, but also the eternal city, 
which is also the city to come, Jerusalem (Confessions, VII.21).  
But it is important to remember that this biblical topos itself involves a projection onto the 
heavens of an extended earthly polis, Jerusalem, which had enjoyed various modes of mixed 
government and had existed in counterpoise to further-oriental empire: in both respects 
exhibiting some similarity to the cities of the Greeks. Conversely, we should also recall that 
the pagan gods were taken to be full participants in the Greek and Roman cities. It is 
anachronistic to over-impose a contrast between the pagan and Biblical sense of the relation 
of religion to politics, and still more to project back upon Augustine a much later western 
break with the civic ideal that was the outcome of later developments, theological and 
political.  
For this reason, if there is really in one sense only one city and not two, in another sense the 
earthly city is really many.  
As we have abundantly seen, Rome is not quite so damned, for Augustine, as the older 
empires and especially Babylon. It significantly participates in the eternal city and 
foreshadows its arrival in time. In part, indeed, by negative contrast (Romulus and Remus 
compared with Cain and Abel), but also in several positive respects: Roman glory and refuge, 
the Roman quest for universal peace and its respect for justice.  
Augustine also to a degree perpetuated Tertullian’s critique of Greek philosophy, with its 
markedly Roman character, premised on a rejection of the latter’s abstraction, relativism and 
excessive bent for speculation. It fails, thereby, for Tertullian, to be sufficiently political, 
adequately able to serve the cause of producing virtuous citizens and a strong polity. The 
philosopher stands nowhere, alienates himself from tradition and polis, and simply ends up 
adopting a series of convenient masks (Ad Nationes II.4).  Tertullian also significantly argued 
that Greek speculative philosophy is unfit for Empire: Rome’s vast material dominion and 
moral uprightness are the visible manifestation of, and justification for Rome’s more political 
mode of theoria: the sign that she is acting most in imitation of a sacred cosmic order.  
This perspective was not, after all, straightforwardly anti-philosophical, since it is also found 




rationality was deficient, because it was too disconnected from politics and history. The same 
perspective was sustained by Augustine, albeit in a more Platonic key.332  
Conversely, the ancient Jerusalem was for Augustine not simply and already the beginning of 
the City of God on pilgrimage in this world. The real beginning of the latter arrives with 
Christ, its first founder and first citizen. Only typologically does Jerusalem already 
foreshadow this city.  
One can also infer a certain Augustinian respect for the Greek cities, insofar as Numa’s wise 
legislation during the period of Rome’s monarchy was linked by Cicero with his Pythagorean 
philosophy, shared by the Southern Italians with the Greeks, as Augustine records (CD III.10; 
VIII.2). Augustine’s own thought is strongly marked by Pythagoreanism from his early 
period onwards.333 Equivalently and conversely, his strong celebration of the uniqueness of 
Platonism as a philosophy cannot have been separable from his awareness of its originally 
republican civic context, especially as the linkage is so strongly renewed by Cicero, to whose 
line Augustine so often cleaves, as we have seen.  
Finally, Augustine’s attitude to the nature of the Church is notoriously complex. It is certainly 
a real polity, with a real organisation, whose boundaries with the polity of the empire are not 
clear, as Augustine’s record of his own episcopal practice renders apparent. It is said to be 
‘on pilgrimage’ and so is composed in Roman terms of what were originally peregrines 
rather than citizens, just as the ecclesial unit of administration was the parochia, the terrain 
within the city traditionally reserved for strangers. All free men ‘in the known world’ were 
made citizens before Constantine, and after the imperial religion became the Christian 
religion after his accession, it was as if Rome itself had fused stability with peregrination and 
the friend with the stranger, in accordance with Biblical understanding. Nor was this fusion 
altogether alien to Rome’s own supposed nomadic origins with Aeneas, and its own stronger 
than Greek emphasis on the civic continuity of kinship through time, that had led it to 
displace myth and philosophy with instructive legends of foundation. 
Thus, on the one hand we have the civitas Dei, very much a polis, inhabited by citizens, but 
on the other it is presented as peregrinatur in terra, on pilgrimage through the world. The 
nature of the life both of this city and the earthly is socialis. These can be read as three tiers 
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of belonging. First that of the civitas, the realm of the familiar cives; yet that realm is for now 
secondly perigrinatur, which means composed of foreigners or aliens in transit. Thirdly, we 
have the idea of the socialis, which indicates a friend or an ally, the socius. 
None of these terms are politically innocent, still less when juxtaposed with questions of 
political and cultural diversity. Roman citizenship in the early Republic (long before the 
Antonine Constitution) was divided into three tiers: Civites who enjoyed the full rights of a 
Roman citizen, Latinii who were allied Italian tribes granted limited rights, including the 
right to apply for citizenship, and finally Socii, effectively tribal vassals of Rome who 
received protection in return for taxes and military service. This system collapsed during the 
Social War in which the Italian tribes demanded and eventually received full citizenship, but 
the category of Socii continued outside Italy and formed a complex and diverse set of vassal 
and tributary relationships across the late Republic (CD 7.24).334  
By contrast to the eventual Antonine universalisation of the cives, Augustine’s novel 
conception of a new Roman-Christian citizenship somehow, it would appear, fuses full 
belonging with the transitory belonging of the peregrinus and the ‘associated belonging’ of 
the socius. Instead of just augmenting full belonging (and so rendering more absolute the 
boundary between insiders and outsiders, however vast that imperial boundary may be) 
Augustine much more radically questions the interior/exterior distinction by suggesting a 
primacy of ‘transitory’ existence both in time (the pilgrim) and in space (the associate). This 
positive and relational notion of transition can be seen as complementary to the notion of 
transition as redemptive ‘hinge’ already considered.  
The significance of the socius is elaborated by Augustine in Book XIX, where, as we have 
seen, he argues that there never was a Roman commonwealth that met Scipio’s description in 
Cicero’s Republic: if the good is the good of the people there is no republic, because there is 
imperfect justice, and the Roman Republic serves demons and expands by unjust violence 
(CD XIX.21). Ultimately love of glory is insufficient to create justice. As he goes on to 
argue, only the city of God answers this definition because it is perfectly just through its will 
to perfect reconciliation via the exercise of forgiveness (CD XIX.24). It is perfectly a city by 
being perfectly a society, a community of friends.  A genuine commonwealth requires justice 
and that in turn requires giving God his due which involves ‘rightly ordered love’: an entirely 
political new definition of virtue (CD XV.22), involving a rule by ‘the counsel of charity’ 
 




which Augustine opposes to the politics of domination (CD XV.7), which is not really 
compatible with republicanism (as he implies, at once in keeping with and yet in criticism of 
Cicero). The ‘bond of concord’ (concordia) constitutes true justice and is the least likely to be 
broken.   
The debased republic is relegated here to the category of mere society. It is simply an 
aggregated association, still Cicero’s ‘multitude’, although now more teleologically specified. 
While any human community whatsoever is now more primarily defined as a societas beyond 
the normal ‘political’ (spatial, finite and semi-exclusive of the household), bound together by 
its object of love which inherently transcends it, nonetheless the City of God in heaven and 
the Church on pilgrimage are ‘supremely social’ as Augustine explicitly says (CD XIX.5). 
The irreducible relationality of the social as association across any boundary is now tending 
for him to displace the ultimate monism of the individual citizen in direct relation to the 
individual city of which he is simply a component. Citizenship is thereby becoming more 
emphatically friendship and love beyond distributive justice, though in fulfilment of the 
latter. The socius is displacing the cives and yet being revealed as the more genuine cives. 
On the other hand, the Church remains primarily a community of collective memory, 
confession and prophecy; still not altogether unlike ancient Israel, insofar as it now looks 
towards the second coming of the Messiah. In a certain way, the arrival of Christianity has 
displaced the primacy of the real with the primacy of the symbolic, a note much to the fore in 
Augustine’s insistence against the Donatists that sacramental validity does not depend upon 
the personal probity of the administrator.335  
It is in this light that one should understand Augustine’s assertion that some apparently within 
the City of God do not eternally belong there, while inversely some apparently within the 
earthly city (outside the Church) really belong within it (CD XVIII.49). This should not be 
read as saying that the actual earthly communities are merely ciphers and that the real two 
cities are only constituted by individual allegiance.336 For this would belie the careful way in 
which Augustine traces specific lineages for both: from Cain and Abel respectively (CD 
XV.1). The point is much more that neither of the cities on earth is pure, that both cities 
represent various degrees of participation in the eternal city which is also the eternal realm of 
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created intelligence. Thus, individual members (and surely groups) within the two cities can 
be respectively more elevated or more debased than the general run of their communities. In 
consequence, even the Church is subject to degrees. 
All of the above tends to the conclusion that there is no simple dualism for Augustine’s 
political perspective. Insofar as a dualism is present, then, as already suggested, it is 
metaphysical and Platonic. There is one heavenly city and one earthly city, mediated by 
various degrees of ontological sharing. Insofar as the City of this World is one, then it seems 
to include the whole of humanity, as if it were a fallen version of the Stoic cosmopolis, 
understood as an aggregation of all naturally human individuals. But this is not the case, just 
insofar as Augustine literally thought of the entire human race as constituting one real, 
ultimately linked household and political community. He was able to do so because he 
thought that human beings, unlike other animals, were derived from one original human 
couple, Adam and Eve (CD XIV.1; XVI.8). It follows that human beings are one political 
community because they are one single kinship group. Augustine recommends exogamy in 
the present era (CD XV.16-17) precisely to reinforce this and not for the opposite reason: his 
thinking, in our terms, is neither tribal nor globalising, but ‘pan local’.  
One could regard this as an exacerbation of a Roman outlook, with its strong emphasis upon 
kinship. At the same time, this does not with Augustine help to foment an ultimate proto-
modern individualism, built upon family-priority, as arguably is the case with Rome in 
general. He condemns the excessive Roman sense of property and propriety in such a way as 
to excoriate both ancient ‘demonic’ safeguarding of one’s tribal own and a burgeoning sheer 
individual selfishness (CD II.20). And if, as Hannah Arendt argued, he exalted ‘natality’ in 
the sense of absolute beginnings (as with the creation of human beings, in contrast to 
doctrines of pre-existent souls)337 then this favoured as much baptismal re-birth as natural 
birth from human ancestors. In consequence, Augustine’s notion of an ordo amoris mediates 
both (CD XV.22). We are to advance from our primary duty to love the nearest by kin to love 
the nearest, the neighbour, by proximity.338 This is one aspect of the order within love. The 
other aspect is that ordering which links through a further and wider relating all the more 
local practices of mutual charity and mercy. This ordering is precisely what constitutes the 
ecclesia: the City of God on pilgrimage. 
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5. Augustine Between Heaven, the Republic and the Empire 
So far in this chapter we have seen that Augustine sought to save rather than question ancient 
ideals of the city and of citizenship which he thought had never been adequately realised, 
because they were predicated on a false religious base that Platonism had but partially 
rejected.  
We have also seen that this continued exaltation of the ancient city is linked to a mutated 
Platonic vision: citizenship as politics conceived as participation is inherently linked to 
viewing all created existence as participation in the divine wisdom and the realm of the 
intelligences, which is also the heavenly city. It can be suggested that, in the long-term wake 
of Philo, he thereby further merged the two dimensions of participation by rendering the 
Greek metaphysical also Hebraically cosmo-political. Not only is the shared co-rule of 
citizens an expression of their shared participation in the Good: it is also an expression of 
their sharing in the eternal angelic citizenship and ultimately in the substantively personal 
relations of the Trinity 
In effect, this is a hyperbolic extension of Plato’s later politics of the Dyad. For the horizontal 
blending of unity and difference, wisdom and passion, the aristocratic and the plebeian, that 
is involved in citizenship and mixed government, is, as for Plato, a sharing in the horizontal 
dimension of participation amongst the Forms themselves. For Plato this was the 
‘interweaving’ of the One and the Dyad; for Augustine it is the community of the angels in 
their manifold sharing in the divine Trinity. 
But as we saw in the previous chapter, Augustine goes further still by understanding the 
heavenly Jerusalem as a participation in the eternal life of the Trinity, insofar as it is an 
interplay of Being, Intelligence and Will or Love and of Ability, Skill and Application.  
Citizenship as friendship is no longer just a collective assistance towards an individual’s 
vision of the One, and paideia is no longer just a ladder of ascent to be finally kicked away. 
Instead, God himself is conceived as both the acme of mutual love and as the ultimate 
expression of dynamic art. He thereby transcends the contrast of soul and city, as of the One 
and the Dyad. The final equality of both pairs in God amounts to a novel ‘politicisation’ even 
of the ultimate: metaphysics as the theory of divine government.339 This more civic vision of 
 





the theological matches Augustine’s claim that Christianity redeems, or even founds for the 
first time, the genuine city of which antiquity had dreamt.  
How then, can one more precisely situate Augustine with respect to this ancient dream? We 
have seen that he broadly endorses inherited conventional notions of justice as distribution, 
giving each person their due, and of the normativity of mixed government, while also 
implying that Christianity ends the inherent tension between higher and lower in soul and city 
that had engendered in the past the Platonic/Polybian cycles of alternating regimes. From 
now on a cyclical history can give way to a linear and progressive or reforming one.340  
So far from giving up this pagan form of virtue for lost, Augustine proposed its fundamental 
reorientation and the vision of a new kind of Christian polity in terms of a retention of virtue 
as pursuit of glory and yet a transvaluation of virtue (as already described) linked to the 
pursuit of the true eternal glory: ‘The glory, honour and power, therefore, which the Romans 
desired for themselves, and which the good sought to attain by good arts, should not be 
sought after by means of virtue; rather, virtue should be sought by means of them’ (CD 
V:12). The implication is clear and even shocking for commentators who suppose that 
Augustine is breaking with the civic ideal: Christians should actively seek the glory, honour 
and power of the true eternal city not through ‘virtue’ but by the ‘good arts’ that seek to 
participate in the eternal Good. Then alone a genuine virtue will be gained.  
One can interpret this  as a preference for Platonic imitative/participatory ‘art’ versus Stoic 
virtue as inwards retreat from passion and engagement. This is borne out by Augustine 
having earlier in this section quoted Virgil’s Aeneid as saying that the Romans excel in the 
political arts the way in which the Greeks do in the plastic ones, and that these arts are ‘to 
establish ways of peace, to spare the fallen and subdue the proud’ (Aeneid, 6.847ff).  Even 
though Augustine rates virtue above glory earlier in the same passage, in terms of the Pauline 
‘testimony of our own conscience’ (a kind of self-honouring which witnesses to our 
glorification by God alone), this later subordination even of virtue to ‘good arts’ understood 
as the architectonic art of politics (as collective poesis rather than individual praxis) suggests 
that we only acquire a good conscience if we are pursuing, in relation to  others, a combined 
sharing in the divine goodness: in other words, the social venture. And that, as we know from 
 




elsewhere, is only possible for Augustine as the liturgical instigation (by the highest 
collective art) and reception of the divine glory: God’s unearned ‘praising’ of human beings. 
His discussion continues with a comparison of the virtue of Cato to that of Caesar. Seeing in 
Cato a prefiguration of the Christian account of political virtue, he cites Cato on what made 
Romans great: ‘But it was other things than these [feats of arms] that made them great, which 
we do not have: diligence at home, a just rule abroad, and a free spirit in counsel, devoted 
neither to crime nor lust’ (CD V.12). He praises Cato (as quoted by Sallust) yet suggests that 
though this speech aspires to true virtue it does not reflect the reality of Roman history. Even 
in the earliest times Sallust himself recorded that ‘the patricians treated the common people 
as their slaves’ (CD III.17). But Cato’s ideal, if inadequate, is not thereby denied.  
And as we have seen, even the early Roman pursuit of glory which inhibited their ideal of 
virtue (though not so badly as their later outright pursuit of dominium: CD V.12), is taken to 
be a typological anticipation of what was lacking in their pursuit of mere virtue, which 
prevented their virtue being complete. Human glory prefigures the divine manifestation of his 
glory as the bestowal of grace which should elicit from Christians a display of honouring at 
least as great as that with which the ancient Romans glorified their city (CD V).  
If Augustine sustained, alongside a politics of virtue, also a commitment to mixed 
constitution, then he additionally continued to endorse, following Marcus Varro, an ideal 
pagan ‘mixed life’ for the individual citizen, combining tranquil contemplation with turbulent 
political involvement (as exemplified in the life of Cicero). This remains the case, even 
though for Augustine the imperative of balance was entirely overridden by the need to refer 
both theory and practice to the ultimate Good of infinite Trinitarian and heavenly peace (CD 
XIX.3). This will temper in future the dissipation of contemplation into solipsism and of 
political engagement into rivalry that ensues when they are not conjoined in their orientation 
towards the eternal city.  
Traditionally civic, also, is Augustine’s promotion of paideia as both education and reform. 
The shared task of ecclesial and secular polity is to produce better people, who are thereby 
regarded as being ideally citizens, rather than just law-abiding subjects. Along with his 
strikingly explicit excoriation of the notion that law is just about protecting persons and 
property, this strongly suggests that Augustine leans to the Platonic and republican, rather 
than Stoic and cosmopolitan aspect of the Ciceronian legacy. His entire recommendation and 




autobiographical awareness)341 implies not indifference to civic solidarity and justice, but 
rather their extension: there is no longer any inevitable resignation to some people and some 
passions lying outside civic or psychic order and amenable only to control by the military and 
by the psychological force of thumos. This is again why it is wrong to think of Augustine as 
blending monastic idealism with realist compromise: to the contrary, his switch away from 
the Eastern eremitic style involved introducing a measure of social realism into the 
contemplative life, while inversely his pastoral practices of eliciting confession and 
exercising mercy suggested a certain ‘monasticisation’ of the lay and the everyday. 
As Dodaro has suggested, the integrating element here is once more the notion of 
transition.342 Just because the earthly city is one, and we are all only on the way, yet are all in 
various degrees participating in the Good, everyone is subject to increasing initiation into the 
mystery of the divine unification with humanity achieved in the Incarnation and in the 
Church. The fact that this is indeed a mystery, as Dodaro emphasises, conveyed by enigmatic 
symbols, rebukes our pride and requires an intellectual patience which runs parallel to the 
patience of mercy. It slowly introduces us to a higher wisdom that only discloses itself to the 
right emotional mood of charity, or love.  
There is consequently no warrant for reading Augustine in a liberal-realist fashion that 
ignores his essentially integral vision of human historical and social life, pivoted on the hinge 
between law and gospel, in the way that Dodaro has expounded.  
It is nonetheless true that Augustine implicitly relativises law codes and explicitly sees law 
and custom more as a work of human freedom, so that providence works through our 
freedom to establish different norms in different ages and even from hour to hour, as he so 
strikingly declares in the Confessions (III.vii). Human insight into objective justice is now 
indeed seen by him in a more ‘liberal’, free manner that goes along with the new primacy he 
gives to the will, desire and love, without however separating them from intellect, teleology 
and truth.  
It is also true that he recognises that, since we will never agree about everything that matters, 
then the order of the earthly city is constituted by a ‘compromise’ between competing wills 
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(CD XIX.17). This could suggest a recognition of a liberal formal order, free from any 
requirement of human agreement about the notion of the good. It could be read as 
recommending the modern notion that politics is about what to do when we disagree.  
However, it is impossible to understand Augustine as recommending such ‘liberalism’ as 
normative, rather than as something we must often resort to and is indeed better than outright 
conflict. One can arguably see him as endorsing a necessary liberal ‘feature’ of politics, a 
need sometimes to agree to differ, without this being the whole story. And one can agree with 
Markus that this distinguished him from the more totalising intolerant features of later 
medieval Christendom, including the supposed ‘Political Augustinianism’ that informed the 
politics of papal absolutism. 
Yet far more strikingly, Augustine seems to disinter the lurking liberalism not just of late but 
of all antiquity, especially if we bear in mind the esoteric link of the anciently familial with 
the modern individualistic as intimated (favourably) by Fustel. Perhaps most decisive here is 
the way in which Augustine denounced the failure of the ancient city to agree upon a shared 
philosophy, or agreement on the nature of the ‘true life’, in contrast to the agreement of the 
Scriptures (CD XVIII.41). What could be less liberal than this? It strongly suggests that 
Augustine saw such ‘tolerance’ as really resignation to fundamental conflict that risked 
surrender to rule by sophistic power. The political advantage of Christianity was not just that 
it offered a cult of worship of the One God, bypassing demonic mediation, but also that it 
offered a single shared fundamental philosophy at both a popular and elite level, however 
much more specific disputes might continue.  
Nor is it the case that Augustine thought there was any level at which one might be just 
resigned to politics as mere formal compromise. For him this could only be an index of a 
degree of failure to exercise mercy and persuasion, or of everyone to confess their sins and 
their faith in the eternal peace. For in saying that there was no true justice in the pagan city 
because there was a failure to offer God his sacrificial due, Augustine is also saying that the 
city resigned to arbitrary compromise is not a just city and so not a city at all. And we have 
already abundantly seen that Augustine is not recommending, nor is even resigned to, the 
existence of mere ‘multitudes’ bound together by objects of love which are less than the 
ultimate. That would amount to a continuing existence of paganism, since he believed, with 




We have already seen that Augustine appears to endorse a kind of Ciceronian balance 
between Republic and Empire. His ideal of citizenship remained participatory and yet he also 
celebrated a more universal imperial citizenship, bringing non-Roman under the rule of 
Roman law. In Cicero’s case this involved much ambiguity: with some tilting (even in his 
construal of the Republic at times) towards absolute central sovereignty and a concomitant 
emphasis upon law as a contractual bond of the individual with central enforcing authority. 
But we have also seen how the imperial context of itself pointed in a more proto-medieval, 
federal and corporatist direction, involving intermediary political communities and various 
inter-nested layers of citizenship, as Cicero himself sometimes celebrates.  
Clearly Augustine favoured this more federal vision, which does not reduce citizenship as 
shared ruling to the shared submission of individuals to law, which we have seen to be 
always a danger, from Aristotle onwards.  
As regards civic participation, Augustine’s own episcopal political practice stressed the 
interpersonal and the direct rule of person over person as spoken of by Peter Brown: this was 
no egalitarianism, but rather an infusing of hierarchical relationships of Ciceronian justice, 
whether between parents and children, masters and slaves, elites and the people and the 
Roman capital and the provinces, with Christian mutual love and care (CD XIX. 21). He was 
heir of a new kind of Romanness, passed on by his mentor Ambrose, who was removed from 
his immense temporal power amidst Rome’s elites to become a bishop, a member of a new 
kind of elite.  
Like the tribunes of old, Ambrose was appointed by popular acclamation rather than imperial 
appointment. In this manner the bishop displayed a kind of political performativity once 
common to the politicians of the republic, but now alien or drained of significance in an era 
of dominance by a centralised and unreachable Imperial court.343 The bishop, by contrast, 
was constantly accessible, perpetually engaged in pedagogy, which remained the main 
currency of political legitimacy for educated Romans. Significant in this regard was the fact 
that Ambrose re-wrote Cicero’s On Duties as On the Duties of the Clergy.344 And there he 
directly refers to Christianity as a liberative enterprise, as restoring citizenship to captives 
through the ransom of the Eucharist. Ambrose’s own pen bore witness to the link between the 
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newly charismatic and the older inter-personal mode of the republican ethos - and we have 
already seen that the latter was just as cultic, in a pagan idiom.  
Augustine was therefore already primed by his background and context to reconceive of 
Roman citizenship in theological terms and to think of Christian witness in the terms of the 
Roman city.  
As regards the federative, Augustine explicitly advocated an international order of many non-
bloated cities and even empires, somehow united by a higher imperial level of shared law and 
shared citizenship, as currently offered by Rome (CD III.10; IV.15). Several scholars have 
stressed how the ius gentium and international private law was first articulated within this 
imperial space which was to a degree already an international con-federated corporate 
domain.345  
Moreover, the Church in general, through its parochial and diocesan structures, had begun to 
make federation far more real. We saw in Chapter Four how the extension of Roman 
citizenship tended to involve a capture of local cults and an obliteration, at least at an official 
level, of local tribal and civic structures.346 Universality, as we concluded,  was in 
consequence not really cosmopolitan, but more achieved through a near impossible 
submission of everyone, both cultically and politically, to a single city, however much it now 
declared its exercise of imperium to be nominalised as a vast terrain and its civitas to exceed 
the bounds of its urbs within specific termini. To the degree that Roman power was 
inherently religious and local there was a limit to the conversion of the city into an empire. 
But with the advent of Christianity, the shared cult is now something far more transcendent, 
even if still mediated by Rome. It becomes thereby possible to have many co-equal episcopal 
centres and a local ecclesially-driven politics not compromised by their connections to 
defeated local gods and militarily captured local cults.347  
And so to reiterate, Augustine’s mode of inclusive Christian citizenship both avoids the Stoic 
naturalisation of citizen into mere legal subject and the Antonine inclusivity that 
xenophobically excludes the alien, through his merging of the categories of citizen, sojourner 
and associate. His concern not to banish (banishment being always the reverse and 
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constitutive shadow of the pagan city) is shown in his discussion of the figure of the Kakon, a 
lonely monster of pagan mythology. Augustine suggests that this being, even though  
he had no wife with whom to give and receive caresses, no children to play with when 
little or to instruct him when a little bigger; and no friends with whom to enjoy 
converse [yet] in the solitude of his own cave, the floor of which, as Virgil describes 
it, ever reeked with the blood of recent butchery, he wished for nothing other than a 
peace in which no one should molest him…Also he desired to be at peace with his 
own body, and insofar as he had such peace, all was well with him. (CD XIX.12)  
Even Cacus, therefore, manifests that ontological and teleological peace that we witness in all 
animal procreation and nurture. But still more significantly, Augustine goes on to claim that  
had he been willing to make with other men the peace which he was ready enough to 
make in his own cave and with himself, he would not have been called wicked, nor a 
monster, nor a semi-Man. Or if it was the appearance of his body and his vomiting of 
smoke and flames that frightened away human companions, perhaps it was not the 
desire to do harm that made him so ferocious, but the necessity of preserving his own 
life. (CD XIX.12)  
The pagan fear of the sub-human monster is here revealed as but a cruel phantom: Cacus’s 
monstrosity is invented to justify his exclusion from a universal political life, the world of the 
social; he is made monstrous by his very exclusion, and in relation to himself is gentle.  
The subtle point is that, on the one hand, isolation is a fantasy projected by the excluders: 
even the lone individual is an internal complex of related elements, a society seeking peace. 
On the other hand, this banishment of a fantasised individual from society reveals such a 
closed society to be itself too boundedly atomistic at a larger level: imperfectly social after 
all. It follows that only a society that remains open to a wider and wilder relating remains of 
itself a perfect foregrounding of the relational. The closed community is not, after all, really a 
community, and the citizen only within bounds is not fully a citizen. 348  
In this way Augustine singularly articulated the trope of the misunderstood monster. The 
Romans, already, as we have seen more than the Greeks, upheld the ideals of domestic life as 
a pattern for political life: this is most visible in Virgil’s Georgics, in which cosmic harmony, 
domestic harmony and the political peace brought by Augustus are closely interwoven. 
 




However, they contrasted this ‘social’ life with a monstrous, excluded and self-absorbed 
exterior, and did so ever-increasingly in the post-Augustan era of the Principiate. It is this that 
Augustine’s new ‘pan-social’ vision of citizenship brings into question.  
In this manner, both the post-Constantinian reality and Augustine’s own ideas pointed 
towards what Garth Fowden has called ‘commonwealth empire’ as exemplified most by 
Byzantium, but to a degree by the Carolingian empire in the West and its successors.349 Such 
a mode of empire mixed central authority with much regional subsidiarity, just as it blended 
at the centre monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements. The empire became more 
emphatically a republic thanks to the Christian irruption. 
Within such a perspective, as anticipated by Augustine, citizenship has begun to be 
universalised as the bringing of everyone under an ultimate universal law, without always 
losing its key defining characteristic as a sharing in self-rule which necessarily requires a 
certain local delimitation or bordering. In this way Christianity offered a universally shared 
practice of political sharing that was neither collectively vacuous nor achieved at the price of 
necessary enmity between Rome and what lay in various degrees beyond Rome. Instead, the 
Christian city on the move through time and space was inherently expansive beyond those 
borders in terms of its aspirations to a universal care and peaceability. Certainly, it involved a 
specific cultic and so cultural identity around its specific mysteries, yet these were 
sufficiently mobile and deterritorialised as to be compatible with many different cultural 
incarnations and linkages. As Augustine had put it: 
for as long as this Heavenly City is a pilgrim on earth, she summons citizens of all 
nations and every tongue, and brings together a society of pilgrims in which no 
attention is paid to any differences in the customs, laws and institutions by which 
earthly peace is achieved or maintained. She does not rescind or destroy these things, 
however. For whatever differences there are among the various nations, these all tend 
towards the same end of earthly peace. Thus she preserves and follows them, 
provided only that they do not impede the true religion by which we are taught that 
the one supreme and true God is to be worshipped. (CD XIX. 17) 
Vital to this spatial mobility was the primacy of time as emphasised by Augustine: 
boundaries can be crossed and territories linked because humans are all of one kind, as 
 
349 Fowden. From Empire to Commonwealth; Anthony Kaldellis, The Byzantine Republic: People and Power in 




Middle English put it: their political ordering is not primarily by a spatial centre, but by 
familial descent through marriage and a communicated sacramental ordering of merciful 




6. Conclusion: Augustinian Anticipations  
In all these ways then, Augustine did not abandon, but extended and rendered fully coherent 
the ancient idea of citizenship.  He did so by insisting on the link of horizontal with vertical 
participation and radicalising the Platonic vision of the eternal ultimacy of the horizontal, 
reconceiving this as itself supreme citizenship. In these terms, at once Trinitarian, 
Christological and sacramental, he was able at last to combine republican citizenship with a 
notion of empire universal enough to be all-inclusive, and yet specific enough to retain the 
core of the citizen ideal. However much the Middle Ages indeed lost his chastening sense 
that something in the earthly city remains outside the Christian purview, its integral approach 
to earthly government and eternal salvation remained in an essentially Augustinian 
trajectory.350   
For the distinctive nature of vassalage in the Middle Ages was not the idea of tribute and 
manorial protectionism, nor even the unique technological and political circumstances that 
gave rise to the dominance of armoured cavalry and small fortifications across medieval 
Europe. Rather, Christians had already transformed master/slave and patronage relationships 
in the context of the Roman Empire into something more like feudal relationships.351 Roman 
ideas of universal citizenship and civic trust were already being religiously modified into 
something like feudal oaths; political and military allegiance was already being reimagined in 
far more directly interpersonal terms of allegiance and gift-exchange than outright contract.  
Even the Empire, already far from monolithic, was being rethought of as a commonwealth of 
peoples which will develop into the idea of Christendom.352  
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Well before the fragmentation of the empire had fully taken hold, Augustine was advocating 
an idea of politics that is more like diplomacy, which is at once above the level of 
territorially-contained political life, and yet also engaged with the intimacies of the domestic 
realm. Likewise, a new kind of elite was forged in this period, as Peter Brown observes, 
united over vast distances by bonds of family and faith, and a shared pedagogic and moral 
life: an elite of natality and re-natality, of kinship both corporeal and psychic.353  
This elite fulfilled in a new way Plato’s ambitions for a kind of universal philosophical 
society, and it formed the pattern for elite life that would survive the fall of the Roman 
Empire and go on to form the basis of medieval aristocratic and ecclesiastical culture. The 
economic relations between peasants and lords had its anticipations in the military colonies of 
pagan Rome. 
However, it was the reimagining of the master-servant relationship as we see exemplified in 
Augustine, as a social relationship, a mutual alliance based on caritas with voluntary service 
given to a servant leader, which would come to form the highest ideals of the medieval social 
order and make possible new forms of economic relation. 
For Augustine, as a Christian, reversed the Aristotelian view that there are natural slaves: ‘He 
did not intend that His rational creature, made in His own image, should have lordship 
(dominium) over any but irrational creatures - not man over man, but man over the beasts. 
Hence the first just men were established as shepherds of flocks rather than as kings of men’ 
(CD XIX. 15). It follows that Augustine was as logical as Marx in seeing that the 
condemnation of slavery implies the equal condemnation of all that approximates to slavery. 
Any mode of hierarchy that is forcibly coercive and therefore unnatural (beyond the for him 
natural rule of men over women, parents over children and the wiser over the less wise) is the 
product of sin for Augustine, and this is likewise the root of all violence which might bring 
other humans under our domination, whether military or judicial. 
Here again we can see evidence of Augustine’s non-liberalism. He does not make the 
distinctions that a typical liberal commentator would make between an abstract liberty and 
the formal and contracted power-relations that the individual navigates. There is instead 
 




something almost proto-socialist in his refusal to make any absolute distinction between 
slavery and other modes of coerced and enforced domination.354  
However, unlike modern revolutionary thinkers, Augustine did not think that we are capable 
of avoiding or defeating sin by our own power. Therefore, he argued that the slave, like all 
who suffer or are excluded from the narrow realm of pagan political life, have their true 
belonging and status determined by a valuative structure entirely free of mortal power 
relations: ‘if they cannot be freed by their masters, they can at least make their own slavery to 
some extent free. They can do this by serving not with cunning fear, but in faithful love, until 
all unrighteousness shall cease, and all unrighteousness be put down, that God may be all in 
all’ (CD XIX.15). This goes beyond the retreat to interior life of Stoicism, as it entails a 
belonging to a cosmic political order, in part realised through the Church’s merciful 
operations in time, which in turn transforms the slave’s actual circumstances.  
Not only do hope and faith root his ultimate moral status in a realm outside of the control of 
his temporal master; his relations to his master are themselves cured of domination by the 
action of the slave himself through his exercise of caritas. By acting with love in the face of 
coercive power and servitude, the slave is not passively cooperating in his subjugation, but 
actively subverting its nature. Through exhibiting a loyalty to his master rather than serving 
him out of fear, the slave draws him into the realm of friendship, a realm normally reserved 
for fellow citizens. Likewise, masters must in turn seek in every way to draw their servants 
into a sphere of charity outside of coercion.  
Far from depoliticising the power relationship in favour of quietism, Augustine, in his own 
mode of ‘master-slave dialectic’, therefore rendered the ultimately private, domestic 
relationship of slavery also political. Unlimited social friendship here sunders the boundary 
between total domestic belonging (including ‘belonging to’) and circumscribed and 
conditional political equality.  
Thus, he declared in Sermon 272: ‘Be what you see, receive what you are…Individual grapes 
hang together in a bunch, but the juice from them all is mingled to become a single brew. 
This is the image chosen by Christ our Lord to show how, at his own table, the mystery of 
our unity and peace is solemnly consecrated’.355 The Ciceronian notion of the vinculum 
 
354 Eugene McCarraher, ‘The Enchanted City of Man: The State and Market in Augustinian Perspective,’ in 
Augustine and Politics, ed. John Doody et al (Lantham MD: Lexington, 2005), 261-95.  





societas humanae is both sustained and surpassed in Augustine’s idea of the vinculum pacis, 







We are now in a position to answer the twelve questions that were posed in the introduction.  
1. Citizenship in ancient Athens was not primarily a matter of office-holding, but of 
birth, of shared cultural style and participation in religious practices. As such, it 
extended equally to both men and women and included children. Aristotle is 
misleading both as to the facts regarding citizenship of his own time and the story of 
the origins of the city of Athens. It was not born solely and primarily out of need and 
for pragmatic purposes of combined strength. To the contrary, it developed from the 
convergence of various kinship groupings that linked descent, land and cultus. Nor 
was monarchic and aristocratic power more sacral in character than popular power: to 
the contrary, from the outset the more dispersed and more rural cults of heroes were 
linked with a popular following. The integration of the city beyond kinship norms was 
as much sacral as it was democratic, and the two processes were linked. 
 
2. There is undoubted truth in the view that participatory citizen self-government is more 
possible in a small community between people who are familiar with each other and 
can often be friends. However, the smallness of the ancient city has been exaggerated: 
their geographical boundaries could be extensive and citizen-structures could extend 
to colonial, trading and diplomatic outreaches. Moreover, city self-government did 
not just end in the Hellenistic age as was once thought; it proved compatible with 
many-tiered levels of allegiance and inter-civic combination.356 In the case of Rome, a 
single Italian city not only offered a ‘proto-modern’ mode of citizenship throughout 
Europe and beyond, but to a degree (though one should not exaggerate) involved 
 





citizens in participatory structures at local and cross-border levels. Citizen-
government can survive in larger structures if elements of corporate subsidiarity are 
introduced.  
 
But one can go further: if you cannot have full political community with the stranger 
in your midst, or with slaves, or with foreigners, then the range of the ‘political’ 
regarded as the participatory, is in itself inhibited.357 This is why the Platonic and 
Stoic quest for a universal, cosmic citizenship (combined by Cicero) need not 
necessarily mean just a kind of internationalism of individual rights. It can 
alternatively mean the extension of the citizenship principle as extending the range of 
political participation and so its very centrality to human life. For this reason, we need 
at least to revisit the notion that the Middle Ages was merely an interlude between 
ancient citizenship of participation in the city and the modern citizenship of actually 
total ‘subjection’, albeit with provided rights and protections under the absolutely 
sovereign state.358 
 
3. Citizen self-government, although ‘reciprocal’ as Aristotle defined it, was not 
democratic in any sense we would readily recognise. Although the free, non-enslaved 
people certainly included the working classes and they could be involved in 
government, even so, aristocratic landowners played a more predominant political 
role and the rule of merit was often seen as an equal principle to the rule of the many. 
Merit tended to be regarded, as Aristotle bears witness, as enabled by a reasonable 
degree of wealth and leisure permitting the exercise of generosity. And while the polis 
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was not constituted by subjective rights in our modern sense, nevertheless the scope 
of mass decisions was significantly inhibited by laws protecting different class 
interests, their balance and harmony.  
 
4. Democracy was itself largely subordinate to religious cult and participation and the 
voice of the gods counted for even more than the voice of the people. There was 
therefore nothing remotely like our association of popular rule with secularity. Divine 
powers were regarded as real and demonstrable by divinatory evidence, and they were 
wholly linked to and bound up with the fortunes of the city. Kings might claim to 
mediate the numinous, but the populace could counter-claim a more direct access.  
 
5. If the polis was inherently suffused with religion, then it also involved some collective 
submission to shared value and notions of virtue. However, the latter were 
primordially to do with heroism, both individual and collective and were committed 
to the primacy of success and survival. Crises ensued, both for Athens and Rome, 
when it was realised that this gave huge licence to self-vaunting and self-seeking 
individuals, who usurped the glory of the city in the sake of their own prestige, and 
thereby destroyed any sense of shared solidarity. Socrates and Plato witnessed against 
this in Athens and later Virgil, Cicero, Seneca, Sallust and Cato in Rome. They 
accordingly suggested, not only that there was a higher and eternal virtue than that of 
the City, the Good as such and Justice as such, but also that citizen self-rule based on 
mutual participation was not truly possible unless a real participation in this Good was 
recognised.  
 
6. By this parallel, we can see that we should not exaggerate the differences between 




less direct democracy exercised by a small group at the centre. There were far more 
levels of mediation. And yet such mediation can be taken as sometimes not diluting 
but extending participation to different spheres and levels of life - involving especially 
more women, more families, more kinship groups and more trades and craftspeople. 
Besides, the even more intensely religious character of Rome could strongly lend 
itself to the importance of linking civic to universal virtue, and civic to natural law, 
whether conceived cosmically or in terms of transcendence. Nor did either monarchy 
(or Caesarism), nor empire necessarily dilute republican rule as much as might be 
thought. For reasons already seen, empire might genuinely extend the bounds of this 
rule, while monarchy could provide a way of balancing aristocratic liberties with 
popular needs for more participation, security and protection.  
 
7. Although this lies essentially outside the scope of this thesis, these conclusions with 
regard to Rome support the idea that we should not so readily assume that medieval 
‘feudal’ relations’ which began already under the Roman sway were entirely inimical 
to citizenship. One could argue counterwise that the Middle Ages, in the cities, towns 
and countryside, exacerbated the ‘social’ and socially diversified side of ‘civil 
society’ which was originally not something outside the political order, but a direct 
translation of Aristotle’s phrase koinonia politike, a partnership in governing, or in 
other words, citizenship (Politics 1252a1-6).359 Thereby, participation was 
alternatively enhanced, albeit alongside many elements of sheer subjugation.  
 
8. The contrast between a this-worldly pagan religion and an other-worldly Christian 
one has been overdone. The ancient cities stood under the sway of the gods and heroic 
performances were eternally rewarded. Christianity, in the wake of Platonism, 
 




transvalued heroic values, but it did not thereby render communal life a matter of 
indifference. Both individual lives and shared political lives were of relative 
unimportance compared with eternal life, but human fate in that respect was to be 
judged by its entire performance, which included public actions as much as private 
thoughts. Moreover, the very means of salvation and of spiritual reform was 
membership within a new polity, the Church, which, while it mainly existed in 
heaven, possessed on earth a real system of government, territorial possession and 
organisation, and a real legal system.  
 
9. Against all that foregoing historical background, we should reconsider the theoretical 
legacies of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Augustine with respect to the city and 
citizenship. Since the nineteenth century, Aristotle has too often been regarded as both 
historically and philosophically normative for the understanding of the latter. This is 
questionable historically, because he had relatively little influence on Roman political 
thought and law, which continued massively to shape medieval thought and practice 
and still more, in a different way, early modern and eighteenth century thought and 
practice. Aristotle, of course, mattered a great deal after the thirteenth century, but his 
political ideas continued to be blended with Ciceronian ones and others of an 
ultimately Platonic provenance.  
Theoretically, it turns out that Aristotle’s thought about citizenship was thoroughly 
aporetic. He failed to align citizenship based upon birth with that based upon sharing 
in government and that based upon virtue. The more he stressed citizenship as active 
role in governing, the more it seemed that citizens by birth, including women and 
children, were excluded, along with the working classes. The more he emphasised 
that virtue could only be exercised actively, the less clear it became that a ruled 




definition of citizenship as a possibility of a rational share in ruling appears to lapse. 
Ultimately, the really virtuous do not seem after all to need to share reciprocal ruling 
with their fellow citizens. So, either some sort of benign tyranny ensues and 
citizenship is abolished, or the truly noble exit from the civic scene, alternatively by 
the expulsion of ostracism, or in order to seek the retired and contemplative life.  
 
10. Plato did not reject citizenship for philosophy, but in the Laws shows how the two are 
integrated through the operation of religion, custom and ritual. Although he did not 
explicitly theorise citizenship, in effect the Laws involves an account of citizenship 
that successfully fuses birth, the sharing in offices and the practice of virtue in a 
manner that Aristotle failed to do. This is above all because he did not abstract from 
the religious horizon which was the real context of Athenian citizenship. One can 
therefore argue that Plato was the more successful theorist of mixed government and 
gave a more secure place to the democratic component. 
The religious horizon included respect for sacred origins and the collective 
motherhood of Athens, besides an appeal to the mediation of divine laws in civic 
customs. Plato’s ethical reforming of the conception of the gods and of these customs 
appeared to take an autocratic form in the Republic, which sought to impose a 
uniformity at the elite controlling centre, in imitation of the divine unity. But the later 
Plato insists metaphysically, and against Parmenides, that there can be no pure 
monism, and that ultimate reality includes also ‘dyadic’ difference and alterity which 
must be blended with the One.  Accordingly, the more complete and more viable city 
blends in unity the young with the old, men with women, the more animal with the 





This is possible because of the power of the higher eros and the elevation of our 
passions, which is allowed more by Plato than by Aristotle, who tends to think more 
in terms of a rational and ‘prudential’ control of the emotions, as of the lower by the 
higher classes. There is both more psychological and more social fluidity allowed by 
Plato, compared with Aristotle’s more static system of classification and more 
spatialising bent. Plato instead sees politics as a temporal process, albeit also cyclical, 
imitating the eternal through motion, as in the rituals of the dance.  
 
11. There is, indeed, a side to Cicero that accentuates the emerging divide between the 
public and private already present in Aristotle. Under one important aspect of Stoic 
influence, Cicero sometime shifted towards a more individualistic understanding of 
citizenship as the possession of private rights and of the city as most fundamentally 
the guarantor of private property and legal contracts, besides its own power and 
security.  
Yet at the same time, Cicero was drawn in a more Platonic direction which stressed 
duty over right, besides relational solidarity and the objectivity of Good and justice. 
This was fused with a different aspect of Stoicism which stressed the diversity of 
corporate bodies held together by bonds of sympathy. In the long term, this 
encouraged the view of human participatory solidarity as extending outwards from the 
local to the universal like the ripples of a lake disturbed by a pebble, in contrast to the 
unmediated and directly interior link between the self-controlled individual and the 
entire cosmopolis.360 But Cicero was not sufficiently self- guarded against the latter 
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vision to the extent that he but ambiguously affirmed the reality of the Platonic 
Forms.  
Nevertheless, through the more Platonic side of Cicero it is possible to see an affinity 
between the Roman extension of citizenship to empire, plus the Roman role for an 
integrating monarchy and the universal and international ethical ambitions of 
Platonism, plus its concern for the role of the philosophic ruler within a mixed 
constitution.  
12. Instead of seeing Augustine as augmenting Cicero’s proto-liberalism, we should 
see him as utterly rejecting it and as instead augmenting his ‘Roman Platonic aspect’.  
Augustine now fully insists that civic participation depends upon our sharing in the 
not just the Forms as the divine ideas, but in the divine Trinity itself which combines 
unity with expressive alterity, and in the realm of the angelic intelligences who now 
themselves compose a city. Thereby, Augustine, in the steps of St Paul, renders the 
city and citizenship eternally ultimate. This is no mere metaphor, since through the 
Church we can already share in this angelic civic life here on earth. Nor is there for 
Augustine any independent political realm in our ‘secular’ sense, as opposed to his, 
which denotes a temporal order. Just as the law of the Old Testament is still valid but 
subordinate to the law of the gospel, so also Roman secular legal order is still valid 
but can only be considered just if it points towards and enables the care and mercy 
exercised by bishops and their subordinates at the parish level, all of which is now 
fully part of the integral Roman imperium.  
The gods may have been banished from the earthly city, but the angels have taken 
their places. In consequence, a free citizenship of heaven is extended even to slaves, 




is now more fully also an oikos. A confederal and corporate order does not displace, 
but greatly extends the sway of a reciprocally exercised and co-involved mutual rule, 
under the directly present and not demonically diluted rule of the God of mutual love. 
Ancient political participation has been salvaged and extended, not abandoned, 
because Platonic metaphysical participation has been intensified and freed from its 
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